

HARVARD STUDIES
IN
CLASSICAL PHILOLOGY

*EDITED BY A COMMITTEE OF THE CLASSICAL
INSTRUCTORS OF HARVARD UNIVERSITY*

VOLUME XXVII



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PREFATORY NOTE

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CHARLES BURTON GULICK,
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COMMITTEE.

CONTENTS

	PAGE
THE DOCTRINE OF LITERARY FORMS	I
By Roy Kenneth Hack.	
THE HISTORICAL SOCRATES IN THE LIGHT OF PROFESSOR BURNET'S HYPOTHESIS	67
By Charles Pomeroy Parker.	
THE CHORUS OF EURIPIDES	77
By Aristides Evangelus Phoutrides.	
SUMMARIES OF DISSERTATIONS FOR THE DEGREE OF PH.D., 1915-16	171
INDEXES	173

THE DOCTRINE OF LITERARY FORMS

By R. K. HACK

Had ancient times conspired to disallow
What then was new, what had been ancient now ?
Or what remained, so worthy to be read
By learned Critics, of the mighty Dead ?

— Pope, *Ep.* 1, 135–138.¹

ONE problem we have always with us. In some blessed fields of research, the investigator may reach results more or less definite, if not definitive; but in the sphere of poetry, of the relation between form and matter in poetic art, wrangling has never ceased, in spite of the great men and great reputations which have been involved in the quarrel. Nor is it likely that the final solution can be attained, for creation and dissension go hand in hand. The poet and the critic are always at war, even when the two activities are combined in the same person; Horace the poet disagrees rather violently with Horace the critic.

All this we may readily admit; yet the historian of literature must not for such reasons abandon the effort to understand the conditions under which poetry has been written, but ought rather to be all the more keen in his effort to discover what effect has actually been exerted on the production of poetry by the contemporary theories of poetry; to judge how far the critical doctrines (for example) to which Horace subscribed really affected his own output of verse and the subsequent course of later poets. It is my belief that the influence of the theory of poetry upon composition has been greatly overestimated; furthermore, that the undue importance assigned to such influence has been largely the result of a single critical doctrine which has been current since antiquity, the doctrine of literary forms.

¹ Pope's translation of Horace, *Ep.* 2, 1, 90–92:

Quodsi tam Graecis novitas invisa fuisset
quam nobis, quid nunc esset vetus aut quid haberet
quod legeret tereretque viritim publicus usus ?

Hence the subject which I wish to investigate in this paper is the doctrine of forms in its application to criticism: first, to sketch the history of the criticism of the *Ars Poetica* of Horace, then to show that there is a basic error in the critical method which has commonly been followed, and lastly to trace that error to its source and to indicate the necessity of a change in critical procedure. For some decades there has been a growing tendency to confine the historian of Latin literature to the pursuit and description of the various genres of literature; there has been a feeling that the whole duty of the modern critic is to classify and to trace the evolution of the $\epsilon\delta\eta$ throughout their life, from their origin through their development, until the $\epsilon\delta\sigma$ decays or is transformed. This conception of literary history has been strikingly expressed by Eduard Norden as follows: "auf Grund dieser Verhältnisse definieren wir die römische Literaturgeschichte als die Geschichte von der Aus- und Umbildung der aus der griechischen Literatur herübergangenen $\gamma\epsilon\nu\eta$."¹ This definition and the theory on which it is based have won wide acceptance; many monographs and books have been published in which its truth has been taken for granted; and yet it is, I believe, a false conception, based on unsound theory.

It is assumed by those who consent to this definition that the history of Latin literature can be adequately represented by criticism in which primary stress is laid upon form; so that the spiritual and personal qualities of poetry become of secondary importance and are consciously or unconsciously relegated to the background.² The natural and inevitable result of this special emphasis upon form is that the critic comes to assume that poets, and particularly Roman poets, rarely contaminate an established genre by the introduction of new and un consecrated matter; and in like manner, that the content of a given poem or series of poems is in most cases predetermined by their form.

But another and even more disastrous consequence of this theory is visible in the discussion of originality and imitation, in the vain effort to discover the exact source of every phrase, the exact precedent for every technical procedure which the individual writer happens to em-

¹ *Einleitung in die Altertumswissenschaft*, i, p. 324.

² By form, I mean here all those qualities or 'accidents' of a poem which are imitable: such as the meter, choice of subject, or the happy ending; for these are exterior and mechanical qualities.

ploy. This analysis of source is, we are told, "the highest postulate; only after the borrowed element has been separated from the personal element does it become possible to make a just estimate of the special and personal element."¹ The "postulate" is indeed plausible; but its plausibility is due to a cunning mixture of truth and falsehood. It is certainly true that if we know what has been read or heard by an artist, say Catullus, we are then aware of the literary influences to which he has been subjected and we are justified in making an estimate of the degree of influence exerted by these several sources; but in the actual artistic product of Catullus we are confronted by an entity, and not by an indefinitely divisible assemblage of results. It would therefore be as absurd to put out an edition of Catullus in which all 'allusions' should be printed in red to show how much or how little is original, as it would be to print an edition of *Paradise Lost* in which all the echoes of classical poetry should be distinguished by a similar rubric. It is very important to know the limits of our knowledge. After one has grasped the full meaning of Norden's "höchstes Postulat," one cannot be amazed at the deduction he drew from it; i. e., "that it is extremely difficult to form an estimate of the personality of either Lucretius or Catullus, because we are not acquainted with any corresponding Greek poets or poetry which will afford a basis of comparison"!² I have chosen this citation because it sheds such light on the critical dogma upon which it is founded. By parallel reasoning from these premises, one could easily show that a modern historian would be unable to attempt an estimate of the character of Napoleon, if the records of the lives of Alexander and of Julius Caesar had unfortunately disappeared in 1700.

It remains then for me to state my own critical position with regard to the evolution of genres. I believe that the doctrine of the evolution of genres is unsound, both practically as a critical method and theoretically as a philosophical interpretation of literary truth. The essence of the doctrine of genres has not been affected by its modification under the influence of modern evolutionary thought: the real existence of the genres is presupposed by the very name of the doctrine. For this reason I shall not undertake to trace its recent history, interesting a subject as that is. These recent changes are largely due to the work of such men

¹ *Einleitung in die Altertumswissenschaft*, i, p. 445.

² *Op. cit.*, i, p. 458.

as Taine and Brunetière,¹ who were profoundly stirred by the example of natural science, of men like Darwin and Herbert Spencer. Both good and evil have come from the doctrine of genres, and it is only because the time has now arrived for us to amend and to transcend this doctrine that I have undertaken to criticize it. The duty of the historian of literature is to record the achievements of men in that region of human activity which is called literature. It is the function of erudition to supply correct material for such a record, to furnish the "connaissances exactes, positives, nécessaires pour asseoir et guider nos jugements."² Any critical method which tends to make us regard literature as a matter of externalized form is highly dangerous. The analogy between a species of animal and a species of literature is false: biological methods when applied to literature are unscientific, that is to say they are out of place. One epic cannot in any true sense be said to beget another epic. The *Aeneid* is not by the *Annales* out of the *Argonautica* out of the *Odyssey* out of the *Iliad*.

What excuse then have critics, some of undoubted genius, had for seeking to apply such a dogma to the history of Latin literature? The answer is found in the notorious dependence of Latin letters on Greek, so often announced by the Romans themselves; in the strong tendency of the Roman race to reduce everything to rule and to legislate not merely for the material but for the spiritual world; and in a great philosophy which we shall later have to discuss. It is a piece of Roman legislation that I wish now to examine, a law to whose influence the term has not yet been fixed.

The *Ars Poetica* of Horace has been in direct relation to critical theory for a longer time than even the *Poetics* of Aristotle.³ It has accumulated a vast bulk of commentary, nearly comparable to that which centers about Homer; it has occasioned among its commentators an acrimony of dispute and a sustained ability to differ which might easily dishearten those who hope for an objective science of

¹ Cf. F. Brunetière, *L'Évolution des genres dans l'histoire de la littérature*, p. 18: "Nous pourrions dire qu'à la critique fondée sur les analogies qu'elle présente avec l'histoire naturelle de Geoffrey Saint-Hilaire et de Cuvier, nous nous proposons de voir si l'on ne pourrait pas substituer, ou ajouter pour la compléter, une critique à son tour qui se fonderait sur l'histoire naturelle de Darwin et de Haeckel."

² Cf. G. Lanson, *Histoire de la littérature française*, p. vii.

³ Cf. Spingarn, *History of Literary Criticism in the Renaissance*, p. 11.

criticism. I believe, however, that some shape of truth will emerge from a summary of previous criticism, and I shall attempt to show that quarrels have arisen from a fundamental error, from the tendency of critics to elevate into an explanation of the whole *Ars Poetica* that particular aspect of the poem by which each has been most impressed.

It is worth noticing that in ancient times no question was raised concerning its status as an *ars* or as a letter. Quintilian repeatedly referred to it as the *Ars Poetica*.¹ It seems reasonable to conclude that the controversy did not then exist, and that the poem was accepted simply and uncritically as a part of Horace's work which was suitable to be read in school; it was didactic material dealing with poetry, and there is no sign that Quintilian was aware, when he employed the term *Ars Poetica*, of all the implications which would later be read into that title. The only other ancient writer who tells us anything of value is Porphyrio, who says that Horace "*concessit praecepta Neoptolemi τοῦ Παπιανοῦ de arte poetica, non quidem omnia, sed eminentissima.*" Upon this slight foundation Nettleship built his interesting but unsound attempt to discriminate between Aristotelian and post-Aristotelian portions of the *Ars Poetica*.²

The modern history of the *Ars Poetica* begins of course in the Renaissance, when men ceased to accept and began to criticize, when the effort was made to "re-establish the aesthetic foundations of literature."³ Hence came the flood of treatises on poetry, and Horace ran Aristotle hard for the place of highest authority. It was necessary to justify poetry against mediaeval scorn and hatred; to this end critics had constant recourse to the arguments of Horace.⁴ Thus the *Ars Poetica* became the textbook of a propaganda; and Minturno admonished his readers "*che gli ammaestramenti del dottissimo Orazio recarci a memoria dobbiamo.*"⁵ But it soon became obvious that the poem

¹ *Ep. ad Tryph.*, 2; *Inst.* viii, 3, 60.

² It is unsound, because the words of Porphyrio do not entitle us to conclude that there was anything more than a general resemblance between the doctrine of Neoptolemus and of Horace. The relation of Aristotle to his followers will be discussed later.

³ Spingarn, *op. cit.*, p. 3.

⁴ Spingarn, *op. cit.*, p. 11: "The more strict defence of poetry was attempted for the most part on the grounds set forth by Horace in his *Ars Poetica*."

⁵ *Arte Poetica*, p. 95.

lacked some of the qualities which a textbook ought to possess: its apparent desultoriness was sure to provoke enemies, so that we find J. C. Scaliger saying "*De Arte quaeris quid sentiam? — Quid? Equidem de Arte sine arte tradita.*"¹ This is significant of the vital change that had occurred since antiquity in men's attitude toward the *Ars*; and the course of subsequent criticism is prefigured by these two types, the one who believes that the poem is a perfect *ars*, the other who believes that Horace indeed intended to write a perfect *ars*, but failed disastrously.

The first opinion not only had numerous supporters during the Renaissance,² but was still defended in the eighteenth century, and has recently been revived in full vigor. The phraseology of Regelsberger (1797) is typical: "*L'art poétique d'Horace, dans un ordre nouvellement découvert, formant le poème didactique le plus accompli de l'antiquité, chef-d'œuvre de poésie et de brièveté.*"³ N. A. Heiden (1815) was obviously unwilling to be outdone by his predecessors in the task of heaping up laudation. "Man findet darinnen alles," says he, "was die Stoiker und Akademiker der Griechen herüber schönes gesagt haben . . . Die reine Vernunft ist seine einzige Führerin . . . Ein wahres Meisterstück . . . Klarheit, Simplicität, Mannigfaltigkeit, Präcision und Gründlichkeit herrschen darinnen vom Anfang bis zum Ende."⁴ Within the last few years, however, few have ventured to follow this lead until Norden published an important article reaffirming the old view with some modern variations.⁵ I shall take up Norden's arguments later.

The second class of critics started always with the same pre-supposition: i. e., that it was the intention of Horace to write a perfect didactic poem; but like Scaliger they found it to be an excessively artless art, and they resorted to various devices to explain away the difficulty. D. Heinsius (1605) was the first to transpose passages which he thought

¹ Scaliger, *Poet.*, vi, 7.

² Cf. H. B. Charlton, *Castelvetro's Theory of Poetry*, p. 12: "The predominant influence in Vida is that of Horace; with him, Horace becomes the dictator of the early Renaissance critics, such as Dolce and Daniello."

³ Cf. F. Schoell, *Hist. de la litt. rom.*, p. 395, who justly calls the work of Regelsberger a "morceau curieux de dialectique."

⁴ *Anleitung zur Kenntniss der Dichtkunst des alten Roms*, pp. 260 ff.

⁵ Cf. Cruttwell, *History of Roman Literature*, p. 295.

were not in logical sequence; Bentley and Peerlkamp quite naturally adopted a method so congenial to their conjectural bent; and they have been followed by Ottema and Ribbeck. Ribbeck is (and one hopes will remain) the last example of this type. Among other transpositions, he puts ll. 24–30 after 1; 37, 408–418 plus 295–308 after 72; 86–98 after 322, and so on indefinitely. After making this collection of *disiecta membra*, he passes the following judgment upon his work: it is “wie ich hoffe, eine wohldurchdachte, abgerundete Reihe zusammenhängender Sätze und Gedanken mit feinen, sicheren Übergängen.”¹ What Horace wrote was difficult to understand; therefore Ribbeck concluded that Horace had not written it, and proceeded to substitute a new *Ars Poetica* of Ribbeck for the original poem. The substitute, being the product of Ribbeck’s own intellect, was comprehensible to Ribbeck; and his praise of it was mere self-laudation. Dacier and P. Hardouin deserve mention under this head: Dacier fancied that Horace had composed the *Ars Poetica* bit by bit at various times, but had died before he could review the fragments and cement them together; Hardouin solved the problem in the fashion characteristic of him by courageously denying that Horace was the author.² It is plain that all these hypotheses tend toward the demolition and not toward the interpretation of the poem; Hardouin was more logical, rather than more stupid, than others of the same school.

One obvious way out of the dilemma was to refuse to recognize the poem as an *ars*, and to explain its lack of complete logical structure by attributing to it some particular and private purpose. Robortelli, one of the early editors of Aristotle’s *Poetics*, was perhaps the first of this class of critics; the list is long, and includes most of the modern editors of Horace—Baxter, R. Hurd, Sanadon, Engel, Wieland, Colmans, Ast, F. A. Wolf, J. Dunlop, Bernhardy, Welcker, Lehrs, O. Weissenfels, Vahlen, Orelli, Kiessling, Page, Palmer, Wilkins, Wickham.³ Baxter supposed that the *Ars Poetica* was a satire directed against the Roman theatre; Engel, that Horace satirizes both poets and contemporary critics. Wieland (1782) developed and modified this hypothesis; and

¹ Otto Ribbeck, *Episteln und Buch von der Dichtkunst*, p. 252.

² Cf. Lamarre, *Hist. de la litt. lat.*, ii, p. 371.

³ For a fuller bibliography see Teuffel-Schwabe, and the article by Stemplinger in Pauly-Wissowa, s. v. *Horatius*.

was the first to emit a guess which Colmans (1783) and Dunlop (1827) eagerly adopted: i. e., that Horace wrote the *Ars Poetica* in answer to a request of the father of the Pisones, who, like the mother of Agricola, was afraid that his son would devote himself too ardently to an un-Roman pursuit, in this case the composition of dramas. Hence Horace wrote the *Ars Poetica* in order to discourage a young man from writing poetry! Wieland's theory has met acceptance in some degree with many subsequent critics, as e. g., Orelli and Patin; but aside from his theory it is true that all the critics of this class discover some satirical and polemic intention in the poem.¹

Naturally the traditional title has not found favor in their eyes, because it seems to them to imply a complete didactic treatment of the subject: they have therefore insisted that the poem is an *epistula*, and is to be judged by the "laws" of that genre. A letter (they say), following the laws of conversation, may and should be loose in structure; and from this point of view the best explanation of the poem has been given by O. Weissenfels.² Weissenfels says that the critic must have always before his eyes "die Eigentümlichkeit der Literaturgattung" to which this letter belongs; that Horace is "kein reiner Dichter" and would therefore have been unable to display his talent in "einer jener reinen, ungemischten Dichtgattungen";³ that he was as Lessing says a "philosophic poet," but that he was not an "*a priori* poet," for he knew his limitations. Personally, I am far from sure what an *a priori* poet is; but as the phrase is used by Weissenfels, it seems to imply merely that Horace had some common sense.

Weissenfels quotes with approval Lehr's paradox, that the letter is the "Form der Formlosigkeit"; he finds nevertheless that Horace steps over "das erlaubte Mass" in his "Willkür," and adopts an hypothesis very similar to Dacier's, "dass Horaz manche von den Vorschriften, namentlich im zweiten Teil der Epistel, völlig gesondert von einander und einzeln in Verse gebracht hat." If all of Weissenfels' monograph were of this nature, it would not have contributed anything new or valuable to previous opinions; but he makes the acute statement that "every work of art must carry in itself the key to its understanding,"

¹ Patin, *Oeuvres d'Horace*, ii, pp. 462-464.

² *Neues Lausitzisches Magazin*, lvi, pp. 118-200.

³ *Loc. cit.*, p. 123.

a principle which would have prevented numerous errors if he had adhered to it.¹ He also points out the folly of regarding the *Ars* as the mere product of a fantasy of Horace's friend Piso, and rightly insists that the poet's own character is the real cause of the epistles. He concludes with an apology for the preponderance of *formal* considerations in the *Ars Poetica*, which he says is accounted for by two reasons: first, that the very nature of aesthetic problems makes it easier to talk of the outer appearance of art rather than of its inner secrets; second, that form always meant more to the ancients than it does to us. The meaning of this last remark, which is usually accepted as a truism, will be brought out to some extent further on in this paper.

Norden stated his position on the *Ars Poetica* in 1905,² and has since emphatically reaffirmed it. His thesis merits our most careful study, not only because of its own thoroughness, but because he represents the biological, scientific method of criticism in its most developed form. The essential points in his thesis may best be given as commentary upon the subjoined scheme of the *Ars Poetica*, which is taken from his article.

I. *De arte poetica* 1-294.

A. *De partibus artis poeticae* 1-130.

1. *De argumentorum tractatione et inventione* 1-41.
2. *De dispositione* 42-44.
3. *De elocutione* 45-130.
 - a. *De verbis singulis* 45-72.
 - b. *De verbis continuatis (de metris)* 73-85.
 - c. *De verborum coloribus* 86-130.

B. *De generibus artis poeticae* 131-294.

Transitio 131-135.

1. *Epos* 136-152.

2. *Drama* 153-294.

Propositio 153-155.

- a. *Die griechischen εἰδή* 156-250.

a. *Tragödie u. Komödie* 156-219.

β. *Satyrspiel* 220-250.

- b. *Σύγκρισις des griechischen u. römischen Dramas* 251-294.

a. *In der Form* 251-274.

β. *In den εἰδή* 275-294.

¹ *Op. cit.*, p. 130.

² *Hermes*, xl, pp. 481-528.

II. De poeta 295–476.

Transitio (295–305) + Propositio (306–308).

A. De instrumentis poetae 309–332.

B. De officio poetae 333–346.

C. De perfecto poeta 347–452.

1. Das Postulat möglichster Vollkommenheit 347–407.

2. Seine Erfüllung durch ernstes Studium 408–452.

D. De insano poeta 453–476.

The symmetry of this scheme is apparent at a glance. I shall try to summarize the argument upon which it is based; although a large part of Norden's proofs consist of mere assertions.

"The problem of the *Ars Poetica* has been attacked in three different ways. The first and oldest, that of transposition to restore order, needs no refutation. The second solution, that there is intentional lack of order, required by the genre (*sermo* or *epistula*), is unsound. The third, which aims to find the order really present, was first employed by Vahlen; but was only carried as far as l. 118. Horace took over this order from the practice of other *rēxvat*; e. g., Quintilian, who in 2–11 deals with *ars oratoria*, but in 12 takes up the *orator*. Horace in the first 130 lines treats of *inventio*, *dispositio*, *elocutio*; which are three out of the five *partes rhetorices* enumerated in Quin. 3, 3. Lines 131–294 deal with epic and drama, which are *genera* of poetry corresponding to the three *genera causarum* in oratory (*oratio laudativa*, *deliberativa*, *iudicialis*).

1–41 deal with *tractatio* and *inventio*; which are practically identical terms. 45–72 deal with the *ἐκλογὴ ὄνομάτων*. The *colores verborum* must conform to the *εἶδος* (86–98), to the *πάθη* (99–113), and to the *ἥθος* (114–130). 156–250 deal with the Greek *εἶδη* of the drama. 156–178 appear to repeat 114 ff., how shall these lines be classified? The explanation is to be found in the purpose of Horace; in the first passage he was handling the *ἥθος* of the diction, here he treats of the character-drawing as such in the dramatic *γένος*, without regard to diction. In like manner is solved the problem of 79–81 and 251–274, both of which passages deal with the iambus; for in 79–81 the *ἥθος* of the iambus was related to *λέξις*, whereas here we are concerned with the development of the iambus within the dramatic *γένος*.

309–332 deal with the *instrumenta poetae*; 333–346, *de officio poetae*, must be compared with Quin. 3, 5, 2; Cic. *de inv.* 1, 6; and *de Or.* 1, 138, 213.

345–347 deal with the postulate of perfection and show how it may be reached through *studium* and *labor* (408–452). 453–476 are added for the sake of contrast. Compare Cic. *de Or.* 3, 54.

The preceding analysis has conclusively shown that Horace founded his treatment of the subject upon a twofold division according to the principle *ars* (*Poetik*) — *artifex* (*Dichter*). We have therefore to inquire to what sphere of literature this principle specially belongs. The answer can be found by collecting instances of other works in which the same bipartite division is employed. Quintilian is the most conspicuous example; but there are plenty of such works in various fields. In music, we have Bacchius, who wrote an *εἰσαγωγὴ τέχνης μουσικῆς*, as well as Boethius, *de Instiit. Mus.* In philosophy, Albinus, *εἰσαγωγὴ εἰς τὴν τοῦ Πλάτωνος βιβλον*. In medicine, we have an isagogic treatise once attributed to Galen (19, 346 ff. K.) and also pseudo-Soranus *ad filium* (Rose, *Anecd. gr. et gr.-lat.*, II, p. 243). This latter is very important, because the author speaks more fully than any other concerning the principle of isagogic composition, which he defines as “*introductio doctrinae cum demonstratione primarum rationum ad medicinae artis conceptionem*.”

Frontinus (*Agrimens.* 1, 64, Lachm.) says “*uno libro instituimus artificem, alio de arte disputavimus.*” Lucian’s treatise *περὶ ὄρχησεως* is constructed precisely as is the *Ars Poetica*. §§ 6–34 deal with the *τέχνη*, § 35 with the *ὄρχηστής*.

All these instances go to show that the principle followed by Horace was a fixed convention. The genre was probably established in Rome under Stoic influences; and we are entitled to call it the isagogic genre. We need a full collection of material; but we can already state a few conclusions which are important for the criticism of Horace’s poem.

1. True *εἰσαγωγαί* give the results of scientific research, in shape comprehensible to the beginner. They therefore form a didactic supplement to ‘*paraenetisch-protreptische Literatur*’! Their characteristic motives are ‘*Alter, Erfinder, Zweck, Teile, Begabung, etc.*’ These motives are all present in the *Ars Poetica*; therefore the poem is isagogic.

2. Use of question and answer is not obligatory in this genre, but is extremely popular. Compare *A. P.* 326 ff., which is a short extract from a humorous but perfectly regular *εἰσαγωγὴ εἰς ἀριθμητικήν*.

3. Such treatises had to be addressed to some one. The Romans, whose family affections were stronger [sic] than was the case in Greece, chose by preference their own son or the son of a friend.

4. A history of the genre cannot be written until materials have been collected. The sophists probably popularized the genre; they transferred it into prose from poetry, for its career is likely to have begun with the pseudo-Hesiodic *Χίρωνος ὑποθῆκαι*.

5. Posidonius wrote an *εἰσαγωγὴ περὶ λέξεως*. Compare *A. P.* 45–130.

6. Varro, under Stoic influence, wrote an epistle for Pompey in the isagogic form (*Aulus Gellius*, 14, 7). The genre rapidly became popular at Rome.

We conclude that Horace was urged to compose a poem in the isagogic genre by the new developments of Roman poetry. A generation had sprung up in leisure, without the hard training of necessity. So art had lost its gravity, and poets esteemed but did not criticize themselves; Horace raised a warning voice. The form was given him by tradition. He had no son of his own, and was forced to address a friend's son. This didactic letter is more Greek than any other of his writings; only the varnish is Roman. A Greek paraphrase would be the best commentary. Horace had never read [sic] the *Poetics* of Aristotle, and traces of that influence are very slight.¹ The *Ars Poetica* unfortunately had no practical success; that is to say, it did not affect the later development of Roman poetry. Ovid composed in the very style which Horace had forbidden."

So ends this perfect specimen of scientific criticism. Let me say at once that I have no intention of attempting to refute all of Norden's conclusions. It is infinitely more important for our study of the history of criticism to understand how Norden arrived at such conclusions, and upon what assumptions his argument is based; for if this method and these assumptions can be shown to be false, then the whole superstructure will fall with them. It must, however, be said that the twofold

¹ *Vide infra*, p. 61.

division of the poem, upon which his attribution to the isagogic genre is entirely dependent, is absolutely untenable. *Ars* and *artifex* are not, of course, two independent concepts, but are in close and logical relationship one with the other. It would tax the powers of a greater than Horace to write 294 hexameter verses on the subject of the art of poetry without ever mentioning the poet. Horace as a matter of fact did not achieve this impossible feat; for he expressly addresses the poet in 14, 24, 38, 45, 87, 119, 120, 125, 129, 136, 153, 178, 183, 188, 234, 270, 290. Yet to cite particular verses is to fall partially into the same error; the truth is well stated in Vahlen's words, that "Dichter und Dichtung gleicherweise durch das ganze Gedicht gehen und beide in manchfältiger Form verwendet werden."¹ It would be difficult enough to write a chapter on the ideal chemist in which no reference should be made to chemistry; but it is certain that in the case of poetry, the art and the artist cannot be mechanically sundered. Norden's separatist argument really implies that a poem is conceivable without a poet.

It is clear that the *Ars Poetica* does not lend itself to such analysis, and that Norden's main thesis is unsound.² It would be possible to go over his scheme in detail; but once the illusory antithesis *ars-artifex* is banished, the examination of minor points is a waste of time.³ Plainly the *Ars Poetica* refuses to be confined within the trammels of the isagogic genre.

We have now surveyed the course of modern criticism of the *Ars Poetica*; and we have seen how various fancied or real qualities of the poem itself have forced its critics into different groups. At first, they all assumed that it belonged to the didactic genre. On this assumption, it received hyperbolical praise from men like Minturno and Heiden; on the same assumption, it was enthusiastically condemned by men like Scaliger and Heinsius. Then a fresh turn was given to criticism by the suggestion that the poem really belonged to the epistolary genre; so that for the last century critics have been divided into two great schools. The first school comprises those who believe that Horace

¹ J. Vahlen, *Sitzungsber. der k. pr. Akad.*, 1906, pp. 589–614.

² Norden's thesis has been thoroughly disproved by Vahlen in the article quoted above.

³ For example, Norden assigns 1–37 to the rhetorical category of *tractatio*. But the subject of 1–37 is unity; and it may be seen by referring to Cic. *de Or.* 2, 177, that *tractatio* has to do with variety of treatment, and not with unity.

intended to write a didactic treatise on poetry, and the second those who believe that he wrote a mere epistle which must be judged by the less stringent laws of that genre. What have these two schools in common? The gulf between their views is apparently wide and deep; and we have on record approximately four centuries of rather bitter polemic. Norden and Weissenfels, whom I have selected as perhaps the most able modern representatives of the two groups, disagree not only concerning the genre, but also concerning the purpose, the sources, the style, and almost all the details of the analysis of the *Ars Poetica*.

Now one expects opinions and tastes to differ, but such a difference as this is not trivial, nor can it be lightly disregarded by students *utriusque sermonis* on the ground that one school or the other is destined to extinguish its rival at some future date. Consequently if it can be proved that these schools are in reality one, that their different interpretations are founded upon identical axioms, that these axioms are themselves insecure and the fatal source of divergent criticism, then we may hope for true progress in the study of this and similar problems, instead of an uneasy oscillation between two irreconcilable opinions.

Such proof is now I believe within our reach. Close examination of the arguments of Norden and Weissenfels reveals the fact that both lay primary emphasis upon the *form* of the poem. According to them, it is the form that determines the content. Their course of reasoning may be put as follows:

Norden: *The Ars Poetica is an εισαγωγή.*

All εισαγωγαί are written in strict accordance with a fixed rhetorical scheme.

Therefore the Ars Poetica is written in strict accordance with a fixed rhetorical scheme.

Weissenfels: *The Ars Poetica is an epistula.*

All epistulae are written in a loose conversational style.

Therefore the Ars Poetica is written in a loose conversational style.

In this wise the Protean miracle is wrought: the same body of verse which is judged by the first school to be "flawless, a true *chef-d'œuvre*, the perfect didactic poem," transforms itself and appears to the second school as "careless conversation, the *Form der Formlosigkeit*." Their premises differ, their conclusions differ; only the *Ars Poetica* remains

the same. The miracle is therefore external to it, and is performed in the mind of its critics. How can it be defined?

We have seen that both schools, in judging literature, desire first of all to establish the form of literature with which they have to do in each particular case. We have also become aware that intelligent critics, employing this method of *formal* criticism, reach results so divergent as to preclude any logical compromise. It is moreover apparent that we have attained a stage in our argument where the doctrine of literary forms again emerges, this time as the cause of incurable confusion in a concrete case chosen from the field of Roman literary history. Incurable, that is, just so long as critics consider themselves bound to attach the label of a definite genre to every work in poetry and prose; just so long as they believe that this generic label carries with it by necessary implication a long train of judgments to be made upon and qualities to be discovered in each work so labelled. It is plain that a genuine scientific method leads, wherever it is applicable, to general agreement among scientists upon a body of ascertained fact; it is equally plain that this method of literary criticism does not lead to such agreement, although we have been in possession of the facts for more than nineteen centuries. Furthermore, since classifications are notoriously easy to make,¹ since at any moment some imaginative student may conceive yet another genre and insist that both of the old schools are wrong, we run a decided risk of spending the future in the pursuit of classifications rather than in the scrutiny of individual works. I do not therefore think it presumptuous to question the validity of the method; on the contrary, I hold that it is of high importance to the truth and value of our study of ancient literature that this method be comprehended in its origin and subsequent development, in order that we may appraise the good and the evil which have attended its employment.

Now the doctrine of literary forms or genres has admittedly been based upon ancient theory, and we have an excellent opportunity to

¹ Cf. William James, *The Principles of Psychology*, ii, p. 646: "It is, for some unknown reason, a great aesthetic delight for the mind to break the order of experience, and class its materials in serial orders, proceeding from step to step of difference, and to contemplate untiringly the crossings and inosculations of the series among themselves."

examine an ancient presentation of that doctrine in the very poem of Horace which has caused so long a quarrel in modern times. I shall attempt (1) to formulate the critical theory subscribed to by Horace, so far as he can be said to subscribe to a theory who boasted that he was "*nullius addictus iurare in verba magistri*";¹ (2) to compare his theory as a critic with his practice as a poet, in order that we may know to what extent his doctrine determined his action; (3) to discuss the relation between the theory of Horace and the *Poetics* of Aristotle. In this way, it will be possible to apply a practical test to the doctrine of literary forms; the fact that the poet and the critic is the same man affords us the ideal conditions for such a test.

In the endeavor to formulate the theory of criticism held by Horace, we must constantly bear in mind that his character is pre-eminently pragmatic, that his tendency is always to insist upon results rather than processes. His universe is for the most part controlled by active personalities and not by abstractions. So far as he can, he substitutes the legislator for the legislation; when he cannot do that, he uses the device we call personification. In a jesting account of his conversion from Epicureanism, he does not yield to argument, as a Greek would have done; but he is "compelled to steer again in the abandoned course" by Diespiter, who has "driven through a clear sky the horses of thunder."² It is therefore only fair to make the same proviso in regard to Horace's theory, that Aristotle makes in regard to his study of ethics — πεπαιδευμένου γάρ ἐστιν ἐπὶ τοσοῦτον τάκριβὲς ἐπιχητὲν καθ' ἔκαστον γένος, ἐφ' ὅσον η̄ τοῦ πράγματος φύσις ἐπιδέχεται. I shall therefore assume in examining the *Ars Poetica* and other writings that the label, that questions of classification, are of no moment whatever; that Horace is expressing his personal opinions in the *Ars Poetica*, and that these opinions are not made any less his own by the fact that Horace is addressing the Pisones.

Horace begins the *Ars* with a sketch of a mad painter and ends with a sketch of a mad poet. The painter is mad because he sets a human head upon the neck and shoulders of a horse; the poet is mad because for some reason he cannot or will not accept and profit by criticism. The painter is employed to introduce and the poet to drive home the central lesson which Horace desires to inculcate in the hearts

¹ *Ep.* 1, 1, 14.

² *Od.* 1, 34, 4 ff.

of all who aspire to poetry: ‘follow propriety as your guiding star, and submit yourself utterly to those men who can teach you what in each and every case is proper.’ From this principle of the all-nourishing, all-informing virtue of propriety, which was to Horace an ardent emotional conviction as well as an intellectual dogma, flow every word and phrase in the poem, all the high lights of vivid denunciation and all the apparent digressions into Greek and Roman literary history. Upon examining the *Ars* in detail, we find therein essential unity, the unity which is conferred on a writer by strong feeling and conviction; we shall not find the unity of strict logical structure. It would be and is absurd to expect of Horace the same mental qualities which we should rightly demand from the author of a scientific treatise. Bearing this in mind, let us proceed with the analysis.

You would laugh to scorn (he says) such a wild picture; for it will be mere *vanae species*, images which have no basis in fact, which have no *una forma* to explain and maintain them (1-9). Painters and poets are entitled to be daring, and have what we call poetic license: but they must not exceed the limits of that license by assembling things which do not belong together (9-13). Purple patches are bad because they are not in their proper place (14-22).¹ You must have unity; but you cannot have unity if you push a virtue into excess; and to avoid excess you need *ars* (23-31). *Ars* requires that you be successful not only in a few details, but in the total representation; do not therefore take on a piece of work too large for your powers (32-40). If you suit the work to your powers, then you will have eloquence and order; by order, I mean saying the right thing in the right place (40-45). Do not be carried away by eloquence into the invention of many new words; it is enough to rearrange old words (46-48). If however you are forced to find a new word for a new discovery, you may have a little freedom, but your new words must really be old Greek words slightly altered; I claim this liberty for myself and Virgil and Varius, just as much as for Plautus and Ennius (48-59). For truly words are like leaves and human beings: they are born, flourish and decay, according to the decrees of *usus*, which governs all speech and makes all decisions (60-72). Homer instituted the *usus* of writing epic in hexameter; in elegiac

¹ Horace seems to be hitting contemporary poets; men like Julius Montanus, who was famous for his ‘sunrises.’ See Ovid, *Pont.* 4, 16, 11; Seneca, *Ep.* 122.

meter plaintive poetry was at first in solitary confinement, since then thankful utterances (*voti sententia compos*) have been shut up with it; but the grammarians' quarrel concerning the name of the first authority for elegiacs is not yet settled (73–78). Anger turned its proper weapon, the iambus, over to Archilochus; later comedy and tragedy borrowed it: and the Muse allowed lyric poetry the following subjects — gods and demigods, winners in the games, the love-troubles of young men and gentlemanly drinking (79–85). If I cannot abide by the meter and style assigned to each subject I have no right to be called a poet (86–88). You must not express comic matter in tragic form, for that would shatter propriety; and yet a tragic character must sometimes use the plain talk reserved for comedy, if you wish him to reach the spectator's heart (89–98). For poetry must not be merely beautiful, but must stir the emotions; in order to accomplish this you must correctly represent the emotion in the actor (99–105). A sad man talks sadly, an angry man threatens; nature is the cause of the emotion which the tongue must translate; be sure that your actors speak in harmony with their characters (105–118).

You may either follow tradition or create new and self-consistent characters; if you choose the second and risky course, see that your characters never change or "grow" from beginning to end (119–127). The second course is risky, because it is hard to transfer general ideas into a particular form; you'll do better to adapt some of the *Iliad*: you can make what you thus borrow really your own, by not imitating with painful closeness, and by avoiding conceit (128–139).¹ Homer was not conceited; he always performs what he promises and always preserves propriety even when lying (140–152).² I repeat that if you want an audience you must preserve propriety in your characters; young men must talk and act like young men, old men like old (153–178).³ The action on the stage must be lively, but not improper; no vulgar murders, or I shall be bored; five acts is the proper length; no gods allowed unless necessary to solve the tangle; do not break the

¹ Cf. Hermogenes: "πῶς κοινὰ . . . ἴδιωσομεν"; in his π. μεθ. δεινότητος, 29. Horace carries his *odi profanum volgus* into art: cf. *Ep.* 1, 3, 11, where he bids the poet "shun the *lacus et rivos apertos*." Pollianus, *Anth. Pal.* 11, 130, has "τοὺς κυκλίους μισῶ, λωποδόντας."

² Cf. Aristotle, *Poetics*, 1460 A: οὐκ ἀγνοεῖ δὲ τοιεῖν αὐτὸν.

³ Cf. *Poetics*, 1454 A: τὸ ἀρμόττοντα.

three-actor rule (179–192). The chorus also must say the proper thing (193–201). The music was more decorous of old than it is now, as was the audience; the audience is now too numerous and mixed; hence the change in music and in style, which has become oracular (202–219).¹ This same change in the audience has forced the tragic poet to write Satyr plays, stuff unworthy of the dignified matron *Tragoedia*; but let it be as little unworthy as possible, let it not degenerate into comedy (220–239). For my part, I shall work over old material for my poetry, and the result will be very good; any one would say he could do as much; but if he tries it he will sweat in vain, so cunning is my art of fitting and joining; old material indeed, but rendered glorious by art (240–243). But I was talking about Satyr plays: they must not be too vulgar, or the best people will not approve; the iambus is the proper meter for them, only do not handle it the way our old untrained poets did; they did not have good criticism, and we've been too easy with our poets (244–264).

Shall I avail myself of current bad taste to write badly? Of course not; but even if I do not commit positive improprieties, I am not therefore good but merely faultless; to be really good, study and imitate the Greeks (265–269). ‘Your forefathers were satisfied with Plautus?’ The more fools they — but they would not have made that error had they been acquainted with the Greek models, from Thespis to old comedy, which by the way became too free and had to be suppressed (270–284). Our elder poets deserve credit for having tried to adapt all sorts of Greek work, particularly for not being such slavish imitators as to write only of Greek deeds and leave our own unsung; but every one of them was lazy and careless in polishing off (285–291). Our poets must use severe measures and never neglect form; instead, they listen to Democritus, who says “poets are inspired by heaven”; so they straightway grow long hair and trim their nails no more (291–301)!² I envy them; if I were not a sane artist, I should write beautiful inspired poetry: but since I am sane, I shall devote myself to showing others how to compose not inspired nonsense but proper

¹ Cf. Plato, *Laws*, 659; and Athen. *Deipnos*, 617 C.

² Cf. Dio Chrys. 53, 1, on Homer; Cic. *de Div.* 1, 37, 80; Plato, *Ion* 533; *Phaedr.* 245. Aristotle, *Poetics* 1455 A, offers a choice between having a “special gift” or a “touch of madness.”

virtuous poetry (301-308). The possession of true wisdom is the source of such poetry: first acquaint yourself with it in the writings of the Socratic school; then you'll be able to write with propriety upon suitable subjects (309-311). When you have learned from the Socratics what are the duties of man toward country, friends, family, as well as the duties of senator, judge, and general, then you can attribute the proper qualities to each character; this is the way to learn your trade and become a real imitator (312-318). A play well furnished with showy maxims and correct characters, even though not truly serious and artistic, will be more popular than pretty verses without any moral ballast (319-322).

The Greeks are real geniuses and have splendid style too, because they do not seek popularity or prettiness but glory; whereas we Romans always want to make money (323-332). Some poets desire to please and so make money, some to instruct; it is better to do both and so kill two birds (333, 334). In your teaching be not too long-winded; in your desire to please do not make up absolutely impossible stories (335-340). Our old conservatives prefer didactic poetry, our young bloods hate it; so, as I said, combine pleasure with instruction: the mark is difficult to hit, but repeated carelessness is intolerable (341-358). I bitterly regret that Homer is not quite perfect, but he must be forgiven; he wrote so much that he became fatigued (358-360). The scale of a poem is much like the scale of a picture; it may be miniature with every detail perfect, or scene-painting of which the general effect is good if you stand far enough away (361-365).¹ But, though I concede the standard of perfection depends somewhat upon the scale, nevertheless mere middling work is a sin against men and gods and the bookshops: our high poetic purpose suffers no backsliding (366-378). Yet every one, especially if well-born and well-to-do, thinks he can write poetry; to such I say — do not; but at least wait nine years before publishing, so that you may repent (379-390). For the calling of the true poet is high: witness Orpheus and Amphion, who wrought miracles; in those days poets founded civilization; Homer and Tyrtaeus inspired warriors; poets taught men ethics and how to foresee the future (391-404). After the struggle of the ages men were at peace, and lyric poetry was authorized by the Muse and Apollo to charm their

¹ Cf. *περὶ ὕψους* 33, 4.

hard-won leisure (404–407). You must have genuine intelligence to succeed in this calling and work very hard to learn the trade (408–418).¹ You need severe masters, for if you are wealthy you are likely to be fooled by flattering critics; a true critic, such as I am, will be a regular Aristarchus to you (419–450). Let no man say it is unreasonable to be so severe about trifles, for unless you are thus severely and honestly criticized you may come to suffer from the worst of all delusions; you may think you are a good poet though absolutely untrained (450–452). In that direction lies madness: you will run about declaiming your verse to all comers, and nobody will care if you perish; none will strive officially to keep you alive, for you kill by recitation any whom you get into your clutches (453–476).

This bald summary will suffice to show with what tenacity Horace clung to his main guiding principle, the law of literary propriety. He constantly insists upon the application of this one *arbitrium et ius et norma*.² The movement of his thought is free, precisely because it is directed from the center of Horace's mind. Yet this is the poem which Norden tries to thrust within the narrow confines of a predetermined rhetorical scheme, following the method of explanation by strangulation; this is the poem, on the other hand, which Weissenfels said "overstepped the legitimate bounds of caprice," and which is thus stigmatized by Saintsbury — "if it were not for its vividness and its constellation of glittering phrases, nobody could see in such a thing aught but a mere congeries of desultory observations."³ The constellation has not at any rate illuminated all of the commentators. Rather let us observe how each of the subsidiary doctrines enounced by Horace depends like a satellite upon the master-idea.

In the first place, the pervasive spirit of routine, the *dixeris egregie*, the faith that meter and content are fixed for all time, the treatment of character, the *rectius deducis*, the five-act and three-actor rules, all these follow by hard necessity upon the doctrine of propriety. In the second place, the excursions into literary history all serve the same end of showing what has been in the past, and come to the same conclusion that the past is the model for the future; the Greeks knew what was right, therefore the Romans must turn to the *exemplaria Graeca*.

¹ Cf. Pindar, *Ol.* 2, 86.

² *A. P.*, 72.

³ *History of Criticism*, i, p. 224.

Hence also comes the insistence upon *ars* rather than *ingenium*: for he is profoundly convinced that all the shortcomings of earlier Roman poetry and all the hasty productions of his own contemporaries are due not to any deficiency in *ingenium*, but to a deplorable lack of *ars*. Horace knows that art is long and patient of criticism, that art is respectful of precedent, conscious of a high purpose, and yet not easily puffed up. Such ideals he could not reconcile with the hurried vaudeville of Plautus, the turgid flow of Lucilius, and the roughness of all the *vetera poemata*.¹ I think that Horace has been wronged by those who represent his attitude toward the elder poets as merely a reaction against their extreme popularity and a desire to force a hearing for himself; his bitterness was really called forth by the slipshod work of his own time, and he employs the elder poets to enforce his warning.

I have spoken of the doctrine of propriety as Horace's guiding principle; but that is not the whole truth. The emphasis which Horace lays upon propriety, and the concreteness of his precepts, do not obscure the fact that propriety, the law of decorum, is only a subsidiary enactment to a greater law or set of laws. These other and paramount laws are the ideals, the criteria, the definitions of perfect form, in relation to which the law of decorum has its being. For every literary procedure, for the depiction of character and the building of plot, for each genre or *είδος*, there exists a distinct law of perfect form. To obey this law is propriety: to disobey is to fail utterly.² The law of decorum is therefore employed to mediate between the ideal form and its realization in practice; its function is explained at length in some passages of Cicero which I shall take up later. For example, the ideal tragedy has five acts: it is improper, if it has four or six. The ideal old man lacks enthusiasm, is dilatory, irritable, a grumbler, and a severe critic of the younger generation: to represent him as enthusiastic, prompt, kindly, is to violate the law of decorum.

Not only the *Ars Poetica* and the other literary epistles, but stray critical remarks in the rest of Horace's verse depend without exception upon the law of ideal forms and the corollary law of decorum. The epic poet may celebrate the exploits of Agrippa; not so the lyric, who

¹ Cf. *Eph.* 2, 1, 54; 2, 1, 170 ff.; and *Serm.* 1, 4, 11.

² It is perhaps necessary to say that the opinions here expressed belong to Horace: their validity will be discussed later.

is forbidden not only by modesty but by the Muse of the lyre "unapt for war" to sing of other subjects than banquets and lovers' quarrels and the affairs of a shifting heart.¹ When his Muse wanders into graver subjects, she is rebuked for her shameless insolence and bidden "quaere modos leviore plectro."² Horace reproaches Maecenas for suggesting that he sing of the wars of Rome or the mythical combats of Greece in the *molles modi* of the lyre. Again, we find a parallel to *Od. 2, 1*, in *3, 3*:

Non hoc iocosae conveniet lyrae:
quo, Musa, tendis? desine pervicax
referre sermones deorum et
magna modis tenuare parvis.

In the ninth ode of the fourth book, he tells what the lyric poet can do for Lollius; he can give him the same immortality which Pindar, Simonides, Alcaeus, Stesichorus, Anacreon and Sappho bestowed on those of whom they wrote. Finally, in *Od. 4, 15*, it is Phoebus himself who thunders the warning not to abandon lyric subjects:—

Phoebus volentem proelia me loqui
victas et urbis increpuit lyra,
ne parva Tyrrhenum per aequor
vela darem . . .

In the *Epodes*, Horace refuses to finish the iambics he had begun, an *olim promissum carmen*, because he is in love, and a lover must not write iambics (*Epod. 14*).

In the first book of the *Satires*, the fourth and the tenth yield to us precepts drawn from the same central store. I have already referred to the criticism of Lucilius: Horace explains that his predecessor is at fault because he cannot endure the "laborem scribendi recte." The remedy is of course quality, not quantity; and a little later Horace thanks the gods who have made him a poet of few ideas, a poor spirit, of rare and scanty utterance!³ For these are the necessary conditions, touched with enlivening irony, of artistic production. In the same satire Horace insists that he and Lucilius are not poets, for the reason that their diction is unpoetic: and says that comedy can only be called poetry on condition that it employ heightened language. The tenth

¹ *Od. 1, 6.*

² *Od. 2, 1, 37-40.*

³ *Serm. 1, 10, 5, 11, 69, 76.*

satire contains little that is unfamiliar: one merit does not make a work of art, style must vary to suit the tone, Lucilius would write better if only he were alive now, and one must despise the applause of the vulgar. One new point, however, is well worth notice, the implied meaning of the phrase "inventore minor."¹ Horace says and sincerely believes that the inventor of a form is *ipso facto* superior to all who may come after, and thus sheds a flood of light at once upon his admission of essential inferiority in satire, and upon the proud refrain "princeps Aeolium carmen,"² "Parios ego primus iambos ostendi Latio,"³ which goes through his work like a song of triumph. I shall comment later upon the philosophical significance of the stress laid upon priority.

The *Epistles* considered apart from the *Ars Poetica* display the same tendency. Horace writes to Lollius about Homer:—

Qui quid sit pulchrum, quid turpe, quid utile, quid non,
planius ac melius Chrysippo et Crantore dicit.⁴

It is natural enough that Horace should regard the "scriptor Troiani belli" as a teacher, as a prophet, as a professor of morality; compare the passage in the *Ars* on the historical function of poetry.⁵ The nineteenth epistle contains his splendid attack upon the "imitatores, servum pecus." For the theory, his "decipit exemplar vitiis imitabile" is of a piece with his warning to unskilled imitators in the *Ars* (132); and the doctrine is the same to which Browning gave expression in his

Nokes outdares Stokes in azure feats,—
Both gorge. Who fished the murex up?
What porridge had John Keats?

In the next few lines (*Ep.* 1, 19, 21–33) Horace annihilates his detractors by asserting and defining his own title to originality. I shall quote the entire passage, for it is difficult to interpret and is apparently quite out of harmony with what he says elsewhere about the cognate problems of originality and imitation. "I have planted free steps on

¹ *Serm.* 1, 10, 48.

³ *Ep.* 1, 19, 23.

² *Od.* 3, 30, 13.

⁴ *Ep.* 1, 2, 3, 4.

⁵ Seneca, *Ep. ad Lucil.*, 88, contains similar moralizing on Homer. Le Bossu (1631–1680), and many others of his time were in substantial agreement with Horace. Cf. Julien Duchesne, *Histoire des poèmes épiques français au XVIIe siècle*, pp. 269–289.

unoccupied ground where none was before me, not trodden in the foot-steps of other men. Who trusts himself will be king and leader of the swarm. I was the first to hold up to Latin eyes iambics of Paros, following the rhythms and the spirit of Archilochus, not the matter, or the language with which he hunted down Lycambes. And lest you should be inclined to decorate me with a humbler garland for fearing to change the measure and poetic form, bethink you that Sappho, no weak woman, tempers her Muse with the rhythm of Archilochus; Alcaeus tempers his; though he differs much in matter and arrangement, nor chooses a father-in-law to befoul with venomous verse, nor twists a halter for his betrothed by libellous song. He is the model, not so much as named by other tongue, whom I, the lyrist of Latium, have made known abroad: my pride is in bringing things untold before to be read by gentle eyes and held in gentle hands.”¹

First we have a straightforward declaration of primacy in the Latin imitation of Archilochus, whom he “followed in meter and in spirit”; though not in the concrete subjects of his epodes. Then he implies that some extremists have blamed him for his reluctance to alter the metrical form employed by Archilochus; a charge against which he defends himself by citing Sappho and Alcaeus, his chief exemplars in lyric poetry, who have both borrowed (at least some of) the meters of Archilochus. ‘And yet,’ Horace would say, ‘none of you my critics would dare accuse either Sappho or Alcaeus of a lack of (metrical) originality.’ According to Horace, the true test of originality for a Roman poet is not the one proposed by these extremists, i. e., the alteration of Greek metrical forms; but lies rather in the introduction of such Greek meter into Rome and strict adhesion thereto. This achievement, which seems to a modern either trivial or, at most, a subordinate part of real originality, was to the mind of Horace the primary essential. Once the meter was transferred, then and only then could Horace attend to the secondary requirement, i. e., that the matter and content (*res*) should not be too similar to the Greek original. His point of view has grown so strange that many commentators have gone astray on the lines (28, 29)

temperat Archilochi Musam pede mascula Sappho,
temperat Alcaeus, sed rebus et ordine dispar.

¹ Wickham’s translation.

This has been wrongly taken to mean that "Alcaeus, though borrowing meters from Archilochus, showed his independence in everything else."¹

Such an interpretation leaves v. 28 hanging in the air; leaves it not merely unexplained, but positively detrimental to the assumed argument. For the "independence in everything else" is asserted only of Alcaeus; what then would be the use of mentioning Sappho at all? If on the other hand we adopt the interpretation I have suggested, the argument of Horace becomes reasonable; Sappho and Alcaeus are two perfect precedents, two undoubtedly original poets, who have used the meters of Archilochus little altered in form. Horace is thus clear from attack on this score, sheltered behind the Greek robes, the *exemplaria Graeca* of which he boasted. The meaning of the puzzling adversative in "sed rebus et ordine dispar" is exactly parallel to that of the negative in "non res et agentia verba Lycamben":² and the whole ideal set forth is that of the strict formal (metrical) imitation counselled in the *Ars Poetica*, modified by the warning not to imitate too closely the actual substance of the original: —

nec verbo verbum curabis reddere fidus
interpres, nec desilies imitator in artum.³

It is not worth while to take up in detail the first two epistles of the second book. As ever, Horace castigates Roman poetry for its imperfect form, the *vestigia ruris*, and refuses even to be complimented in "prave factis versibus."⁴ His remarks on audiences and on degenerate taste recall *A. P.* 212 ff. The epistle to Florus arrests our attention by displaying a portrait very nearly related to the picture of the mad poet in the *Ars*; here we have another "scriptor delirus inersque," who is delighted with his own bad work. A second similar *motif*, that of the righteous critic, the Aristarchus of the *Ars*, is to be found in 110 ff.

We have now traversed the whole of Horace's verse in the search for his critical theory; and we have made doubly sure that the critic Horace is like one of his own ideal characters, armed cap-a-pie with consistency, *servatus ad imum qualis ab incepto processerit*. He remains

¹ Cf. Wickham, *ad loc.*

³ *A. P.* 133, 134.

² *Ep.* 1, 19, 25.

⁴ *Ep.* 2, 1, 160.

the evangelist of propriety and the high-priest of convention. His doctrine of literary forms is substantially the same as that of our modern critics, subject only to the reservation I made concerning the changes incident to progress in science and the theory of evolution. He is conspicuously lacking in speculative activity; he does not trouble himself to give the reasons and elucidate the principles which underlie his specific rules. The basis is taken for granted; he could afford to take it for granted because, as we shall see later, the fundamental axioms of his critical belief were universally accepted in his time. If his doctrine is valid, then we may logically demand that its validity be shown in his own practice, and that his artistic product correspond to his artistic principles, or rules. If on the contrary his doctrine is not valid for his own work, if it can be proved that the practising artist quietly foreswore or ignored the body of rules which he himself laid down, then I shall maintain that we have absolutely conclusive evidence of its essential falsity. For a theory which pretends to lay down the laws of poetry must stand or fall by one test and only one test, the facts in the case. Either meter and content are inseparably connected, or else the laws are void and of no effect.

These laws are most distinctly stated in *Ars Poetica* 73–98. They may be recapitulated as follows: (1) the feats of kings and captains and war's sad tale must be written in hexameter, (2) the voice of complaint and of granted prayers in pentameter, (3) anger, as well as comedy and tragedy, in the iambus, (4) gods, children of gods, the victor in boxing and the horse first in the race, the troubles of young hearts and the gay banquet, in lyric meters. One subdivision of the third law requires that the verses and diction of comedy be distinguished from the verses and diction of tragedy. One subdivision of the first law permits hexameter to be employed for the *sermo* or satire, by the authority of the inventor Lucilius; but we have the express statement of Horace that the *sermo* is not poetry, so that this subdivision is nominal and not real. Such then is the tenor of the laws. Let us look to his poems for the practice.

The law demands that there be no mixture of genres; that the subjects of epic, of lyric, of iambic, of satire, be kept in separate metrical compartments. If we discover that Horace deals with the same theme in both iambic and lyric meters, or if the *Epodes* are not all angry, the

law is void, at least so far as Horace is concerned. The only use that a critic has for a law of poetry is instrumental; i. e., if the law is valid, he may confidently employ it as a tool to explain poetry which has been written by poets themselves under the dominion of that law. But if the poet did not obey the 'law,' the critic is thereby forced to abandon it as a defective instrument. He has no choice; if he attempts to retain the invalid law, he is no longer a critic, but a false substitute for the original poet; he will either try to re-write the original poem in conformity with the imaginary law (as Ribbeck and countless others have done), or he will *vi et armis* insert the law into his interpretation of the poem (as Norden did).

Let us assume that Horace has succeeded in realizing the first part of his boast, in the adaptation to Latin of the metrical form of his avowed master Archilochus; has he been equally successful in the second part, in the reincarnation of that bitter spirit, the *ira* which has immortalized the poet and eternally disgraced the man? Our answer must be in the negative. Out of the seventeen epodes, only nine can be said to display the Archilochian spirit. The other eight are not only not satirical, but are demonstrably lyric in feeling and content. Let us first examine the Archilochian nine. The third, fourth, fifth, sixth, eighth, tenth, twelfth and seventeenth epodes are satirical enough to leave no doubt of their classification. The second epode is more puzzling; sixty-six lines of genuine lyric beauty are so to speak upset by the four lines at the close. Can the addition of these four lines be fairly said to transmute the whole poem into a satire? The true explanation is to be found, as Sellar has shown, in the character of Horace: who, "when he is most in earnest, checks himself and brings himself back to the ordinary mood in which he meets society."¹ The procedure is familiar to us from the *Odes*,² and is also exemplified by his ironical qualification of the wise man, "praecipue sanus, nisi cum pituita molesta est."³ The closest analogies to this epode are to be found in the *Georgics* of Virgil and the *Elegies* of Tibullus; in spite of the fact that neither Virgil nor Tibullus wrote in Parian iambics. Therefore the best of all the epodes is too idiosyncratic to admit of classification.

¹ Sellar, *Horace and the Elegiac Poets*, p. 130.

² *Od.* 2, 1, 37-40; 3, 3, 69-72.

³ *Ep.* 1, 1, 108.

The other eight epodes are in tone indistinguishable from the *Odes*. The first epode is no less lyric than *Od.* 2, 6; 2, 7; 2, 17; the seventh, ninth and sixteenth present the most instructive similarities with the political odes.¹ The eleventh is made up of commonplaces on love; the *limina dura* and the *latus* play the same rôle as in *Od.* 3, 10 and in a host of elegies, comedies and epigrams.² The thirteenth closely resembles *Od.* 1, 9; the fourteenth contains a familiar confession

. . . me libertina neque uno
contenta Phryne macerat;

and the fifteenth is the rejected lover's complaint.³

The 'law of wrath' is therefore so far from being valid for the *Epodes* that only a bare majority of them are in various degrees explicable by its terms. In other words, it is impossible for a critic acquainted with this so-called law to predict, before reading a given epode, what the general character of that epode will be. The conclusion is inevitable that the poet Horace was not governed by the law of the iambic genre which he himself stated; as for the critical consequences of this conclusion, they will be discussed after the *Odes* have been examined.

At this point, I am overtaken by a natural scruple; the words of Martial creep into my mind — "improbe facit, qui in alieno libro ingeniosus est." It may be destructive of the spirit to pursue the same method of analysis on the precious body of the *Carmina* which I have already employed in the minor case of the *Epodes*. Nevertheless, it must be done; first, proof must be given that a large number of the odes cannot be classified according to the laws of the lyric genre. There are at least two ways in which this may be accomplished: either by showing that the content of a given poem differs from all the contents sanctified by law, or by showing that the content of a given poem would fairly entitle us to classify it under a different genre. After it has been proved that the laws are inoperative and are as empty of

¹ Plüss, followed by Sellar, regards the ninth epode as an Archilochian invective "against the foreign queen." He asserts that vv. 23–26 refer to Cleopatra, Jugurtha and Hasdrubal. There is nothing in the Latin to justify or even suggest this interpretation; it is merely one more instance of the mania which forces poems to be misread by their labels.

² Cf. Ov. *Am.* 1, 9, 19; Lucret. 4, 1177; and *Od.* 1, 25. ³ Cf. *Od.* 1, 6, 13.

reality in this case as in that of the *Epodes*, then I shall try to make amends to the spirit of Horace by a brief sketch of what I believe to have been his actual procedure in lyric composition.

In the first place, we discover that two odes violate by their metrical structure the boundary between ode and epode; they use the Alcmanian strophe in common with the twelfth epode.¹ The infrequency of this violation renders it of no great consequence; but it shows at any rate that Horace did not hesitate, after composing three poems identical in form, to publish two as lyrics and the other as an epode.² Much more urgent is the problem of the classification of the odes according to content; if all of them deal with consecrated lyric subjects handled in lyric form, the law is valid. I shall mention only those cases which constitute a definite departure from the terms of the law.

In the first book of the *Odes*, *Pastor cum traheret* (15) is essentially epic, *Quis desiderio* (24) is elegiac, *Parcius iunctas* (25) is satiric, *Te maris et terrae* (28) is dramatic elegy, *Icci, beatis* (29) is epigrammatic. In the second book, *Ulla si iuris* (8) is undoubtedly satire; in the third, *Donec gratus eram* (9) is clearly dramatic, *Extremum Tanain* (10) is erotic elegy or else an epigram, *Uxor pauperis Ibyci* (15) and in the fourth book *Audivere Lyce* (13) are satirical. It is obvious that Horace, the perfect artist, was a desperate mixer of genres; for the laws of lyric precedent certainly do not cover the odes just cited. But suppose that some defender of these laws be confronted with poems which cannot by any extension of fancy be identified with any previously existing genre of lyric, or with any mixture of genres: with poems which are a genuine new creation on the part of Horace: he will then be compelled to admit that his position is untenable. For he cannot make any new category for an ode of Horace without flying in the face of Horace's energetic denunciation in the *Ars*, 86-88:—

descriptas servare vices operumque colores
cur ego si nequeo ignoroque poeta salutor?
cur nescire pudens prave quam discere malo?

Yet it is precisely such a new creation which we cannot avoid recognizing in the larger and better portion of the odes, in those very poems

¹ *Od. 1, 7 and 28.*

² I do not mean to imply that these three poems were composed and published at about the same time. The epode is probably earlier than the two odes.

which guarantee the immortality of Horace and secure for him the title of poet. I mean, of course, the odes in which he embodied his patriotism and his morality in verses of undeniable originality. What work, out of all which were written previous to the time of Horace, can be cited as precedent for *Iam satis terris* (1, 2), for *Motum ex Metello* (2, 1), for *Iam pauca aratro* (2, 15), for the glorious sequence which opens the third book, for *Qualem ministrum* (4, 4) and *Divis orte bonis* (4, 5), for *Quae cura patrum* (4, 14) and *Phoebus volentem* (4, 15)? "None but a Roman could have conceived them: none among all the Romans but Horace could have written them." The same is true of his moralizing odes; they contain many a commonplace idea, which might have been expressed in almost any literary form, but they come to us with the unmistakable stamp of his style and his genius. A great number of the best odes are therefore refractory to classification; and the laws of the lyric genre upheld by Horace the critic are definitely annulled by Horace the poet. The argument is logically complete and might be left at this point; but it will be profitable to look at the other side of the shield and inquire what, if any, odes are after all susceptible of regular labels.

On reading through the odes, we find that many of them can be arranged under two such labels; (1) those in praise of the gods, (2) those which describe *iuvenum curas*, love-affairs. Under the first head fall 1, 10, 12, 18, 21, 30, 34, 35; 2, 19; 3, 11, 18, 25; 4, 1, 3: under the second, 1, 5, 8, 13, 19, 22, 23, 27; 2, 4, 5, 12; 3, 7, 9, 10, 20, 26, 28; 4, 10, 11. Now these are for the most part correctly and prettily turned verses, *amabilia carmina*; some of them deserve to be called charming; but be it said at once that with rare exceptions they are the least vital and the least inspired work that Horace has left us. How could it be otherwise? Horace did not believe in the gods; Horace was not an ardent lover. Bacchus¹ is not a real deity to him, but a name conventionally equivalent to "wine" or to "poetical inspiration"; and the strife of commentators in the vain endeavor to decide which of Horace's loves was the least unreal is sufficient evidence that his love-poems are decorative but not heartfelt. They might, to paraphrase Wordsworth, be defined as "Alcaeus recollected in tranquillity." Horace wrote poems to the gods because it suited the formal religious revival of his

¹ *Od. 3, 25.*

epoch; he wrote verses on love because it was a popular theme and also because the Greek lyric poets had done so before him. As for his poems in praise of wine, they are undoubtedly more sincere; though they are never touched with the earnestness of our old song "Back and side go bare, go bare."

We may therefore conclude not only that the generic laws are inapplicable to the *Odes* taken as a whole, but also that even in the cases where the laws appear valid *their validity is in inverse ratio to the originality and personal merit of the poems*. I suspect that our haste to revolt against romanticism, against extravagant and unbalanced expression, has led many students of the classics to tumble into the opposite abyss, and to praise classical poets for their supposed obedience to rules which had they really been obeyed would have destroyed poetry as surely as a mechanical organ destroys music. F. W. H. Myers, in his essay on Wordsworth, deals wisely with Wordsworth's own attempt to construct a theory of poetry. "Poetry, like all the arts, is essentially a mystery. Its charm depends upon qualities which we can neither define accurately, nor reduce to rule, nor create again at pleasure. Mankind, however, are unwilling to admit this; and they endeavor from time to time to persuade themselves that they have discovered the rules which will enable them to produce the desired effect. Among such incomplete explanations Wordsworth's essays must certainly be ranked. It would not be safe for any man to believe that he had produced true poetry because he had fulfilled the conditions which Wordsworth lays down." In the same way we may affirm that if Horace had complied with his own rules, he would not have been the Horace we know and love, but a mere poetaster.

Are we then left rudderless, to drift without any positive guidance, without any hope of understanding the actual procedure of Horace? Let us consider his practice by itself, and try to penetrate some little distance beneath the surface of that most difficult of all mysteries, the mystery of creation. It is clear enough now that we can never hope to reach the truth by the aid of the doctrine of literary genres, which, like Milton's oracle, runs through the archèd roof of the palace of literature in words deceiving. No critic, however profoundly versed in the lyrics which had been written *ante Horatium*, could have predicted the scope and content of the body of poetry left us by Horace. So long as we had

faith in the rules, it was comparatively easy to explain an ode. All we had to do was to discover in what meter it was written, and to classify it with the other poems written in the same meter; genus *lyric*, species *Sapphic*, content *light, graceful and rapid, expressive either of gay or serious animation of feeling*.¹ To abandon the rules is to undertake a harder and (I must insist) a more valuable kind of criticism; we are brought face to face with the personality of Horace. He is not easy to understand, for no man of genius is easy to understand; a complete explanation is impossible, but that does not excuse us from making a beginning.

Fortunately Horace has not left us without guidance. For the *Ars Poetica* is not merely an exposition of general critical theory, but also the most minute description of the actual task of composition. In it the poet tells us frankly how he wrote his lyrics. Ostensibly the *Ars* is largely devoted to laying down rules for the construction of comedy and tragedy; but it is of far greater actual value as a self-revelation, which enables us to follow the poet into his very sanctuary. This statement seems to contradict what has been said above concerning the proved discrepancy between the theory and the practice of Horace, but the contradiction is only apparent; for previously we were discussing the theory of literary genres, whereas now I refer to those passages which relate to the choice of words and phrases, to the slow torture of the pen. The portrait of the good critic, the Aristarchus who "if verses are dull will point it out; if they are harsh in rhythm, will find fault with them; if they are rough in style, will make an ugly cross with black ink opposite to them; who will apply the knife to redundant ornament; who will bid you clear up ambiguities and will mark what should be changed" — this portrait is sheer autobiography. The identity is established by Horace himself in the famous lines

ego apis Matinae
more modoque
grata carpentis thyma per laborem
plurimum circa nemus uvidique
Tiburis ripas operosa parvus
carmina fingo.²

¹ Sellar, *op. cit.*, pp. 186ff. Sellar's attempts to discriminate between Sapphic and Alcaic odes are utterly untenable.

² *Od. 4, 2, 27-32.*

To build an ode line upon line, strophe upon strophe, fitting, joining, struggling with the limited Latin stock of words until he had attained formal and detailed perfection, the neatness of incision for which a lapidary strives, — that was Horace's way. Petronius put the truth in two words; his *curiosa felicitas* (the laborious art of making phrases) is far better criticism than Quintilian's *verbis felicissime audax*. Hence the obvious insincerity of those verses in which Horace claims to be drunk with inspiration; his chosen companion was the file and not the bottle, Aristarchus and not Bacchus.¹

But Horace, like every other man, was subject to the defects of his qualities; his self-confessed attention to detail led him to forget the whole while he was engaged on the parts, and thus constantly to break one of his own maxims.² Take this tendency along with his personal and racial dislike of thinking a subject through, and I believe we have the explanation of many a puzzling poem, both in the *Sermones* and in the *Odes*. For example in *Od. 1, 3*, the first eight verses pray for the safety of Virgil in his voyage to Greece; the remainder of the poem insists vigorously upon the impiety and peril of attempting to sail the “estranging sea.” Surely this is to set a human head upon the neck of a horse; the structure is utterly illogical. Logic is indeed of no avail before such a difficulty; but the mental habits of Horace, which were not logical, forced him to work slowly and to think not by units but by fractions. His original impulse to write a courteous *bon voyage* to Virgil endured for the space of eight lines; but that, Horace felt, was insufficient. He had to go on, though he had said all he had to say to Virgil; so he drew upon his inexhaustible store of commonplace, from the particular compartment which dealt with ships and sailors.³ Meantime Virgil was forgotten, and soon the forty lines of Asclepiads were brought to a triumphant conclusion. Yet the conclusion had no more and no less to do with the beginning than the end of a train of thought has to do with the beginning.

Another instance is *Laudabunt alii*, of which the first fourteen verses are a rhetorical celebration of Tibur, the following six advise Plancus to “finire tristitiam vitaeque labores molli mero,” and the last twelve

¹ Cf. *Od. 3, 25.*

² *A. P., 25, 34, 35.*

³ Cf. K. F. Smith's edition of Tibullus, pp. 244–247, for parallels; the idea is “largely due to the Cynics and Stoics.”

adduce the precedent of Teucer.¹ The *vera causa* of this disjointed composition is the mental habit of the composer, whose attention was concentrated upon the task of writing Alcmanian strophes, upon the unity of meter; while the unity of thought and central purpose was unheeded.

Turn to *Vides ut alta stet*; in the first few lines a picture of extreme cold weather is succeeded by the sage counsel

nec dulcis amores
sperne puer neque tu choreas,

donec virenti canities abest
morosa.²

By this time the stage-setting of the poem has wholly slipped the attention of the poet, who concludes

nunc et campus et areae
lenesque sub noctem susurri
composita repetantur hora,

nunc et latentis proditor intimo
gratus puellae risus ab angulo
pignusque dereptum lacertis
aut digito male pertinaci.³

Everyone knows that the dead of winter at Rome is hardly the season for the "campus et areae" and "lenes sub noctem susurri."

At this point I must enter a *caveat*. Some one may fancy that I am endeavoring to exhibit defects in these odes which we all love, to indicate the presence of imperfections which should lead us to condemn; on the contrary, I feel that Horace becomes more human and more sympathetic just in the degree that his poetry is a revelation of his character and his ways. It was the settled practice of the Renaissance that classical poetry should be regarded as the achievement of objective perfection; a practice which has had the most disastrous consequences. The very name of the 'humanities' forbids that they be tried by the criterion of impeccability. In other words, the meteorology of Horace is totally indifferent to the critic of literature, save in so far as the

¹ *Od. I, 7.*

² *Od. I, 9.*

³ It is almost certain that *nunc* means "while you are young" as well as "now"; but, however it be taken, it contains no reference to the open fire and the wine.

personality of Horace was affected by his scientific beliefs. If a poem were a machine, then we should be justified in applying to it the tests we employ with machinery; accuracy to fact, conformance to objective reality, and efficiency. But a genuine poem is not a machine, and is always subjective. Let me give a few more examples.

Integer vitae has long been felt to present difficulties. It begins like a hymn with the more or less solemn proclamation of the poet's inviolability, and ends with the gaiety of

dulce ridentem Lalagen amabo,
dulce loquentem.

Now that we are rid of the old deceptive tenet that poems are written according to a predetermined scheme, it is not hard to imagine how the poem grew. The first eight verses are on a theme present in many of his odes; "di me tuentur, dis pietas mea et musa cordi est."¹ After he had composed these verses, it occurred to him that he might continue with one of the illustrative anecdotes of which he was so fond.² The mention of Lalage in v. 10 is a purely decorative detail, appropriate to the theme. Had the ode ended with v. 16, it would indeed have been logically complete, though not half so good a poem. But Horace was not yet satisfied; his mind recurred to Lalage and made her furnish him with a conclusion which was far from being implied in the ironical address to Fuscus. The same habit of psychological transition may be observed in *Parcus deorum cultor*,³ where Jupiter is displaced five lines before the end by the goddess Fortuna; in *Mercuri — nam te*,⁴ where Lyde is quite forgotten at the close of the poem; in *Impios parrae*,⁵ where Galatea suffers the same fate as Lyde; and in *Tyrrhenae regum*,⁶ where Maecenas suffers the same fate as Galatea.

Every man who knows Horace must make his own reconstruction of the *Odes*, and it is not at all my intention to attribute to the preceding paragraphs the sort of scientific validity which belongs to a mathematical demonstration, or to deny the value of interpretations written from another point of view. Genius, because it is alive, is always changing; and the trait of Horace's character which I have tried to

¹ *Od. 1, 17, 13; 1, 26, 1; 2, 7, 12; 3, 4, 25-36.* Cf. Ovid, *Ars Amat.* 3, 548-550; *Fasti* 6, 20.

² Cf. *Od. 2, 7, 13; 3, 4, passim; Serm. 2, 3, 142-157; 2, 6, 79-117; 2, 8, 54-78.*

³ *Od. 1, 34.* ⁴ *Od. 3, 11.* ⁵ *Od. 3, 27.* ⁶ *Od. 3, 29.*

indicate above was not permanently in the foreground of his writing. When he was inspired by a strong and durable emotion, Horace composed poems which are all one piece of "linked sweetness." The thought of death was often with him, and enabled him to write *Eheu fugaces*,¹ *Postume*; he loved Maecenas, and we have *Cur me querelis*;² he warmly admired Augustus, as well as the peace and safety of which Augustus was the symbol, and we have *Divis orte bonis*.³ These poems, and others such as these, betray no faltering, no change of theme; the current of his inspiration was not at any point interrupted or broken. In other words, we have ample proof that Horace frequently surpassed his ordinary self: which is the most disconcerting and precious quality of genius.

We have seen that the rules promulgated by Horace the critic do not hold when compared with the positive practice of the poet; that the law of literary genres is not a valid criterion in the case of that author who has so long been cited as one of its chief supporters, and that his doctrine did not determine his action. It is legitimate to infer that such critical theories are in need of close examination on the historical side. For their influence in ancient and modern times has been vast and their dominion over the realm of classical criticism has been practically unquestioned. If then it be possible to understand their genesis in antiquity, we shall arrive at a more accurate appraisal of their worth. If it become plain that they had their origin in confusion and in error, we shall be in a better position to judge the course of subsequent literary history, and we may be able to approach the solution of other and weightier problems than that presented by the *Ars Poetica*.

The *Ars Poetica* is not an isolated phenomenon. It is surrounded by a cloud of witnesses, chief among which are the rhetorical works of Cicero. I shall not attempt to deal with Varro and Lucilius, because I wish to avoid conjectural restorations, and because Cicero will furnish us with ample evidence for the purposes of the present argument. It is a noteworthy fact that Cicero's conception of eloquence corresponds very closely to the Horatian conception of poetry, and that an identical theory lies at the foundation of their critical precepts. Cicero will also do us the invaluable service of revealing the *fons et origo*, the great common source upon which they both drew.

¹ *Od. 2, 14.*

² *Od. 2, 17.*

³ *Od. 4, 5.*

Like poetry, *eloquentia* has a glorious origin, "id ex honestissimis causis atque optimis rationibus profectum";¹ eloquence broke through the "crust of custom" and instituted new and better ways of living; turned men from violence to justice, and gradually civilized the world.² Cicero ventures even to claim for eloquence that merit which was supreme at Rome: "tantam vim habet illa, quae recte a bono poeta dicta est 'flexanima atque omnium regina rerum oratio,' ut non modo inclinantem excipere aut stantem inclinare, sed etiam adversantem ac repugnantem *ut imperator fortis ac bonus capere possit.*"³

The end and aim of eloquence, like that of poetry, is to instruct, to give pleasure, to stir to action;⁴ Cicero avoids the old problem of the morality of rhetoric by insisting that the true orator must be virtuous, that *sapientia* must be united to the power of speech.⁵ The utmost stress is laid upon the necessity of "locutio emendata et Latina";⁶ *natura* and *ars* are frequently discussed, quite in the Horatian manner and with the same conclusion; and the difficulty of the orator's task is urged throughout, just as Horace dwells upon the indispensable *limae labor.*⁷

Much could be made of these and other coincidences of doctrine; but they are not so important as the underlying theory of which they are the expression. This theory is lucidly stated in the *Orator*, 70–75, and it deserves to be quoted at length; for in this passage Cicero emphasizes the mediating function of the doctrine of decorum to which reference was made *supra* p. 22:—"The perfect orator . . . will be able to speak in whatever style the case may demand. Now wisdom is the basis of eloquence as it is of everything else; for it is a task of the

¹ *De inv.* 1, 2.

² *De inv.* 1, 2 and 3.

³ *De Or.* 2, 187; cf. *Brutus*, 256: "multo magnus orator praestat minutis imperatoribus."

⁴ *Brutus*, 185; *A. P.*, 343, 344.

⁵ It is interesting to compare this with Aristotle, *Rhet.*, 1, 1. Aristotle like Cicero admits that rhetoric can be abused, but says: τοῦτό γε κοινὸν ἔστι κατὰ πάντων τῶν ἀγαθῶν πλὴν ἀρετῆς, and that truth is more easy to prove than error. Cicero has simply taken the step logically indicated by Aristotle, and defines eloquence as *sapientia* + rhetoric. In the *de Part. Or.* 1, 2, he is giving the rules of mere rhetoric and therefore says nothing of *sapientia*. Cf. *de Or.* 3, 55.

⁶ *Brutus*, 258; *de Or.* 3, 38.

⁷ *De Or.* 1, 109; 1, 223; 2, 5; 3, 22; *Brutus*, 25.

utmost difficulty to perceive what is fitting, in speech no less than in life. The Greeks call this *πρέπον*; we may use the word *decorum*. Not only has a great deal been written on this topic, but it is in the highest degree worthy of our study; for ignorance of decorum is the cause not only of faults in daily life, but is the principal source of faulty poems and speeches. The orator must moreover observe propriety not alone in the substance of his discourse but also in its verbal expression; for both the expression and the substance must be varied according to considerations of fortune, office, influence, age, place, time and hearer. Always, in every part of a speech, as in every part of life, we must heed the requirements of propriety. Propriety depends upon the subject under discussion, and upon the characters both of those who speak and of those who are addressed; it is a topic of great scope and range, and is therefore handled by *philosophers in ethical treatises, by grammarians writing on poetry, and by orators in every kind and subdivision of their subject*. For surely propriety is violated, if you employ on a single judge the most eloquent phrases and lofty *loci communes* to plead a petty case of damages caused by rain; or if, when the majesty of the Roman people is at stake, your speech be mean and pettifogging. . . . On every occasion you must watch to see how far you may go; for though every man has his own limit, it is better to err by falling short rather than by going too far. . . . Since we must avail ourselves of this principle of decorum in all we say or do, be it little or great; since it is plain that this principle is of vast importance and of the widest applicability (though it depends upon other considerations than those which govern duty, for duty signifies the fulfilment of obligations which rest always upon us all, whereas decorum varies according to occasion and to character); since the force of decorum is manifest not only in what we do and say, but also in facial expression, in our bearing and gait; if breaches in decorum are equally manifest and are avoided by poets as the worst of blemishes, as for example when a poet represents a base man speaking uprightly, or a fool wisely; if that famous painter was aware, in depicting the sacrifice of Iphigenia, whereat Calchas was sad, Ulysses deeply affected, Menelaus filled with grief, that he must draw Agamemnon as having his head covered, since no brush could imitate that supreme sorrow; if finally even an actor must aim at propriety; what shall we say of the orator?

Since the power of propriety is so great, the orator will pay attention thereto in every case and every part of a case; for it is clear that not only the lesser parts of a speech but each oration by itself ought to be fashioned after a different model. We must therefore discover the characteristic mark and form which belongs to every kind."

"Sequitur, ut cuiusque generis nota quaeratur et formula"; these words are the key to the doctrine of decorum, for they reveal the standard, the criterion by which propriety must in each case be tested. By following the clue they afford, we may hope to arrive at a fairly clear notion of the philosophical basis of Cicero's rhetorical compositions; which will in turn serve to explain the poetical theories of Horace. Perhaps the best method will be to examine the *Orator*, its purpose and its argument; for the account of his position given in the *Orator* is of necessity more direct and less hedged about by qualifications than in the dialogue of the *De Oratore*.

In the first place, his purpose is to shadow forth the shape and image of perfect eloquence,¹ to express an unrealized and unrealizable ideal,² to tell what is the best *genus orationis*;³ he repeatedly employs the words *species* and *forma* as synonymous with *optimum genus*. This last term has such a wide range of meaning that we might not be certain of its equivalence in this passage, were it not for two references in his letters, which give to the *Orator* the title "*de optimo genere dicendi*."⁴ Our next step must be to determine what Cicero meant by these terms *species* and *forma*. Fortunately he gives us an explicit definition. Phidias (he says), when sculpturing a statue of Jupiter or of Minerva, was not copying an actual model, but had in his mind a *species pulchritudinis eximia quaedam, quam intuens in eaque defixus ad illius similitudinem artem et manum dirigebat*. In like manner we may form a conception of perfect eloquence, an inner vision which corresponds to the inner vision of Phidias: — "ut igitur in formis et figuris est aliquid perfectum et excellens, cuius ad cogitatam speciem referuntur ea, quae sub oculos ipsa cadunt, sic perfectae eloquentiae speciem animo videamus, effigiem auribus quaerimus."⁵ In the next sections Cicero makes a statement which is not only decisive of the philosophical source of his method, but which will also enable us to explain the genesis of the

¹ *Or.* 43.

² *Or.* 7, 8.

³ *Or.* 52.

⁴ *Ep. ad Fam.* 12, 17, 2; *ad Att.* 14, 20, 3.

⁵ *Or.* 9.

doctrine of decorum and of ideal forms of literature as held by Cicero, by Horace, and so far as we know by all the critics of their time:¹ — “*Has rerum formas appellat iδέas ille non intellegendi solum, sed etiam dicendi gravissimus auctor et magister Plato*, easque gigni negat et ait semper esse ac ratione et intelligentia contineri; cetera nasci, occidere, fluere, labi, nec diutius esse uno et eodem statu. quicquid est igitur, de quo ratione et via disputetur, id est ad ultimam sui generis formam speciemque redigendum. ac video hanc primam ingressione meam non ex oratoriis disputationibus ductam, sed e media philosophia repetitam et ea quidem cum antiqua tum subobscura aut reprehensionis aliquid aut certe admirationis habituram: nam aut mirabuntur quid haec pertineant ad ea, quae quaerimus; quibus satisfaciet res ipsa cognita, ut non sine causa alte repetita videatur, aut reprehendent, quod inusitatas vias indagemus, tritas relinquamus. ego autem et me saepe nova videri dicere intellego, cum pervetera dicam, sed inaudita plerisque, et fateor me oratorem, si modo sim aut etiam quicumque sim, non ex rhetorum officinis, sed *ex Academiae spatiis extiisse*; illa enim sunt curricula multiplicium variorumque sermonum; sed et huius et aliorum philosophorum disputationibus et exagitatus maxime orator est et adiutus: omnis enim ubertas et quasi silva dicendi ducta ab illis est nec satis tamen instructa ad forensis causas; quas, ut illi ipsi dicere solebant, agrestioribus Musis reliquerunt.”

It is manifest therefore that Cicero's ideal orator is to be constructed by systematic reasoning upon the model of a Platonic ‘ideal’; that he has chosen not to continue the ordinary rhetorical discussions but to have direct recourse to philosophy; that he anticipates censure and surprise will be caused by his unconventional procedure. But in reality his critics will merely reveal their own lack of familiarity with the previous history of thought, for he will appear unconventional only to those who work in the rhetoric-shops, and not to those who have dwelt in the Academy.

One would think that this was a sufficiently explicit statement of the source from which Cicero drew his doctrine of an ideal form of eloquence; and yet modern criticism has paid little or no attention either to the statement itself or to its consequences. Laurand, after quoting

¹ *Or. 10-12.*

this very passage from the *Orator*, says “Cicero, therefore, did not borrow from Plato much which has to do with the art of oratory.”¹ This is an astounding sample of the art of “Quellenforschung” as it is practised today. To say that Cicero did not borrow much from Plato, when Cicero has just admitted or rather boasted that his whole doctrine of an ideal form of eloquence is due to Plato! It cannot be said too emphatically that such a system of Quellenforschung serves only to obscure the truth. The sole method of imitation which it takes into account is imitation by quotation, the mechanical reproduction of words and phrases; while it suffers the essential relationship of one thinker with another to go unheeded.

Leaving Plato for a moment, let us go back to Cicero and Horace. Cicero has said that the *species* and *forma*, the *optimum genus* of eloquence, is a Platonic idea. A difficulty at once arises out of the very definition of the *iδέα*. How can that which is eternal, which neither is born nor perishes, which is always the same, — how can such an ideal be adapted to the practical uses of oratory, to the infinite flux and change of daily life, to the exigencies of circumstance? Yet the solution is apparently very simple, and we have it in Cicero’s own words: — “is erit enim eloquens, qui et humilia subtiliter et magna graviter et mediocria temperate potest dicere.”² All eloquence has been divided into three parts or styles; perfect eloquence therefore consists in mastery of each of these three and in the ability to employ each at the proper time. It is no longer static and fixed; it has been dowered with life and flexibility by means of the doctrine of decorum. Without the aid of *τὸ πρέπον*, the antinomy could not be resolved, no rules could be laid down; without its aid, no art of rhetoric could be written and no art of rhetoric was written.³ It is the doctrine of decorum that mediates between the ideal form of eloquence and the practice of oratory, in

¹ *De Tull. Ciceronis studiis rhetoriciis*, p. 25.

² *Or. 100.*

³ I have not sufficient space to go into this in detail; but it is quite certainly true. Both Quintilian and Dionysius of Halicarnassus (to name only two witnesses) maintain the supreme importance of decorum. Cf. Dion. Hal. *de comp. verb.* 20: *καὶ γὰρ τοῦς ἄλλους χρώμασιν ἀπασι παρεῖναι δεῖ τὸ πρέπον. καὶ εἰ τι ἄλλο ἔργον ἀτυχεῖ τούτου τοῦ μέρους, καὶ εἰ μὴ τοῦ παντός, τοῦ κρατίστου γε ἀτυχεῖ.* Quin. II, I, I: “proxima est cura, ut dicamus *apte*; quam virtutem quartam elocutionis Cicero demonstrat, quaeque est meo quidem iudicio maxime necessaria.”

precisely the same manner that it mediates between the several ideal forms of poetry and the practice of poetical composition. Cicero has proclaimed that Plato is his master: Horace, too, has told us that the *Socraticae chartae* are the source of all good poetry.

We are now in a position to assert the fundamental identity of the critical theory of Cicero and of Horace. Each maintains the same doctrine of decorum as the basis of judgment upon any literary performance; each establishes a fixed literary ideal as the criterion in relation to which decorum must be measured. We have seen that these two doctrines underlie all their critical utterances and are the framework upon which both writers build. Furthermore, we have Cicero's word for it that Plato is the source of the doctrine of an ideal form of eloquence; a fact which would be obvious even if Cicero had not called our attention to it. Up to this point, we have reached certain definite results; it will be profitable to sum them up before taking the next step.

We began with an examination of the doctrine of literary forms as it has been applied to the criticism of the *Ars Poetica*; we discovered that it produced confusion and disagreement; we then studied the doctrine as promulgated by Horace and found that it did not avail to explain his own poetry. We then undertook to trace the genealogy of this doctrine and its corollary, the doctrine of propriety; and we learn from Cicero not only that they permeate his rhetorical writings but also that they have been borrowed from Plato. We have already given serious grounds for the belief that the doctrine of literary forms is not sound. So far as critics trust themselves to it, they are betrayed into externality, into prolonged examination of the outer features and into wrangling over classifications; while the individual and personal, the heart and soul of the truth, are left severely alone, or are dismissed briefly as mere aesthetic trifles. Is it conceivable that Plato is responsible for this erroneous method of literary criticism? Has Cicero any justification for attributing his scheme of eloquence to the great philosopher?

I believe that Cicero is right, and that Plato is responsible; and I shall devote the last part of this paper to a discussion of causes and consequences. We must attack the error at its source, which is the doctrine of ideas; for the laws of the genres are nothing but the expression in the sphere of literature of the Platonic doctrine of ideal forms.

The Platonic doctrine is, I believe, logically inapplicable to literature; yet Plato sought so to apply it, and the results have been disastrous for all his followers, from Aristotle and Horace to Brunetière and Norden, as well as for Plato himself. The historical process has been long and infinitely complex; our only chance of understanding it depends upon our ability to sympathize with Plato and interpret his purposes, without being swallowed by him. For his magic is so strong, his charms so powerful, that it is hard to read him without being overwhelmed by them; of all the arts that he learned from his master Socrates, the art of making disciples was the one he acquired most thoroughly.

Now it was the purpose of Plato to enthrone scientific truth, and to establish its dominion over the universe by means of dialectic.¹ He searched for the reality which underlies all appearance, for an abiding identity somewhere apart from the multitude of phenomena. He knew that poetry is vastly different from scientific truth; therefore he excluded poetry from his ideal state. Grant his premises, and you are compelled to grant his conclusion; but the premises are absolutely false. Intense as may be our admiration for Plato, it must not blind us to the fact that there is something fatally wrong in a theory of art which annihilates Homer. Παλαιά τις διαφορὰ φιλοσοφίᾳ τε καὶ ποιητικῇ: old is the quarrel between poetry and philosophy, says Plato in an apologetic passage.² If this quarrel can be resolved, no matter how tentatively and imperfectly, we shall have gone far on the road to an understanding of the bold position of Plato. First we must define. Philosophy means to Plato the search for those eternal natures which constitute the inner reality of the universe, and which alone can be objects of true knowledge.³ Once they are discovered, he intends to make the world over upon their model. Their truth is unalterable; they remain the same from everlasting to everlasting. Precisely in this respect, that is in their permanence and their uniformity, resides the essential likeness between the modern scientist's "laws of nature" and the Platonic ideas; there are of course differences between the two conceptions, but the fundamental postulate, the postulate of uniformity, remains the same. Without this postulate, modern science is

¹ I use the term "scientific," because science means to most of us now the same thing that philosophy meant to Plato; knowledge which is certain and is free from self-contradiction.

² Rep. 607.

³ Cf. C. C. J. Webb, *History of Philosophy*, p. 32.

unthinkable; and it is from this point of view that Plato's truth can rightly be called scientific. Both the modern scientist and Plato assume that the laws of nature are incapable of change. But poetry is a very different thing; in the widest sense of the word, poetry is an expression of man's creative power, of man's indefeasible and divine gift of altering the universe and of bringing into being something that never was before. Here then we have two undeniable facts; poetry on the one side and science on the other. If we can discern just what these contrasted realities mean to man, what relation they bear to human life, we shall also be able to draw some inferences concerning the relation of the Platonic ideas to human life.

The laws of nature are unalterable; in so far as we have to do with them, we are in unqualified subjection to them. When we speak of man's conquest of nature, we do not mean that these laws have been transformed by man, but merely that increasing knowledge of them has enabled us to avail ourselves of principles imperfectly known hitherto. Science lays down rules which men must obey; and strict obedience to these rules is a guarantee of perfect success, or rather of success which is perfect within certain limits and in certain ways. To forget the limitations of science is literally a fatal error, an error which brings death with it; for it does away with and utterly destroys (in logic, though not in fact) the creative activity of man. Nothing can be more sure than that science and scientific method do not and cannot govern the whole of human life: man is not always in subjection to scientific rules, and he actually does a great deal for which no such rules can be given. This other side of human life is the creative, the poetic activity of man. Without this side, man would have no history, and the world would be a mere mechanism; but inasmuch as he possesses it, he is not bound but free, so that he can achieve, create, invent. His creative power is of course limited, precisely as science is limited. They are in fact two reciprocal functions; neither one can dispense with the other. The scientist cannot do without the poetic faculty, any more than the poet can afford to disregard the law of gravitation.

Plato paid no heed to this truth when he made his attack upon poetry and art.¹ What we call poetry is nothing but one manifestation of

¹ Cf. Jowett, *Dialogues of Plato*, ii, p. 120: "The philosopher may be excused if he imagines an age when poetry and sentiment have disappeared, and truth has

man's creative power, a power which is necessary to human life. Plato tried to construct a world in which there should be no creation, no change, no poetry, a world of absolute and immutable Being, a scientific world. He followed the argument whither it took him; he was intensely logical.¹ But his premises were wrong, as I said above. He thought that scientific truth was the only reality in the universe. To appreciate how serious was his error and how far-reaching its consequences, one has only to follow in the *Republic* his working-out of the doctrine of ideas. Plato's dialectic is predominantly surgical; he reforms by cutting away. This world in which we live is at a half-way stage between existence and non-existence; it can be brought into conformity with existence, which is absolute truth, only by resolutely excising all the elements which are properly non-existent and false.² As we look about us we seem to behold incessant change, birth and decay; the phenomenal beings we call men appear to be swayed and torn by wild appetites and passions, to love and hate, to be born and suffer and die. None of these things are true, if we fix our eyes not on appearances but on reality; and our set purpose (*qua* Platonists) to reform this world of appearances depends for its fulfilment upon our ability to abolish, so far as we possibly can, all that causes change and error, whether the change be external to us or take place in our souls. Emotions and appetites are the beast of unreason in man;³ the only good and tolerable emotion is the Platonic Eros, the love of knowledge.

Thus Plato's desire to do away with emotion was enough to bring him into conflict with poetry. Plato was aware that not he only but all Greeks were profoundly moved by their poets, easily stirred to pity and to laughter; this he makes the heaviest count in his accusation, saying that "the poets satisfy and delight" that natural feeling in us taken the place of imagination, and the feelings of love are understood and estimated at their proper value." One is at a loss how to deal with such statements. How can a philosopher, whose business it is to recognize the truth, ever be excused for imagining a falsehood, for denying imagination, and for sneering at love?

¹ *Rep.* 394 D.

² Cf. *Rep.* 585. From this conception is derived the inhumanity of Plato, his hatred and contempt for the crowd; he shrank from the facts of human life to such an extent that he was forced to create a mythical monster, compounded of man and lion and serpent, instead of courageously admitting that man always was and always will be an animal.

³ *Rep.* 586 A.

"which is just hungering after sorrow and weeping."¹ Plato was therefore compelled either to forswear the very heart of his doctrine, or to expel from the state the poet as a disturber of the soul's peace and health.² We hear so much about Plato and myths, Plato and mysticism, Plato the great artist, that we are inclined to forget that he was one of the sternest and most thorough logicians that has ever lived, and to forget how intense was his faith in the conclusions to which his reason led him. Plato's expulsion of the poets was no mere metaphor, but was profoundly serious and earnest.

This decree, however, was not yet sufficiently broad-based to satisfy Plato: for the poets professed to teach mankind, to give good counsel, and to make men better in their cities,— a claim which was directly antagonistic to Plato's philosophy.³ It would have been suicidal for him to grant their claim; if the poets were right there was indeed no ground for his philosophical existence, and the philosopher who had asserted his monopoly of wisdom was doomed. He believed that truth could be attained in one way only; and that way was the one he advocated.⁴ The fight for his philosophical life was in itself an adequate reason for his denunciation of the poets; it forced him to prove that their assertions were false in every particular, that there was no truth in them and no possibility of the truth being in them. To meet this exigency he employed the famous theory of imitation. It behooves us to tread carefully here, because the real import of this theory has been so often misapprehended.

The real world is made by God, and consists of absolute and immutable Forms.⁵ Strictly speaking, He is the sole artisan and sole creator. On earth, however, we have men who at one remove imitate

¹ *Rep.* 604 ff. Cf. 606 D: "And the same may be said of lust and anger and all the other affections, of desire and pain and pleasure which are held to be inseparable from every action,— in all of them poetry feeds and waters the passions instead of withering and starving them."

² *Rep.* 398.

³ Cf. Murray, *Rise of the Greek Epic*, pp. 1 ff., and the references there given.

⁴ Plato's aristocratic impulses found expression in an aristocratic and exclusive doctrine. Hence "the real ruler must be a philosopher; and the philosophic nature is reserved for a few rare souls: 'a whole people cannot be a people of philosophers'." (Barker, *Political Thought of Plato and Aristotle*, p. 110).

⁵ *Rep.* 596, 597.

these heavenly Forms; if the Form be of a bed, we call the prime earthly imitator a manufacturer of beds. The beds which he makes are like reality, but not perfectly real; for they are at one remove from the perfect reality which is in heaven, although they are the best which are in this world, and represent the nearest approach to perfection which can be made by man. Therefore the manufacturer of beds and any one else who imitates at first hand has a right to exist. But the poet has no such right; for he merely talks about what other people do, make, and think. He imitates an already imperfect imitation; i. e., he imitates a phantasm and not the truth, from which he is twice removed. The result is completely divorced from truth: only children and fools will take it for reality.

Thus Plato proves his point: and thus a sophistical and unjust argument was begotten, whose numerous progeny have darkened the discussion of aesthetic and literary theory ever since. It has been said that the ideal of history is "*tout comprendre et ne pas s'indigner*"; but it is a false ideal. Not to understand is perhaps inexcusable, but not to be indignant at this vicious doctrine of Plato's is to make oneself partaker in his crime; it is to banish life from literature, as well as literature from life. Plato did not engage in a fair fight with poetry: he struck it from behind with a deadly weapon — the theory of imitation, and his pupil Aristotle, who adopted the theory and made it the foundation of all he said about literature, affords us a fascinating and instructive spectacle.¹ In the hands of the skilful Aristotelian dialectic, the offensive weapon of the master was transformed into an instrument of healing; and the wounds of poetry were staunched, though temporarily and imperfectly, by the very same tool which had been used to inflict the blow. The theory of imitation was employed by Plato to accomplish a special purpose, to achieve the ruin of poetry and art; and we have seen that Plato longed for this disastrous consummation because his scheme of the universe was incomplete, because he

¹ Finsler, *Platon*, pp. 14-26, gives ample proof that "Platon am Ende seines Lebens die gesamte Poesie ohne Ausnahme als Nachbildung bezeichnet hat, und zwar ganz unabhängig von allen ausser ihr liegenden Gesichtspunkten." We can never get at the truth about Plato so long as we regard his use of the term *mimesis* as a mere accident of phraseology; Plato knew what he was doing, and to regret its "disparaging associations" (Butcher, p. 121) is like regretting the "harsh treatment" accorded Charles I.

attempted to make the world wholly scientific and sought to exclude from it all creative activity. This error of Plato's was rapidly transformed into a definite system of aesthetics and of criticism; and it has profoundly influenced all men and all things which have since come into contact with it, be they little or great, Horace or Aristotle, the Alexandrian grammarians or the mediaeval scholastics, Scaliger, Boileau, Pope, or Taine and Brunetière and Norden.

In particular, I wish to show its intimate and vital relation to the twin doctrines of literary form and of decorum to which Cicero and Horace adhered. This relation will become manifest as soon as we have set forth the terminology employed by Plato in his theory of imitation. It is hardly possible to exaggerate the influence which, through the medium of this theory, Plato has exerted upon the subsequent history of literature; and we shall discover that the conjunction of this theory with the doctrine of ideas has determined all the ordinary formulas of criticism.

1. The perfection of reality, of reason, of science, of truth, is expressed by the words *εἶδος* or *ἰδέα* (form, shape).¹ These perfect *εἴδη* or *ἰδέαι* are in and constitute nature (*φύσις*); it may be said that god is their maker (*θεὸν ἐργάσασθαι*) or that he is the creator of nature (*φυτουργός*) or that god is he who makes by virtue of nature (*φύσει πάντα πεποίηκεν*). Nature is itself perfect and is indistinguishable from the *εἴδη*.²

2. At one remove or separated by one generation (*γέννημα*) from perfection are all the phenomena of this universe, both things and men. The maker of a phenomenal bed or table (such as we actually use) makes it by copying the real shape (*πρὸς τὴν ἰδέαν βλέπων*);³ he acts as agent of the shape, and the result is not of course real, but is a semblance of reality (*τι τοιοῦτον οἶον τὸ õν*).⁴ The duty of the philosopher is to extract and abstract the reality from the semblance, by means of

¹ I should apologize for repeating this familiar terminology, were it not so necessary for my argument. See *Rep.* 596 ff., or any good account of Plato's doctrine.

² Cf. A. W. Benn, *The Greek Philosophers*, p. 233: "The sense of supreme and absolute reality belongs in a much higher degree to the Platonic *φύσις* than to the nature of modern or even of Aristotelian philosophy."

³ 596 B.

⁴ 597 A.

dialectic: dialectic is the "only method which attempts systematically to form a conception of the real nature of each individual thing."

3. One remove further away from reality is a third class of things, which are imitations of the semblances of reality. For example, the real bed is an *εἶδος*, the phenomenal bed is a copy of the *εἶδος*, but the "bed" which is made by a painter is a copy of a copy.¹ Therefore it has no part nor share in reality or truth; it is a mere imitation.² It cannot deceive the elect, but it does deceive children and thoughtless men.³ The makers of such imitations are painters and poets; they are imitators and sorcerers, who pretend to have all knowledge but actually have none.⁴ If they had, they would not imitate phantasms, but would try to copy reality; that is, they would abandon art for science.⁵ "Do you think that if a man could produce both the original and the imitation he would give himself up to the manufacture of the imitations, and make this his object in life, under the idea that he professes a most noble purpose?" Thus science utters through Plato the decree of banishment from the state.

The decree is entirely justified, if the premises be admitted: nevertheless Plato makes one illogical exception to the execution of the decree, in that he permits hymns to the gods and panegyrics on good men.⁶ In this case, Plato clearly allows his feelings to overcome his reasons: his motive is laudable, but the act is due to what we call "human weakness," as when a man who believes exclusively in organized charity gives alms to a beggar.⁷ If, however, we summon Plato to defend his lack of logic, he will say: — "Though I banish poetry, yet I still love it with all my heart, and shall welcome any proof that poetry is not only pleasurable but also profitable; as things are, I can tolerate only the exception I have named, and that only on condition that the gods and good men be represented as perfectly good." Thus does Plato hint at the method of rescue, at the defense against his own indictment; a hint which was caught at eagerly by Aristotle.

¹ 597 B.

² 598 B.

³ 598 C.

⁴ 598 D. It will be noticed that Plato makes no less unfair use of the principle of division of labor than of the theory of imitation.

⁵ 599 A.

⁶ 607 A.

⁷ It has been suggested that Plato, very likely, had another motive: i. e., reluctance to interfere with established religious conventions.

Before going on to that, let us draw the inferences necessitated by the theory of imitation as we have outlined it. The perfect form of anything is called the *εἶδος* or *ἰδέα*. Suppose that we are looking at a particular bed (*κλίνη τις*) made by a human manufacturer: how shall we judge it, by what standard or criterion shall we criticize it? Plainly *we shall judge it by the degree in which it corresponds with or approaches to the perfect form or εἶδος*. Although the phenomenal object never can be absolutely perfect, we must strive to make it *conform* as nearly as possible. Moreover, we shall criticize in terms of excess and defect: that is, we shall discover that the particular bed either lacks some of the qualities inherent in the perfect bed, or has some qualities foreign to the perfect bed, or both. We shall say it is too long or not long enough, or too soft or not soft enough. So with every other particular thing in the universe, including particular men: we shall praise and condemn by the standard afforded by the *εἶδος*, in terms of conformity to that standard. But this is the doctrine of propriety, and this is also the doctrine of perfect forms; this is precisely what we have been searching for throughout our investigation. The essential framework and system of these doctrines is therefore Platonic; they must apply to literature, for they apply to everything. As a matter of fact, Plato himself applied them to literature, both to poetry and to rhetoric. In the *Gorgias*, statesmen, sophists, and rhetoricians, are damned by the same argument which Plato employs against poetry; they must go, and their places must be taken by the true philosopher, since he alone can make men better.¹ Remembering the identity of scientific (that is, ultimately real) truth with the *εἶδη*, let us examine Plato's critique of Homer.

Since scientific truth is also (for Plato) moral perfection and since gods and heroes are morally perfect, a poet who represents gods and heroes as immoral beings is irreverent, offensive and injurious; that is, he violates propriety inasmuch as he is false to the perfect form. The poet must be compelled to impress upon his poems the likeness of

¹ Cf. *Gorgias*, 503 A: "Rhetoric is of two sorts; one, which is mere flattery and disgraceful declamation; the other, which is noble and aims at the training and improvement of the souls of the citizens, and strives to say what is best." That is, Socrates has set up a 'perfect form' of rhetoric, and has compared actual rhetoric with that perfect form; naturally it falls short of the ideal, and is therefore condemned, by parity of reasoning with the condemnation of poetry.

moral perfection; failing in that, he fails in all. The utterly nihilistic character of Plato's doctrine comes out in page after page. He does not merely expurgate, he excinds Homer. He leaves no place of shelter for art, and it would be impossible to write poetry in Plato's state. I should not insist upon an already obvious fact, were it not that so many literary critics have thought that they could accept his premises and escape his conclusions, that by some magic they could disentangle themselves from his almost flawless dialectic.¹ Plato, we may be sure, would have treated them as a saint later treated the Laodiceans. No man can logically reconcile Plato's theory of art with the continued existence of art. Plato could not reconcile the two, and he was no mean logician. However, we have seen what was the origin of Plato's error; we have seen how he employed the theory of imitation to serve his purpose, and how the twin doctrines of propriety and of the perfect form came quietly forth from their home, the doctrine of ideas. Let us trace a few steps in their downward career.

Aristotle, the great conservative and natural scientist, criticized the details of Plato's doctrine, but adopted its essential methods, and therewith its essential error. As the old saying goes, he criticized Plato as a foal kicks its mother. No logical compromise with the theory of imitation was possible; therefore Aristotle made an illogical compromise. He tried to accept both things as they are, and also Plato's realism. But Platonic realism means that things are not really as they are, but utterly otherwise. This is the reason why Aristotle invented his *ὕλη*; matter is the illogical stop-gap between things as they are and nature or *φύσις*, which is perfect and is identical with the *εἶδος* and with *οὐσία* and with the *τέλος τῆς γενέσεως*.² But one cannot introduce

¹ Cf. I. Babbitt, *Masters of Modern French Criticism*, *passim*. Mr. Babbitt is constantly appealing to Platonic definitions and to Platonic idealism to rescue us from naturalism and from the philosophy "of the flux." There is, however, no hope of rescue in Platonic idealism (or rather realism); naturalism and Platonic realism are both equally hostile to humanism, and the sooner it is recognized the better for truth and for criticism.

² Cf. A. W. Benn, *Greek Philosophers*, p. 289; he discusses Aristotle's notion of substance, and concludes "the truth is, that we are here, as Zeller has shown, in presence of an insoluble contradiction, and we must try to explain, not how Aristotle reconciled it with itself, for that was impossible, but how he reconciled himself to it."

such compromises between logic and fact without getting into difficulties; a single initial error vitiates the whole process. From this point of view, we can explain though we cannot justify the difficulties which beset the *Poetics* of Aristotle; for he brought them on his own head by his attempt to reconcile the fact of poetry with the Platonic theory of imitation. Aristotle sought to meet the two logically irrefutable charges made by Plato; i. e., that poetry is immoral, and that poetry is not in accord with ultimate reality.

Butcher has said that "Aristotle was the first who attempted to separate the theory of aesthetics from that of morals."¹ This statement is extremely misleading, and is based upon a false interpretation of Aristotle. On the contrary, Aristotle insists throughout the *Poetics* upon the morality of poetry; we cannot afford to forget that Aristotle was under the necessity either of answering Plato's accusations against poetry or of remaining silent on the subject of poetry. Plato had said that in the case of pity, love, anger, and all the mental sensations of desire, grief, and pleasure, "poetic imitation feeds and waters the passions instead of withering and starving them." Aristotle's course was plain. "My dear master," he said, "you are certainly right in saying that poetry has a powerful effect on the emotions; but your prejudice blinds you to the fact that the effect is not evil, as you say, but good. You denounce poetry because it stirs the emotions: I praise poetry because it expels them from the soul precisely as a purge expels evil from the body. Therefore the soul is made better by poetry and not worse. The function of poetry is moral purgation." Thus

¹ Castelvetro, *Poetica d'Aristotele*, pp. 9, 116, 117, is more nearly right: "*Aristote riprueba con poche parole quello che dice Plaione.*" Butcher, *Aristotle's Theory of Poetry and Fine Art*⁴, has a very bad time trying to reconcile the *Poetics* with what he himself believed to be true. Compare these three passages: "art addresses itself not to the abstract reason but to the sensibility and image-making faculty; it is concerned with outward appearances; . . . its world is not that which is revealed by pure thought; it sees truth, but in its concrete manifestations, not as an abstract idea (p. 127): "the work of art was not a semblance opposed to reality, but the image of a reality which is penetrated by the idea, and through which the idea shows more apparent than in the actual world (p. 160): "since it is the office of the poet to get at the central meaning of facts, to transform them into truths by supplying vital connexions and causal links, to set the seal of reason upon the outward semblances of art, it follows that the world of poetry rebels against the rule of chance (p. 180)."

Aristotle introduced the doctrine of *catharsis* into his definition of tragedy; so far from abandoning the prevalent Greek tradition concerning the office of poetry, he confirmed it with all the weight of his authority. It makes absolutely no difference to the argument whether we interpret *catharsis* as a physiological metaphor, in the sense of 'purging,' or as a metaphor from the religious rite of lustration, in the sense of 'purification.' I think there is no doubt that 'purging' is the correct translation, but in either case the man whose emotions have been purified or purged is thereby made better; and since this is the end and ultimate justification of tragedy, tragedy has a moral purpose. The doctrine of *catharsis* is Aristotle's refutation of Plato; and, curiously enough, it may almost as truly be said to be Plato's refutation of Plato.¹ Plato repeatedly refers to the " purging away of pleasures and emotions"; and all Aristotle had to do was to extend the application of a process long familiar and to assert the morality of poetry by virtue of its effect on the moral nature of man. In this way a metaphor suggested by the medical practice of all ages and by religious theories current in Greece since the early days of Orphicism became a stately aesthetic dogma and a perennial source of discussion among the learned.

Aristotle had thus removed the first objection to poetry. To find an answer to the other accusation, i. e., that poetry has no part in the real truth, was not a difficult task for the man who wrote the *Organon*. Scientific truth, which meant to Plato knowledge of the *εἰδη*, meant to Aristotle knowledge of the universal, of *τὰ καθόλου*. But poetry, said Aristotle, is founded upon the universal, not upon the individual. It describes, not the kind of thing that has happened, but a kind of thing that might happen, i. e., what is possible as being probable or necessary. Hence poetry is more philosophical and of graver import than history, since its statements are of the nature rather of universals,

¹ Cf. *Phaedo* 69C; *Rep.* 560D, 567C; and *Laws* 790, 791. For Orphicism, compare Burnet, *Phaedo*, *ad loc.*, and the *Early Greek Philosophy*, 88, 107 ff. Butcher's and Bywater's attempts to show that tragedy, according to Aristotle, has no direct moral influence, are most unconvincing. "Tragedy does not make men better, though it removes certain hindrances to virtue" (Butcher, p. 269). It is plain that if there is within a man something which hinders him from being virtuous, then the tragedy, by removing that hindrance, does more than a merely negative work.

whereas those of history are singulars. It is appalling to realize how an argument conceived for the express purpose of refuting Plato, a paradox employed against a deduction from an untenable theory, has reverberated through subsequent criticism. Suffice it to say that poetry is neither philosophy nor science, and that the attempt to identify the truth of poetry with scientific or philosophical truth is wholly indefensible. Poetry has nothing to do with universals. The attribution of universality to poetry was forced upon Aristotle by the theory of imitation; and his polemic is entirely contained within the limits of that theory. But that theory is false, and what is contained within it is also false.

However, Aristotle considered that he had thus cleared the ground for his treatise on poetry. Now comes the crucial moment for the history of criticism: in what way did Aristotle approach the actual task of judging literature? His acceptance of the theory of imitation compelled him to regard literature as an external product, and not as an expression; as something which man makes, and not as something to which man gives birth. We must resolutely free ourselves from the opinions we have already formed about the *Poetics* in the course of previous study, in order that we may renew our curiosity and get fresh impressions from the facts.

“Our subject being poetry, I propose to speak not only of the art in general but also of its species and their respective capacities; of the structure of plot required for a good poem; of the number and nature of the constituent parts of a poem; and likewise of any other matters in the same line of inquiry. Let us follow the natural order and begin with the primary facts.”¹ The promise of Aristotle’s first sentence is abundantly fulfilled in those that follow: his treatise is at once scientific and practical. He presents us with the earliest complete application of the doctrine of literary forms. Poetry, which is a species of imitation, is itself subdivided into several sub-species. These sub-species are literary forms; and it is of the utmost importance, for the historian of literature at least, that the Aristotelian method of criticism be fully understood.

His statements, then, are to be true and precise in the scientific sense; his definitions are to be mandatory both for the critic of poetry

¹ *Poetics*, 1447 A, Bywater’s translation.

and for the poet.¹ To each definition is attached a penalty, which operates as automatically as any other scientific law: if you attempt to disregard the 'law' (or force) of gravitation, you pay the penalty by falling; if you attempt to disregard the law of tragedy, you pay the penalty, because what you have written will not be a tragedy. Conversely, if you obey the law strictly, the result will be a tragedy; and if you obey it perfectly, the result will be a perfect tragedy. If a critic take up your work to criticize it, his whole duty will be to see whether or not it conforms perfectly to the law. If it does, he cannot withhold his approval; if it does not, he must condemn it.² For in the eyes of Aristotle, a definition is a scientific law and an expression of ultimate truth; this is the reason why the process of defining is so enormously important in his philosophy. He believes that a definition must set forth the "actual lines of cleavage which nature has established between kind and kind,"³ and failure to distinguish between the Aristotelian *ōpos* and modern usage has led to a great deal of loose thinking. When we define, we merely declare the sense which we intend henceforward to put on a word or symbol; whereas Aristotle taught that to know the definition is to know the thing defined, to know the form or *eidos* in perfection. In such wise did form become lord over the realm of literature and criticism as well as over all other fields of knowledge.

The all-important question for us, then, is to determine whether these scientific definitions of form are what they pretend to be, whether they do or can correspond to the ultimate scientific truth. Do such definitions possess objective validity? If they do, they must fulfil two requirements: they must explain all 'tragedies' or whatever form is being defined, and they must be capable of verification. The conclusion is, I think, beyond reasonable doubt, that such definitions do not and cannot possess objective validity. Compare them with a genuine scientific law, and they fade and shrink into desiccated and

¹ Through these Aristotelian definitions, which must state the absolute essence and the cause of the things defined, the Platonic doctrine of ideas enters into all the innumerable classifications which Aristotle undertook; both philosophers hold that Form is the ultimate reality.

² It is obvious that we owe this method of criticism to the Platonic forms. Cf. *supra*, pp. 51, 52.

³ A. E. Taylor, *Aristotle*, p. 23.

ineffectual abstractions.¹ For example, take those scientific laws which deal with the behavior of falling bodies: by their aid we can explain a given event, such as a man's breaking his neck, without reference to the date of that event. He may have fallen a century ago, he may fall a century hence; but we can tell with absolute certainty the rate at which he fell or will fall. If we could not do so, we should reject these laws: for their whole value lies in their power to furnish us with an explanation which shall be applicable any time and all the time. Tried by the same test, what becomes of the law of tragedy? Neither Aristotle's nor any other conceivable definition will assist us to explain any particular tragedy whatsoever.² Our knowledge of the law of gravitation affords us a peculiar but genuine scientific comfort when we pick ourselves up after a fall. We know what has happened to us. But no law of tragedy ever gave or can give a similar glow of satisfaction to the man who has just finished reading the *Oedipus Tyrannus* or the *Medea*: something very real has happened to him, but it is not susceptible of scientific explanation. In order to know the particular tragedy, we have to live with it; precisely as we have to live with a friend in order to know him. *The experience is in each case real*, and yet is extremely incapable of being expressed or explained by a scientific formula.

In like manner, let us examine the second requirement, in the name of which we demand that a scientific law be capable of verification. Verification means that we must not shrink from the facts, that we must take our hypothesis and plunge with it into the midst of reality. If it enables us to swim, to keep our heads above water and to meet

¹ It may occur to some one that I am doing Aristotle an injustice by comparing his laws of tragedy to the laws of natural science. I am not: as a matter of fact, it was Aristotle who did himself an 'injustice,' by attributing an even higher degree of reality to his disquisitions on literature than the modern scientist would to his hypotheses concerning the uniformity of nature.

² The vain endeavor to abide by the laws of Aristotle has conducted to the production of a vast body of error; e. g., take the sentence of Butcher (p. 270): "The private life of an individual, tragic as it may be in its inner quality, has never been made the subject of the highest tragedy." What do these words mean? Is not Lear an individual created by Shakspere? Is there any valid distinction between the private and the public life of an individual? What Butcher really means, as the following argument makes clear, is that he did not like Ibsen.

new waves, well and good: it has stood the test and we must stand by it. If on the contrary, the next novel fact cannot be met and overcome by the law, the law must go and not the fact. Now that is precisely the situation that criticism is in, so long as critics endeavor to establish 'scientific laws' of form. Their 'scientific definitions' of a particular form are always being refuted by good new work, so that the history of criticism has been the history of a long scramble to overtake these new facts; each critic has been forced to jettison the old laws and to make new ones, and the critic therefore always remains behind and not in the truth. If these arrears could ever be cleared up, if there were reason to believe that sometime an ultimate law will be correctly stated, then all would be satisfactory; but the arrears will never vanish, because the creative activity of man can never be imprisoned. Science may and does limit art; but it cannot control art. Poetry has a truth and a reality of its own; it is not subject to scientific truth and reality. The doctrine of evolution, which is another name for mystery, has been applied to the genres of literature, in an attempt to solve the admitted difficulty; but evolution does not touch the real problem of the validity of the genres. To say that things which have no scientifically real existence evolve is to pursue a dream.

It is therefore impossible to establish a scientific and objective definition of any form of literature. We might easily reach the same conclusion in another way: that is, by examining the mental process through which a critic goes in the endeavor to define. Tragedy cannot be defined in the void: the critic must have some works of literature which all acknowledge to be tragedies in the particular and concrete sense. The definition of the genus must be reached by combining the essential attributes common to all the species. But this means abstraction from the reality; it means that tragedy must be studied externally and not from the inside; that it must be treated as a given fixed product, not as a round truth but as a flat surface. The result is that the definition cannot be equivalent to the concrete fact and cannot possibly explain that fact, because the particular tragedy is not itself objective. On the contrary, each particular tragedy is an expression of the creative power of some particular man, and is a part of the author's life. Aristotle did not escape the consequences of the old Platonic error, and his definitions are necessarily invalid.

But that is not all. The fact that they are false and are based on a false philosophy did not prevent them from succeeding. This method to which Aristotle gave the sanction of his authority was followed implicitly by all the Peripatetics, by all the Alexandrians, by Varro, Cicero, and Horace. Herein lies its vast importance for the history of literature and of criticism. Definitions were altered from time to time to suit the changing conceptions held by individuals or by schools; but the fundamental assumption always remained the same, and each critic as he formulated his own doctrine thought that he had put in definitive words the ultimate truth, the veritable essence and *φύσις* of that *εἶδος*. Hence the stress laid by them all upon the corollary doctrine of propriety; for no concrete work of letters could be judged good, unless it were in perfect conformity with the *εἶδος* as defined by the critics. The curse of Alexandrinism was contained in Plato and Aristotle, for their doctrines had externalized literature and directed the attention of both critics and poets to rules and formulas, to the *εἶδος* with which (they believed) they must conform. Dogma was piled on dogma until originality succumbed, or the poor remnants of creative power were forced into extravagance and obscurity, the *Alexandra* of Lycophron or the *Technopaignia* of Simias.

As an example of such dogmas, we might take Aristotle's statement that the most important of the six parts of every tragedy is the plot, because "the plot is the end and purpose of the tragedy."¹ We have become so habituated to the use of such terms as "plot," "diction," and "character," that we do not easily nor at once realize the absurdity of such a statement. Let us examine the word: it is defined as "the combination of incidents, or things done in the story."² Aristotle separates plot from character, and argues that "a tragedy is impossible without action, but there may be one without character."³ Sweep away these abstractions, and look at the truth: it is plain that there can be no actions without actors, that every actor has a 'character,' that plot and character are simply names that we give for the sake of convenience to different aspects of a reality which is one and indivisible. The convenience which we attain by the use of such names is purely empirical and is not at all scientific; we have a right to use them, but we have no right to use them as if they were mathematical symbols.

¹ *Poetics*, 1450 A 22.

² *Poetics*, 1450 A 4, 5.

³ *Poetics*, 1450 A 24.

From this point of view we can see how intimate is the dependence of Horace upon Aristotle. The definitions of the genres, with their imposing air of finality, actually varied in terms according to the subjective prejudices and the dominant interests of each critic; but they were always made out of the same material and by the same method. Now a mechanical concept, like any machine, is worn out by constant use; and this is exactly what happened to the conception of the *εἶδος* of literature. The elaborate definition of tragedy given by Aristotle became a brief formula in the hands of his pupil Theophrastus;¹ and his careful scientific study, in the *Poetics*, of the perfect form had inevitably the effect of elevating various concrete poems into the position of concrete models. Take the case of epic: Aristotle says that "Homer is in the serious style the poet of poets, standing alone not only through the literary excellence, but also through the dramatic character of his imitations."² That is, Homer is a concrete example of success in the epic genre. The irresistible inference is that if a poet imitates the epic of Homer, he also will be a success. I do not see how we can logically find fault with any poet for making this inference; and, as a matter of fact, it is notorious that poets after Aristotle did make it. He had told them to comply with the laws of the genre or be poetically ruined; their answer is easy to understand. They said: "Show us, not merely a definition which our minds do not readily grasp, but also real specimens of poetry which conform to your rules, and we shall be only too glad to become perfect poets." Aristotle made it easy for them to believe that Homer had caught and fixed for all time the immutable ideal shape of epic; they looked behind them to the Golden Age, in poetry as in all else, and there was no bitterness or reserve in Horace's heart when he sang that he was *inventore minor*.³ Hence came the Alexandrian craze for canonical lists of approved poets and orators: hence came the cry of stifled originality, urging the Romans by day and night to study the *exemplaria Graeca*.

¹ Cf. Diomedes: ". . . ἡρωϊκῆς τύχης πεπλοτασίς." ² *Poetics*, 1448 B 35 ff.

³ Many elements conspired to assure the place of the *inventor*. Euhemerism, admiration for the divine in man, was unconscious long before it became a system: witness the Greek attitude toward Theseus and Heracles, and the dictum of Aristotle, *Metaph.* 1, 1, 14. The pity of it is that Horace felt that he was necessarily a lesser poet than Lucilius, not on account of Lucilius's poetry, but on account of his meter.

All this evil was implicit in the theory of imitation: Horace merely played his part in the historical unfolding of doctrines and methods which dominated the Graeco-Roman world. It is useless and foolish to search through the *Ars Poetica* for phrases which may be direct quotations from the *Poetics*; because the whole poem is a spiritual quotation of the *Poetics*, and is a quotation in the same sense that a child may be called a quotation of his father. We have had enough of Quellenforschung in the mechanical sense; it is time to study the parentage of the spirit. In this sense, there can be no doubt that Horace is the child of Aristotle. His literary theory is entirely conceived within the trammels of the doctrines of form and decorum. It is fortunate for us that his theory could not control his practice, that his poetical genius was too strong to be killed by his critical theories.

I cannot go further into the history of the doctrine of literary forms. We have traced it back to its philosophical genesis in Plato, and have discovered that an erroneous and inadequate method had an erroneous and inadequate beginning. Wherever and whenever it has been accepted by men, the consequences have been the same; sterility, mechanical reproduction, routine, or on the other hand, wild extravagance and uncontrolled vagaries in art and literature, — in every case, the death of sane creative spirit. Great play has been made with the antithesis between classicism and romanticism; like so many other antitheses, it is essentially false, and we must resolve it by transcending it. It is not true that Platonic idealism, when applied to literature, tends to encourage sanity: on the contrary, it produces results which are apparently paradoxical, either excesses amounting to mania, or a faith in mechanical routine which amounts to death. I am not arguing; I am calling attention to the fact that Platonic idealism has, for reasons which have been explained above, the same effect upon human life as the most materialistic and naturalistic philosophy. The Alexandrian age is an example; the Renaissance is another; and the nineteenth century is a third, with which we are all familiar. In no century have men put more naïve and pathetic confidence in the power of science to explain and to control everything in the universe; in no century have men committed wilder excesses in art and in letters. The one excess flows from the other: for whenever we persuade ourselves that there is no truth but scientific truth, whenever we try to compre-

hend and govern the human faculties in their entirety by science, we do not therefore succeed in eliminating and annihilating our creative powers, but, what is almost as bad, we leave them uncontrolled or aborted. In other words, we cannot, so long as we live, help being poets, but it is very easy not to be a good poet.

The same principle holds true of criticism. On the one hand, a vast number of critics who have been misled into thinking that scientific method will give us the whole truth of literature; on the other, a lesser body of anarchists, who believe in *picaresque* criticism, in the adventures of the soul among master-pieces. With the latter class I have no concern, for they have not perceptibly interfered with classical studies. But with the others we are all most bitterly concerned. They have sought to reduce criticism to a science; and, like Norden, they define literary history as the history of the transformation of the genres. They found their history upon form, upon the *εἶδος*; we have criticized their foundation, and we have shown that it does not correspond to the truth. We have taken a concrete literary problem, the *Ars Poetica* of Horace, and followed the work of its critics through four centuries. They never grasped the reality, because their critical method absolutely precluded that happy result (except as they uttered truth accidentally, and out of relation to their system); let me recall their method in the light of our conclusions.

Each of the two schools thought, as Aristotle would have thought, that the problem which they had to solve was a problem of classification and of definition; that the ultimate question was whether the *Ars* belongs to the didactic or to the epistolary genre. These genres were defined quite in the Aristotelian manner; a didactic poem possesses one very distinct set of qualities, and an epistolary poem possesses another distinct set. The next step was to decide whether the qualities actually discernible in the *Ars* correspond more closely to the ideal didactic or to the ideal epistolary poem. So far the two schools were in agreement, but at the moment of decision they divide; and the gulf between them cannot be traversed. For the decision involved the making of a subjective judgment, which could not possibly be controlled by scientific reasoning. However, the decision was made; one side voted "didactic," and the other "epistolary." The ensuing spectacle is instructive to a degree. Each school proceeds to discover

in the poem which they have just classified all of the qualities which belong by their own definition unto that class. If any one of these qualities is lacking, or is present in defective or excessive quantity, the critics at once objurgate or apologize for Horace, according to their mood and their temperaments. Hence, for example, Weissenfels says that Horace "exceeds the permissible limits of capriciousness"; Weissenfels has stored in his mind a Platonic ideal form of the epistolary genre, in which a certain fixed amount of caprice is not only permitted but is required. Hence Norden, whose ideal of the isagogic form requires that the poem be addressed to the son of the author, apologizes for Horace's dedication to the Pisones, on the ground that Horace, being unmarried, could not after all have been expected to dedicate the *Ars Poetica* to a son of his own. These, it may be said, are minor absurdities. A major and a fatal absurdity is implicated in the very nature of such criticism. For the critic first attributes certain qualities to a given class, and then extracts those qualities from each representative of that class; a process which adds no more to our knowledge of the individual specimen than does the packing and unpacking of a portmanteau.

What then ought we to do? Are we condemned to nihilism and dilettantism, to a career of trifling? On the contrary, there is a method of literary criticism which is not only better worth while, but is infinitely harder and more solid than the pseudo-scientific method. It demands of the critic that he be both scientist and poet at the same time. By the aid of science, he must labor to establish the objective facts, to know the texts and the monuments, to know the material facts of the past, everything which is a matter of record. If he is studying Euripides, he must know everything which can scientifically be known about Euripides and all his works. But even when he has reached that stage, his task is scarcely begun. Before he can explain Euripides to us, before he can write the history of Euripides, he must employ to its uttermost his own creative power, his own poetic faculty. Therein lies the greatest difficulty of criticism; and yet, unless we surmount this difficulty however partially and imperfectly, the truth is far removed from us. For to understand a work of literature is to understand a man, somehow to stretch and torture our own creative power, which alone can give us insight, until we have repeated in ourselves

quam longo intervallo the creations of genius. To criticize is to re-create, to live over again that portion of a great man's life which found expression in a tragedy, a lyric, or in a *Phaedo*. The name which we apply to any particular work of literature is a mere convenience: the ultimate reality is the spiritual life of the author of that work. The doctrine of literary forms has always turned away our eyes from that reality, has caused us to rest content with a futile label.

This does not mean that the true critic is stripped of his judgment, and is devoid of the power of selection, of the duty to praise or to condemn. Rather it means that all praise and condemnation must be of the man who is author and creator, and not of the plot or the subject or any other Platonic abstraction. Gilbert Murray, in his *Rise of the Greek Epic*, quotes a remark of Mr. Mackail "that in the *Iliad* we have a second-rate subject made into a first-rate and indeed incomparable poem by the genius of a great poet," and continues: "I think this view would probably be widely accepted. Many scholars would agree, with a pang, that the subject of the Wrath was not quite in the first rank of nobleness."¹ This is a good sample of the Platonic fallacy; and is worth testing.

Homer presents us with his vision of human life. Its value depends upon his creative power, his personality. If his creative power is slight and inadequate, then his poem is necessarily ill-conceived, and is partly dead; we shall have a right to condemn it, and so to dispraise Homer. But if his creative power is great, then the poem is entirely alive, and we have no right to condemn it except on one condition; i. e., unless it convinces us that Homer was himself an evil and not a good genius. If as we read we feel a shudder of horror at the evil personality of the author with whom we are associating, if we are persuaded that Homer hated the good and loved the cruel and the base, then we must condemn him as we condemn a Borgia. But no sane man can read Homer without being stirred by a genius who was not only great but fine and pure and high. Homer did not "choose a second-rate subject"; his subject is human life, which is the 'subject' of all poetry. Until we have eliminated from human life the "crude pride and self-absorption, the cruelty and lack of love" (which qualities as they are displayed by Achilles cause Murray to denounce the 'subject' of the *Iliad*),

¹ *Rise of the Greek Epic*, p. 251.

we have no right to condemn Homer or any other poet on such grounds. We might as well say that Shakspere is immoral because Macbeth was a murderer and Othello was jealous.

For similar reasons we must abolish the old method of Quellenforschung, which required us to "separate the borrowed element from the personal element" of poetry before we could make a just estimate of the personal element. This method goes on the crass assumption that literary truth is identical with scientific truth. Take a textbook on chemistry; it is perfectly possible for a chemist who has studied the book to discriminate between "old" and "new" truths contained therein, to tell how much is borrowed and how much is a fresh and personal contribution. Scientific truth is a body of objective truth which can be and is extended by discovery. But literary truth is not created in that way, nor can it be weighed and measured in that way. Catullus and Horace did not take the Greek authors with whom they were acquainted, select portions of their work, and then add thereto some new truth which was their sole personal achievement. On the contrary, all the literature which they read and heard passed into their own souls and became, not a part of their stock-in-trade, to be dealt out in the same condition as received, but an inalienable aspect of their own creative activity and life. Their originality is not decreased in the slightest by the fact that they have been influenced by Sappho or Alcaeus; it is profoundly enhanced. It is absolutely impossible to separate from their literary works a borrowed element, and then to appraise a personal element. A work of science can be translated; a work of literature cannot. It can only be transformed.

The absurdity of the Quellenforscher's postulate is due to precisely the same error which underlies the doctrine of literary forms; to avoid this error and its consequences, to be both scientists and poets, is the ideal that we must set before our critics and ourselves. So long as we put exclusive faith in scientific method, so long as we believe that literary history is a record of the *εἰδη* and their changes, so long we are doomed not to know the truth, to falsify criticism, and to misunderstand the past.¹

¹ I desire to express my indebtedness to A. A. Howard and C. H. Moore for their kind suggestions, and to acknowledge my obligations to Sir Henry Newbolt's brilliant articles on the meaning of poetry.

THE HISTORICAL SOCRATES IN THE LIGHT OF PROFESSOR BURNET'S HYPOTHESIS

By CHARLES POMEROY PARKER

WE will assume that the *Phaedo* gives a true account of the talk which Socrates held with his friends on the last day of his life, and we will examine the consequences of that hypothesis. My obligations to Professor Burnet in this discussion are very great, and also to Professor Taylor. Any one who is familiar with their recent writings will see at once just what and just how great these obligations are, and will notice immediately where I venture to add anything or to disagree in any point.

Granting then the hypothesis about the *Phaedo*, we ask what we learn as to the philosophy of Socrates. We know first that he was interested in the doctrine of Archelaus that primitive animals found nourishment from a milky fluid caused by disintegration (*σηπεδόνα*, chemical interaction?) of heat and moisture,¹ a biological doctrine. This interest may safely be placed before the military expedition to Samos in 441/0, on which Socrates, aged twenty-eight, went with Archelaus. Secondly we know that Socrates pondered with perplexity the question whether blood, air, or fire was the means (or instrument) of thought, another biological interest. The theory of blood, suggested by Empedocles,² Socrates might have heard before

¹ *Phaedo* 96B 2. I accept the emendation of Sprengel, *ὑγρὸν* for *ψυχρὸν*. He was the editor of Dioscorides, and was himself a biologist. The authority of Diogenes Laertius (ii, §§ 16, 17) seems to have read *ὑγρόν*. In § 17 Diogenes Laertius says *τηκόμενόν φησι τὸ ὄδωρ ὑπὸ τοῦ θερμοῦ . . . ποιέν γῆν*, and the presence of moisture is implied in the earth just afterwards where we read *γεννάσθαι . . . τὰ γῶνα ἐκ θερμῆς τῆς γῆς καὶ ιλὺν παραπλησίαν γάλακτι οἷον τροφὴν ἀνιεῖσης*. Perhaps it is for this reason that Diels reads *ὑγρόν* instead of *ψυχρόν* in § 16. [Vorsokratiker, p. 233, l. 16.] Epicurus, from whom Lucretius probably got the ideas of V, 806–817 (*calor atque umor superabat in arvis — succum consimilem lactis*, etc.), must have read *ὑγρόν*. He was much under the influence of Archelaus *μάλιστα ἀπεδέχετο, φησι Διοκλῆς* [Diog. Laert. 10, § 12]. The corruption to *ψυχρόν* was easy, palaeographically, and must have taken place very early.

² *Fragm.* 105 (Diels). As Empedocles visited Thurii soon after 444, and was apparently travelling and spreading his theories at that time in his life, knowledge

441. Air as the organ of thought would be suggested by the teaching of Diogenes of Apollonia,¹ which was burlesqued by Aristophanes in 423. Socrates might have been influenced by it earlier, but perhaps not more than ten or twelve years earlier, say about 435. We can hardly throw the influence of Diogenes much earlier than that. Fire at first suggests the influence of Heracliteans, but we naturally look for some marked recent adaptation of the fire idea as an influence on Socrates. Such perhaps we can find in Leucippus. The soul atoms in Democritus are fire atoms, a notion which he may easily have inherited from Leucippus. This notion of fire as the instrument of thought, if it was derived from Leucippus, might have come to Socrates earlier than the theories of Diogenes did.² The theory of the brain as the instrument of sensation and thought, starting from Alcmaeon, could have reached Socrates, in the latter part of the Age of Pericles, from physicians of the time. Possibly we should limit the theory of Alcmaeon to viewing the brain as the unifier of sensations,³ upon which Socrates reflected, allowing thought to take of his theories might easily reach Athens about 442 if not before. As to the visit to Thurii see Diog. Laert., viii, 52, and Burnet's remarks on this in *Early Greek Philosophy*, 2d edition, § 98.

¹ See especially the passage from Theophrastus quoted in Diels, *Vorsokratiker*, p. 233. We find also here a certain interest of Diogenes in the brain, but it is secondary. As to the time of his influence on Socrates, we must be careful not to place too early a philosopher so obviously eclectic; yet he must precede the publication of Anaxagoras' *νοῦς* theory.

² The question is as to the relation of Leucippus to Anaxagoras. The priority of Leucippus seems possible. When Democritus seemed to Favorinus to accuse Anaxagoras of stealing the theory of *νοῦς* from himself (see Diog. Laert., ix, 35) he may really have claimed priority only for the school of Abdera as believing in fire atoms which were thought atoms and in the *δῆμος*. Of course *νοῦς* really was different in Anaxagoras, had a grander position, and a more powerful one than in the atomic school. One may suspect that Leucippus taught immediately after Empedocles, and that Socrates might hear of him soon after the expedition to Samos, — as early as 439.

³ Notice in Theophrastus' account (Diels, *Vorsokratiker*, p. 101, ll. 13–28), the phrase ἀπάσας δὲ τὰς αἰσθήσεις συνηρήσθαι πώς πρὸς τὸν ἐγκέφαλον. This is the gist of the whole account — one quotation from Aetius says ἐν τῷ ἐγκεφάλῳ εἴναι τὸ ηγεμονικόν, but we feel less certainty in anything attributed to Aetius; and Chalcidicus in saying *cerebri sede, in qua est sita potestas animae summa ac principalis* may be misunderstanding the meaning or value of his authorities. But at any rate the theory of Alcmaeon pointed in this direction. The words of Socrates

place by means of the brain. Whatever Socrates may have guessed, he remained in perplexity as to the organ of thought. Growth of the animal body, also, remained a subject for theorizing. At one time he seems to have adopted Anaxagoras' theory of growth, that in the food there were flesh and bones, etc., out of which came greater bulk of bones, flesh, etc., to the man. The question asked by Anaxagoras, *πῶς γὰρ ἀν ἐκ μὴ τριχὸς γένοιτο θρὶξ καὶ σάρξ ἐκ μὴ σαρκός*, need not have waited till Anaxagoras worked out all his theories and published them. It might spread abroad with its answer in philosophical circles at any time in the later Periclean Age. At any rate we get a clear idea of biological interest of various kinds in Socrates, in the first ten or twelve years of the Thirty Years' Truce, from the age of twenty-three to thirty-five. These years seemed to the philosopher of seventy the years of his youth. The words *νέος ὥν* need not be limited to mean that he was under twenty-five only.

The biological interest consisted in finding causes of nourishment, sensation, thought, and growth; and the causes always seemed to be processes by which one physical condition changed into another; but it was hard to see any compelling reason for any particular belief about the cause in any particular case. Similar difficulties arose about the action of the earth and sky. Prominent among the theories of cosmology which Socrates mentions is that of the *δίνη*, or *δῖνος*, a notion perfectly familiar in the time of the Thirty Years' Truce, being taught in various forms by Empedocles, Leucippus, and Anaxagoras, and satirized by Aristophanes in 423 B.C. It was familiar years before that date, perhaps before 441 in the form Empedocles gave it which seems to be referred to in the *Phaedo*. Finally, especial prominence is given to questions about number, for instance, what process gives us two when we start with a unit. Such mathematical puzzles were natural in years when Zeno was between forty and sixty years of age. If with Burnet we accept Plato's statement that when Socrates was *σφόδρα νέον* Zeno was nearly forty, then Zeno's mathematical puzzles might

in the *Phaedo* which follow, however, *ἐκ τούτων δὲ γίγνοιτο μνήμη καὶ δόξα, ἐκ δὲ μνήμης καὶ δόξης λαβούσης τὸ ἡρεμεῖν, κατὰ ταῦτα γίγνεσθαι ἐπιστήμην* may denote a theory of knowledge developed by Socrates himself on the basis of Alcmaeon's theory of sensation. It seems more to belong to the Socratic school, and was developed further by Aristotle in a well-known passage of the *Posterior Analytics* 99 B 36—100 A 9.

easily have perplexed Socrates at any time in the latter half of the Age of Pericles. Number, cosmology, biology, processes of causation — these would seem to have been Socrates' interests for a good many years after 446 B.C.

The conversion of Socrates by hearing and reading the book of Anaxagoras can hardly have taken place while Anaxagoras was in Athens. A man of Socrates' temperament, in perplexity about the way of developing the doctrine of *νοῦς*, would certainly have tried to go to the wise man and question him. Anaxagoras must have already gone to Lampsacus. The date of his banishment must have been before the Peloponnesian War. The exile was due to one of the attacks made on Pericles by prosecuting his friends. In the midst of the grave discrepancies as to the time of these prosecutions we should note the fact that Plutarch had found among his authorities for the life of Pericles several theories as to the reason why Pericles encouraged the Athenians to enter into the Peloponnesian War, one of which was that the statesman desired to re-establish his power and influence, weakened by the attacks on his friends Phidias, Anaxagoras, and Aspasia. This sounds like the echo of a genuine bit of contemporary gossip, but no contemporary could have thought of it unless the events had preceded the war. They need not all have happened just at the same time. Nothing could have been more natural than that in the years following the finishing of the Parthenon there should have been some reaction against the successful long domination of Pericles. His enemies tried to weaken his prestige by attacks on the character and standing of his friends. Even as early as 435 there might be rumors as to the impious talk of Anaxagoras about sun, moon, and sky. On these Diopeithes hung his prosecution. When the philosopher was exiled, a year or two later there would naturally come the attack on Phidias. And when he was imprisoned and died, Aspasia was perhaps the next, though Pericles saved her and kept his power. If Anaxagoras was banished in 435 or near that time, he was probably about sixty years of age.¹ This probability is important in view of the fact that

¹ If Burnet is right in suggesting that Empedocles was born in 490 B.C. or earlier, we need not place Anaxagoras' birth ten years before that time. οὐ πολὺ κατόπιν τοῦ Ἀναξαγόρου γεγονὼς says Theophrastus (?) of Empedocles [Simplicius, *phys.* 25, 19]. And Aristotle speaking of Anaxagoras [*Metaphys.* 984a 11], comparing

he seems to have published his doctrine of *νοῦς* after he left Athens. He might have had the idea earlier, but if he was a man slow in publishing results,¹ like Darwin, wishing to test a theory before he taught it, years might pass by until a crisis in his life, and a new residence, and the establishment of a school in Lampsacus, crystallized the theory and roused him to the publication of it. This was likely enough for a man of sixty, much less likely at seventy years. Socrates then at the age of thirty-five, dissatisfied with old views of causation was inspired by the new suggestion and found a new approach to philosophy. The verification of this chronology must be found in the reasonableness of the situation given by it. We repeat therefore. Anaxagoras driven out of Athens by that wave of reaction against Pericles which was caused by the very success of the statesman's policy, being now of the age of sixty and forced by circumstances to review and take account of his life-work, throws into definite literary form his philosophy of Thought as the orderer of the Universe, and publishes the book at Athens. Socrates, still young enough to experience a great intellectual conversion, hears the book read by a friend, and eagerly seizes the great conception, which henceforth rules his life, that Thought is *the cause*.

And now, what do we learn from the *Phaedo* as to Socrates' philosophy of Thought? The whole drift of the dialogue seems to show that he turned to the Pythagoreans for help, using their help, however, in a thoroughly original way. With Anaxagoras' method of handling Thought as the cause he was thoroughly dissatisfied. By himself he could not trace out a system of proving what was best, and therefore to his mind true, nor does he anywhere in the *Phaedo* proceed by this method. The endeavor to make knowledge of the good the centre of his philosophy had failed, and on the last day of his life he did not advise any one to adopt it. The whole doctrine of the *ἰδέα τοῦ ἀγαθοῦ* in Plato's dialogues must have been a development made by Plato on the basis of the hint given by Socrates in the account of his conversion. Socrates himself took another way. Baffled in the attempt to find Thought in the facts of the world by looking at them directly, he him with Empedocles, says, *τὴν μὲν ἡλικίᾳ πρότερος ὅν τούτου, τοῖς δὲ ἔργοις ὕστερος*. Two or three years' precedence in age will account for these phrases.

¹ May not this be implied in the phrase of Aristotle, *τοῖς δὲ ἔργοις ὕστερος*?

turned to the obvious presence of thought in human words. The words most full of clear thought in Hellas at that time were the propositions of Mathematics as studied by the Pythagoreans. Socrates desired on all subjects to have thoughts as clear as those which were in the propositions of Mathematics, and he felt that then he would be near to the actual working of Thought in things. The whole method of himself and his friends in the *Phaedo* is mathematical. To make an hypothesis, to work out its consequences, to reject it if they are absurd, to accept it if they harmonize with our best hypotheses, — this method is mathematical, as Socrates shows in the *Meno* by his demonstration that the diagonal of a square is the side of a square twice as large. And in the *Phaedo* the hypothesis of which Socrates and his friends are surest is the doctrine of ideas. He might easily have found the beginnings of this doctrine in Pythagorean mathematics, the *idea* of absolute equality, the *idea* of absolute greatness. The Pythagorean physicians may have had *ideas* of absolute health and strength. But with these we find Socrates talking of absolute justice,¹ beauty, heat, and life. We may suspect that Socrates himself had made this introduction of the doctrine into biology, physics, ethics, and aesthetics, and that he hoped to attain the thoughtfulness and security of mathematics in all these lines of thought. It was his first real contribution to philosophy.

But he would soon observe that human grasp of the ideas was weak and uncertain, that there was something which men were trying to say about them and not saying fully. Therefore, it became his duty to try to find definitions which would stand the test of the method of hypothesis. Following the method described in the *Meno* he would try out definitions given by others, or would suggest solutions himself. Xenophon and Plato both represent him as making suggestions himself, and such conversations are consistent with the Socrates of the *Meno* and *Phaedo*. The first book of the *Republic* where Socrates tests other men's definitions of justice, and the second, third, and fourth books where he constructs and tests a definition of his own, may not have been actually spoken by Socrates, but they are consistent with the conversation in the *Phaedo*. The *Protagoras*, the *Charmides*, the

¹ See for instance *Phaedo* 65D where the *ideas* of justice and goodness are absolutely parallel with those of greatness, health, and strength.

Laches, and the *Lysis*, as far as this characteristic goes, are real Socratic philosophy, though there may be other considerations which show them to be unhistorical. The *Parmenides* on our hypothesis, as we have worked it out, must be unhistorical because Socrates in extreme youth ($\sigma\phi\delta\rho\alpha\ \nu\epsilon\sigma\tau$)¹ could not have discussed with Zeno and Parmenides a theory to which he was not converted and which he had not developed at all till he was about thirty-five.

The acceptance of the *Phaedo* as historical destroys our belief in the historical character of any dialogue which is inconsistent with it. Not even consistency with the *Phaedo*, such as that of the first four books of the *Republic*, or of the *Protagoras*, would prove that Socrates ever actually spoke the words assigned to him in them unless compelling reasons such as Burnet brings for the *Phaedo* applied to the other dialogues. Plato would not misrepresent the last hours of Socrates, but he might develop the thought of Socrates by imaginary conversations in harmony with the well-known method. And when there is a dialogue in which the speaker is indeed said to be Socrates, yet in which the method and doctrines are inconsistent with the *Phaedo*, going beyond it in ways that the *Phaedo*'s Socrates could not have travelled, then we certainly have a Platonic advance in philosophy.

Now the only method of finding any truth in the *Phaedo* is the method of framing and testing hypotheses. If any universal is to be proved and known we must try out our hypotheses about it by bringing up facts to test them. This is the only $\epsilon\pi\alpha\gamma\omega\gamma\eta$ consistent with the *Phaedo*. There is no real induction, no gathering of the truth out of the particulars. But in the *Symposium* we have a method much more like real induction. Long experience with beautiful things and beautiful thoughts reveals the world to the lover more and more as the multitudinous sea of beauty ($\tau\delta\ \pi\omega\lambda\ \pi\acute{e}\lambda\alpha\gamma\sigma\ \tau\omega\ \kappa\alpha\lambda\omega\ — Symp.\ 210D$), and at last there flashes upon the mind of the experienced man a beauty higher than any particular beautiful thing. Obviously any idea might be approached in the same way. Long experience of just things would in the end give to one a world of shining justice, and at last, to the earnest lover of justice, there would be revealed an absolute justice higher than any particular experience. Long acquaintance with healthy things, or living things, or hot things would give at last

¹ *Parmenides*, 127C.

the insight into the real health, the real life, the real heat. There is nothing like this in the *Phaedo*. Socrates on the day of his death has not dreamed of any such approach to truth. Therefore, the method of Diotima's speech to Socrates must be Plato's extension of the Socratic philosophy. Again the *Phaedrus* has the suggestion of an insight into ideas which is given by the love of them. Socrates called himself a lover of men and a lover of wisdom, but there is no sign in the *Phaedo* of love giving insight. The *Phaedrus* as far as this goes is a Platonic extension of the thought of the historical Socrates. The *Republic* in books 5, 6 and 7 suggests a long experience with all good ideas, especially in rational investigation with other lovers of wisdom, as an approach to the absolute goodness. Hypotheses are done away with, and there is a vision of the *iδέα τοῦ ἀγαθοῦ*, to be attained by long study and experience. These books, therefore, are Platonic.

Now as to the myths, we must remark that our present hypothesis requires us to believe that the *Phaedo* myth was actually spoken by Socrates on the last day of his life. We thus learn that Socrates was a *raconteur*, a man who loved to tell a tale as the Greeks loved to hear one. But personally I do not find the myth in the *Phaedo* really beautiful. To me it seems tiresome in its length and detail. It has imagination, and a sense of large things, and a shrewd humor in the telling, as in the suggestion that the Mediterranean Sea is a puddle in the real earth, where we human beings live like frogs or even fishes. But high inspiring beauty I do not find, nor should I expect to find it in a man who, however good and however clever, could take that hopelessly *bourgeois* view of making music and poetry which Socrates takes early in the dialogue, when he thinks that he is making music by putting Aesop's fables into rhythm. Whenever, therefore, I find a really noble myth like that in the *Phaedrus* and that in the *Republic*, I say to myself that Plato is, like Socrates, telling a tale, but that the inspiration is wholly his own. And I cannot believe that the historical Socrates ever sat under the waving plane tree and discoursed beautiful poetry. But this particular feeling is somewhat too personal. We shall be on surer ground if we return to the philosophy.

There is a new doctrine of the cause announced by Socrates on the last day of his life to his friends, and it involves a new way of viewing the well-known ideas. Socrates would seem to have pondered it long

and carefully himself, but it was new to his friends. No longer does Socrates treat the *idea* as something outside of the particulars. In the earlier parts of the dialogue the *idea* does seem outside, *παρὰ τὰντα πάντα ἔτερόν τι* (*Phaedo* 74A). All through these earlier pages runs a strong Pythagorean dualism. But on page 100 the idea is seen to be the essence, the formal cause, of the particular. By what word to describe its relation to the particular thing is doubtful, *παρουσία*, or *κοινωνία* or some other name. But at any rate the essence is not somewhere else, not really separate. The fire carries essential heat and the soul essential life. One verb to describe this is *ἐπιφέρει*. We may call the idea *ἐν ἐπὶ τῷ πολλῷ*, or *ἐν ἐν τοῖς πολλοῖς*, not as before *παρὰ τὰ πολλά*. The *ἐπὶ* or the *ἐν* gives us the statement of the perfected Socratic philosophy. It was at the last true, as Aristotle said, that Socrates did not make the universals separate. But the Pythagoreans who introduced the doctrine of ideas in mathematics, and Socrates himself in earlier days, and perhaps some follower of Socrates in Megara¹ did. Plato himself, when thinking of the moral struggle, or of the inadequacy of this present world of sensations, might easily fall into dualism, and would not be untrue to the earlier Socrates when he did so. Either way of handling the doctrine might be natural to the historic Socrates, at first strongly touched with Pythagoreanism, and then beginning to feel his way to the essential unity of the intellectual and material worlds, even before he made on his death-day the first statement on record in European philosophy of the formal cause. We can hardly distinguish Socrates from Plato by this criterion. And yet perhaps it would be possible to fix the relative date and bearing of some of Plato's dialogues by observing whether they carried the doctrine of causation beyond that point to which the dying Socrates had carried it. We cannot follow up this particular inquiry now, but I have at least indicated what seem to me some of the most important consequences of accepting, as I do heartily, the hypothesis of Professor Burnet as to the historical character of Plato's *Phaedo*. I trust that in all this I am substantially in accord with the views of both Burnet and Taylor.

¹ See Taylor's *Varia Socratica*, p. 87.

THE CHORUS OF EURIPIDES

BY ARISTIDES EVANGELUS PHOUTRIDES

I. DEFENCE OF SUPPOSED FAULTS

1. THE LENGTH OF THE CHORAL PARTS

PERHAPS no other author of antiquity, with the exception of Aristotle, has caused more confusion to critics than Euripides. From Aristophanes and Antiphanes to Schlegel and Goethe, he has been praised and satirized with the warmest admiration and the bitterest invective. In our own day, the difference of conception with regard to "sad Electra's poet" might lead an unsophisticated student of the subconscious to explain the case of Euripides as a dual personality. Certainly, Shorey's Euripides is as distant from Gilbert Murray's as Aristophanes is in spirit from Aeschylus. Nor is this divergency of opinion limited to a uniform appreciation or depreciation of the poet. There are more puzzling subdivisions in either party. Each friend or foe finds his own grounds for admiration or contempt, and we can hardly find two persons whose premises or conclusions are in every respect identical. One critic attributes to Euripides characteristics which another denies, and the more we read about the poet the less we are apt to understand him.

The astonishing versatility of our tragedian makes him the Proteus of Dramatic Literature. There are passages in his works which rise to Aeschylean grandeur; others, which are full of Sophoclean serenity; and others, which startle us with the modern spirit of Shakspere or Ibsen. A chronic bitterness links Electra with Lady Inger. The atmosphere of fancy envelops Miranda as well as Helena. In Hecuba's fortunes, we are reminded of the sorrows of Queen Margaret. Romance, gallant knights, ladies fair, fanciful adventures are not unknown to Euripides. Minor details assisting in the creation of realistic situations and characters are seldom discarded. Human passions

so preponderate over other motives characteristic of the Hellenic drama, that Euripides is more easily read and more boldly translated by moderns than either Aeschylus or Sophocles.

What is true of the poet in general is also true of the choral element of his drama. There are numerous critics who seriously believe that Euripides has brought decadence into the tragic chorus and that he has not only minimized its part but has even dealt with it impatiently and negligently. When Goethe speaks of the chorus in Euripides as a "burdensome tradition useless and discordant,"¹ he voices the feelings of many of our poet's detractors. But the typical popular view is expressed in the words of a German scholar:² "The Euripidean chorus," says Stolte, "has lost its own power and character and changed its function. Indeed, it has either so far receded from the plot that there is no connection between it and the characters of the drama, as is the case in the *Phoenician Women* and in the *Iphigenia at Aulis*, or, where it does not entirely stand apart from the action, its relation is very remote, as in the *Hecuba*, the *Hercules*, and others. . . ." The same writer a little later follows closely the opinion expressed by Bernhardy and others:³ "Thus the chorus of Euripides, following the example of the epic poets, figures in many a tragedy as a careless and uninterested spectator, who, instead of giving utterance to universal reflections, indulges in long narratives that have nothing to do with the substance of the play or with the nature of the chorus. For the function of the chorus is not so much to relate as it is to reflect on things. Far from doing this, the chorus seems to be anxious to while away the time by singing various songs, which, full of charming descriptions and metaphors though they are, cannot escape the charge of being foreign to the plot and very similar to mere interludes. . . ."

¹ *Briefwechsel zwischen Goethe und Zelter*, edited by F. W. Riemer, Berlin, 1833, pt. I, p. 69 (letter 29): ". . . der Chor erscheint oft als ein lästiges Herkommen, als ein aufgeerbtes Inventarienstück. Er wird unnöthig und also, in einem lebendigen poetischen Ganzen, gleich unnütz, lästig, und zerstörend. . . ."

² Franz Stolte, *De chori, qualis in perfecta Graecorum tragœdia appet, ratione et indole*. Jahresber. über das königliche Progymnasium Nepomucenum zu Rietberg für 1881-82. Paderborn, 1882.

³ Cf. G. Bernhardy, *Grundriss der griech. Literatur*, Halle, 1876-80, ii 2, p. 437.

Ill fate is pursuing Euripides even after his death, it seems. The creator of the most charming feminine types in the ancient drama is constantly branded as a woman-hater! The poet of the *Suppliant Women* and of the *Bacchae* is denounced as a satirist and contemner of the popular gods! No wonder then that his choruses, too, are found at fault, and that there are some critics who even think that as much connection exists between Euripidean chorus and drama as between the lyric effusions and the drama of Seneca.

Against these accusations only a careful study of Euripides himself can offer effective assistance. To lessen the importance of the chorus it would have been necessary for our poet either to shorten the parts that were to be recited by the chorus, to curtail the dialogue between the chorus and the actors, or to make the chorus entirely ineffective, disinterested onlookers at the action in the play, without motive or passion sufficiently strong to render them participants of the plot.

But has he diminished the rôle of the chorus? Or, at least, has he in this respect gone farther than his predecessors? That we may stand on firm ground, let us examine numerically the parts each of the three tragic poets has given to his choruses in comparison with the parts ceded to the rest of the actors. The figures from the tragedies of Aeschylus are as follows:

Title of Drama	Verses in the Drama	Choral Part
Supplices.....	1074	650
Persae.....	1076	500
Septem.....	1084	487
Prometheus.....	1094	201
Agamemnon.....	1674	838
Choephoroe.....	1076	452
Eumenides.....	1047	434
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Seven Plays.....	8124	3562
Maximum in the chorus of the Supplices.....		0.60...
Minimum in the chorus of the Prometheus.....		0.18...
Average choral part in Aeschylus.....		0.43...

From these figures we see that of eight thousand one hundred and twenty-four verses included in the seven extant dramas of Aeschylus, three thousand five hundred and sixty-two belong to the chorus. The

longest choral part is found in the *Supplices*, in which, of one thousand and seventy-four verses, the chorus has six hundred and fifty, i. e., sixty per cent of the whole play. The shortest Aeschylean chorus is that of the *Prometheus*, where of the one thousand and ninety-four verses of the play only two hundred and one belong to the chorus, which is no more than eighteen per cent. These examples, found in the same author, show not a small difference and are clear witnesses of the boldness with which Aeschylus treats his own art.¹

Sophocles follows always a middle path. Reckoning according to the colometry found in Jebb's edition, we gather the following figures:

Title of Drama	Verses in the Drama	Choral Part
Oedipus Rex.....	1530	312
Oedipus at Colonus.....	1779	384
Antigone.....	1353	358
Ajax.....	1420	344
Electra.....	1510	221
Trachiniae.....	1278	242
Philoctetes.....	1471	228
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Seven Plays.....	10341	2089
Maximum in the chorus of Antigone		0.26...
Minimum in the chorus of Electra		0.14...
Average choral part in Sophocles.....		0.20...

The seven plays of Sophocles contain altogether ten thousand three hundred and forty-one verses. Two thousand and eighty-nine, i. e., about twenty per cent of these verses belong to the chorus. Thus we find in Sophocles a greater evenness than in Aeschylus. The average choral part in the former is a little more than the minimum choral part in the latter, and while in Aeschylus the chorus varies from sixty per cent to eighteen per cent, in Sophocles its variance is limited between twenty-six and fourteen per cent.

What of Euripides? Using the colometry of Murray's text in the Oxford edition, we arrive at the following numbers:

¹ The numeration has been made according to the colometry of Sidgwick's text in the Oxford edition.

Title of Drama	Verses in the Drama	Choral Part	
Cyclops.....	709	195	
Alcestis.....	1163	301	
Medea.....	1419	295	
Heraclidae.....	1055	205	
Hippolytus.....	1466	325	
Andromache.....	1288	245	
Hecuba.....	1295	231	
Supplices.....	1230	275	
Hercules.....	1428	398	
Ion.....	1622	294	
Troiades.....	1332	331	
Electra.....	1359	294	
Iphigenia Taurica.....	1499	279	
Helena.....	1692	284	
Phoenissae.....	1766	278	
Orestes.....	1693	222	
Bacchae.....	1392	399	
Iphigenia Aulidensis.....	1629	368	
Rhesus.....	996	307	
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Nineteen Plays.....	26133	5526	
Maximum in the chorus of Rhesus	0.30...	
Next to the maximum is Cyclops with.....	0.27...	
Minimum in the chorus of Orestes	0.13...	
Next to the minimum is Phoenissae with.....	0.15...	
Average choral part in Euripides.....	0.21...	

Of the twenty-six thousand one hundred and thirty-three verses which are contained in the nineteen extant plays, five thousand five hundred and twenty-six are devoted to the chorus, that is, twenty-one per cent of the whole work of Euripides is choral. If we compare with these figures those of Sophocles, we find that the percentage in Euripides is even larger than that of his predecessor. Since, however, the difference is rather small, we may with justice assert that both Euripides and Sophocles have given one-fifth of their drama to the chorus. The maximum choral part is found in the *Rhesus*, where a little less than one-third, or about thirty per cent of the whole play is assumed by the chorus. But since there are many who would deny the Euripidean authorship of this play, let us consider the play that stands next to it, i. e., the *Cyclops*. The difference is insignificant. Of the seven

hundred and nine verses of this indisputably Euripidean play, one hundred and ninety-five, i. e., twenty-seven per cent, belong to the chorus. On the other hand, the minimum choral part in Euripides is found in the *Orestes*, the chorus of which sings or speaks two hundred and twenty-two, i. e., thirteen per cent of the total of one thousand six hundred and ninety-three verses. The minimum choral part in Sophocles is fourteen per cent, but the difference is too insignificant to be taken into consideration, and is exactly balanced by the difference we have found in the maximum data. After studying these figures, how can we account for the common accusation that Euripides has shortened the choral parts? Indeed, if any one of the three tragedians must be accused, why not look to Aeschylus rather than Euripides? Is it not true that Aeschylus has shortened the choral rôle from sixty to eighteen per cent? This boldness cannot be charged against Euripides, who has preferred either to preserve or even to increase the Sophoclean measure, but may never be justly accused of having reduced it.

2. THE CHORUS IN DIALOGUE

The question of the dialogue is an even more difficult one to determine. For if we had preserved only seven plays of Euripides, and these seven were the *Ion*, the *Orestes*, the *Alcestis*, the *Bacchae*, the *Hercules*, the *Supplices*, and the *Rhesus*, there would be no difficulty in forming an unvarying opinion. In all these plays, the dialogue between the chorus and the actors is by no means of less importance than in Sophocles' tragedies. In the *Supplices*, the chief interest centres about the unfortunate mothers of the princes who died before the walls of Thebes. They form a chorus of suppliants and concentrate the sympathies of the spectators. In Sophocles, we have not a parallel case. True, the old Thebans through dialogue with Oedipus persuade their wrathful king to restrain himself from inflicting a heavy punishment on Creon, a fact which corroborates my belief that the chorus is not always ineffective even in the action of the Sophoclean drama.¹ Yet

¹ *Oed. R.* 649–696, especially v. 649:

Chorus: πιθοῦ θελήσας φρονήσας τ', ἀναξ, λισσομαι.

and v. 669:

Creon: δέ δέ οὖν Ιτω . . .

τὸ γάρ σόν, οὐ τὸ τοῦδε, ἐποικτίρω στόμα . . .

it is Euripides who furnishes us with most convincing examples of choral activity in dialogue. In the *Ion*, the chorus not only is effective, but it mingles with the action and stands by its sympathies with a boldness which far surpasses that of any Sophoclean chorus, and which reminds us very strongly of the choral conceptions of Aeschylus. The young Athenian women who have accompanied Creusa, their queen, to Delphi are threatened with the extreme penalty of death in case they disclose to their mistress Xuthus' relation to Ion. Yet they are so overcome by their sympathy for their maltreated queen, that they dare divulge the secret and enter upon a most dangerous conspiracy against the life of the foundling. We even miss in them that resignation and hesitancy which are the characteristics not only of the post-Aeschylean chorus but of the chorus of Aeschylus himself. For in the moment of crisis, we see them forgetting entirely their own danger and suggesting to the pursued queen the only course of safety.¹

I should point to the importance of the dialogue part of the chorus in the *Cyclops*, the *Hercules*, and other plays; but I pass over these for the present to come to the most astonishing of all Euripidean choruses, that of the *Rhesus*. For, although I am aware of the doubts which Scaliger, Hermann, and their followers have cast upon the authorship of this play, I cannot help feeling with Paley and other opponents² that there is so much of Euripides in the *Rhesus* that it is to be wondered why its genuineness has ever been questioned. Why should we be impatient about allowing our poet to retain his own property? In this tragedy, the chorus of guards open the play. Indeed, this is not the only example in Euripides of a chorus being on the stage at the rise or — according to the methods of ancient theatre management — the fall of the curtain. At the opening of the *Sup-*

¹ *Ion*, 1255–1260.

² Bothe, Dindorf, Vater, etc. See: Josephi Scaligeri, *Ad Manilium Prolegomena*, p. vi ff., and Virgil. *Catal.*, L. Bat. 1617, p. 31; Godofredi Hermanni, *Observationes de Graecae linguae dictis*, p. ix ff.; *Opuscula*, vol. i, p. 136 and vol. iii, p. 262; *Elementa doctrinae metrcae*, p. 124. Chr. Dan. Beckii, *Diatribam criticam de Rheso supposititio Euripidis dramate quae exstat in editione Euripidis Barnesio-Musgraviana*, vol. iii, p. 444. Against these cf. Matthiae, *Eurip.* viii, p. 2 ff.; Aug. Boeckhii, *Secunda de Sophoclis Antigona commentat.* in *Actis Acad. Boruss.*, 1828, p. 110, note 1. Frid. Bothii, *ed. Lips.*, 1825, p. 55 note. Ludov. Dindorffii, *ed. Lips.* 1825; and especially Friderici Vateri, *Eurip. Rhes.*, Berolini, 1837.

plices, Aethra, while delivering the prologue, is not only facing from the very start the mourning mothers of the slain chiefs, but makes it understood that they have already been in this suppliant attitude for some time and have won her sympathy. The opening of the *Heraclidae* is another illustration of the same usage. But in the *Rhesus*, we have something more than the presence of the chorus. The guards have the first lines and they call out Hector in order to announce to him what must begin the action of the play. I can show in Sophocles no choral dialogue of the same importance as that of the chorus in the *Rhesus*, when the guards actually seize Odysseus. Indeed, as far as physical action on the part of the chorus is concerned, this scene is unique in all ancient tragedy. It has been observed that the nearest that an ancient chorus comes to physical action is in the scene between Aegisthus and the old Argives who form the chorus in the *Agamemnon* (1622 ff.). Yet why should this instance be put above the chorus of the *Hercules*? Like the chorus of the *Agamemnon*, they are feeble, tottering, helpless. But when the cowardly tyrant Lycus dares threaten with death the harmless children and wife of their absent hero, they have the courage to raise their staves and to attempt to fight against the cruel oppressor (252 ff.). Clytaemnestra in the *Agamemnon* interferes to restrain further bloodshed; in the Euripidean play, it is Megara, the menaced wife of Hercules who averts an actual fight. In the *Rhesus*, however, physical action is not only threatened, but is performed. The chorus of guards trace Odysseus, seize him, and do not let him go free before he gives the password of the Trojans. This action is accompanied by a very vivid dialogue between the chorus and the disguised spy, and there is hardly any other moment in the tragedy which creates a greater suspense than this (674-691).

If we had only the seven or eight plays we have mentioned, our conclusion would be that Euripides has not diminished but rather intensified the part which the chorus take in the dialogue. But can we draw the same conclusion from the rest of the nineteen plays that have come down to us? The chorus of the *Andromache* and of the *Iphigenia among the Taurians* engage very little in dialogue, and that of the *Iphigenia at Aulis* seems to be entirely disregarded by all actors. The same taciturnity is observed in the choruses of the *Phoe-*

nissae, the *Troades*, and the *Electra*. Are we then to carry from these examples the impression that Euripides has after all minimized the dialogue of the tragic chorus? But if we compare with these our first series of plays, we must draw two entirely opposite conclusions. Is it not possible to explain this apparent inconsistency by examining into the nature of reticent or talkative choruses? Instead of attributing to Euripides an arbitrary operation upon the dialogue part of the chorus, may we not discover a natural reason for what seems to be a startling innovation? I venture to suspect such a reasonable cause. What appears as an innovation is only a natural course which might have been taken by Sophocles or by Aeschylus, a course which these tragedians might even have followed in some of their lost dramas.

Let us compare a few of the bold and the timid choruses respectively. We have already noticed that the chorus in the *Ion* consists of young maidens, attendants of Creusa. They have come to Delphi following their queen, who is in great distress. Owing to what she deems to be Apollo's faithlessness, she has lost the child to which she had many years ago given birth. Since that time, she has been married to a foreign prince who has become the king of Athens, but she has remained childless. No heir has been born to the kingdom of Athens. How can she prevent the utter extinction of the royal house in which she was born? Her attendants are devoted to her, participants of her affliction, and sharers of her great secret as is shown from the concealed allusions they make to it in the end of the first stasimon (vv. 492 ff.):

"Ω Πανὸς θακήματα καὶ
παρανλίζονσα πέτρα
μυχώδεσι Μακραῖς, . . .
ἴνα τεκοῦσά τις Φοίβω
παρθένος, ὁ μελέα, βρέφος,
πτανοῖς ἔξορισεν θοίναν
θηρσί τε φουνίαν δαῖτα, πικρῶν γάμων
ὑβριν. . . .

To be admitted into the very secret which is the source of Creusa's shame and unhappiness, they must undoubtedly be of proved faithfulness and loyalty. With determined courage, they stand by their

queen, who, at the same time, is their trusting friend. Thus it is only too natural to witness them resenting what they consider to be a foreign adventurer's betrayal not only of their queen but of their city. They will not have a bastard ruling over Athens, and, against the threats of Xuthus, who depends too much upon servants' submissiveness, they disclose the plot, connive at the vengeful conspiracy, and suggest to their mistress in the critical moment of danger the only way to safety.¹

In the *Alcestis*, the chorus consists of elders of the city of Pherae. Their king is under the bane of death and is saved only through the noble self-sacrifice of their queen. They are free-born citizens whose fortunes are involved in the fortunes of their rulers. They have a right to speak, to question, to suggest. Thus they make the attendant woman explain to them the grievous state of the royal house, they question Hercules on his journey, they express their surprise at their king's excessive hospitality, and they share with him in the funeral dirge.²

Likewise, we may account for the boldness of the chorus in the *Rhesus*. They are soldiers set to guard the Trojan camp in the night. It is their duty to announce to their chief what they consider ominous during their watch. Thus they do not hesitate to wake up Hector, to take part in the argument between him and Aeneas, to point out to their proud leader his error in his cool reception of Rhesus, to suspect him of treachery, to seize a suspect. Their intervention in the dialogue is most consistent with the exigencies of the plot of the play.³ In the same manner, it is natural for the Bacchantes, the inspired followers of Dionysus, to oppose openly the persecutor of their god's cult and to express their exultation at their god's triumph over the impious king, — however revengeful and horrible it may be;⁴ for the old devoted followers of Hercules, to forget in the moment of a revolting cruelty, exercised upon their hero's relatives, their white hair and weak frames and to raise their hands against the blood-thirsty tyrant;⁵

¹ *Ion*, 213–237; 566–569; 752–859; 1106 ff.; 1250 ff.

² *Alc.* 141, 456, 551, 861 ff.

³ *Rhes.* 1, 131, 327, 674, 729, 804 ff.

⁴ *Bacch.* 576, 604, 775, 1024, 1153 ff.

⁵ *Herc.* 234, 875, 1041, 1427 ff.

for the free citizens of Athens in the *Heraclidae*, to declare openly their sympathies for the cause of the wronged;¹ and for the Suppliant Women, to call for help on Aethra, a mother herself, and, therefore, capable of understanding the depth of a mother's woe.²

But what of the reticent choruses? In the *Phoenissae*, the chorus consists of women who

Afar from the tides against Tyre's walls swelling,
For Loxias chosen an offering,
From the Isle of Phoenicia . . . came to be thrall
Unto Phoebus, to serve in his palace-hall
Where 'neath crags of Parnassus . . .
. . . he hath made him a dwelling.³

On their way, they have stopped at Thebes, the land of the children of Cadmus, by lineage the same people with their fathers. In spite of their kinship with the Thebans, they are practically in a state of exile. In the beleaguered city that a son of their common ancestor had founded, they feel a touching sympathy for it, pray for its safety, and are concerned in its fate; but their interest is somewhat distant, and they have not the courage to interfere with the great action which is developed before their eyes. Contrary to the habit of a chorus, they do not at first address Polynices when he enters with a terrified air, but they modestly refrain from speech, and it is only after a comparatively long address of the newcomer that they answer him, a fellow-exile.⁴ In the same manner, they modestly listen to Menoeceus' noble resolution, and it is only when he has departed that they sing of the noble courage and wisdom which characterize the house of the Earth-born in spite of the ill fate that pursues them. Even in the extremely pathetic dirge of Antigone and Oedipus, their sympathetic utterance is short, and, although it bursts out uncontrolled at the miserable sight of the procession bearing the corpses, it is soon suppressed before the presence of the woeful sister and father (1480).

Nothing could be more natural than the self-restraint and reticence of these Phoenician maidens at the sight of woes with which their

¹ *Heracl.* 73, 329, 961 ff.

² *Suppl.* 1, 634, 798, 1123 ff.

³ *Phoen.* 202 ff. Translation by Arthur Way.

⁴ *Phoen.* 280 ff.

kinship urged them to sympathize, but with which their present distance reminded them that they had no right to interfere. Their attitude is not less justifiable than that of the chorus of Theban women in Aeschylus' *Seven against Thebes*, who being natives of the city endangered by its rulers' feud have reasons to look with greater anxiety upon the great crisis, to express their fear and agony against the warnings of Eteocles, and even to attempt to dissuade their stubborn king from taking the fatal course which he is resolved to follow. Theban women would naturally play their bold and impulsive rôle in the city of their birth, a rôle which would naturally be very different from that of foreign women whose stay in the Cadmean city is only temporary and whose familiarity with the actors depends entirely upon a distant relationship.

Another chorus of few words in dialogue is that in the *Andromache*. It consists of women of Phthia, who, proud of their free parentage and native origin, feel at the same time a little sympathy with Andromache, the slave of noble blood, the unfortunate princess of Troy. But their position is embarrassing. In the first place, they cannot freely express their own thoughts before the gates of the palace of Neoptolemus, because their king is absent, and they fear the impulsive revengefulness of Hermione and the treacherous methods of her father, the Spartan king, greedy of power and cruel in heart. On the other hand, they cannot easily approach Andromache. The noble wife of Hector is absorbed in her own sad fortune. Bereft of a glorious husband, torn away from the city of her fathers, which she saw laid low with sword and fire, dragged to a foreign land in bondage to the son of the very man who had slain her Hector, in the moment of her danger, she neither publishes her grief, nor looks for sympathy to a crowd of native women. In her days of bondage, she can still hold a dignity becoming a noble princess, a quality which not only enrages the impulsive young bride who plots against her life, but also keeps back her sympathizers. The women of Phthia feel this dignified attitude of the tormented princess, and they, unable to reconcile it with the present state of affairs, explain it as a pride that even slights their sympathy. Under the circumstances, they naturally check themselves and assume a reserved, reticent attitude in dialogue and a highly reflective and retrospective mood in their odes.

The chorus in the *Medea* is of the same kind. They are Corinthian women who come to express their sympathies with a foreign princess wronged in her conjugal rights. It is natural for them also to be reticent. Yet we find them engaging in dialogue more often than the women of Phthia and expressing a sympathy far more vivid than that expressed for Andromache. What makes this difference? Why do the women of Corinth stand so firmly by a foreign princess against their own ruling house? I should point out that the women in the *Andromache* see more justice on the side of Hermione, who, being a lawful wife, is slighted by Neoptolemus on account of Andromache; whereas the women of Corinth see justice entirely on the side of Medea, a woman like them, who has been abandoned for another woman by a calculating husband. But the main cause of the difference is the attitude of Medea toward the chorus. The daughter of Aeetes knows not the dignity of the daughter of Priam. She freely approaches her sympathizers, and, through her confidence, she wins them all the more to her cause. The chorus's sympathetic appeal is immediately answered, and the women of Corinth feel thus a certain courage and strength in their stand for Medea which the women of Phthia could not feel for Andromache. Yet even in the *Medea*, the chorus do not take the important part in the dialogue which a chorus more related to the heroine might have taken. Is it not natural that they should do so?

Then there is the *Iphigenia at Aulis*. Here not a chance is given to the chorus to engage in dialogue. The women of Chalcis often try to take a part in the conversation, but they are hardly ever deemed worthy of an answer. When Menelaus has finished his spirited complaint against Agamemnon (376), the chorus give the ineffective advice that "it is a bad thing for brothers to quarrel," but Agamemnon makes his answer directly to Menelaus, and gives no sign of recognition to the women. Thus throughout the play a verse or two is often spoken by the chorus in the different scenes, but their voice is the voice of one crying in the wilderness. Even the messenger of the miraculous sacrifice will not notice the presence of the chorus, but appeals directly to Clytaemnestra, who is in the house, to come forth and hear what he has seen. The unfortunate women, who could not check their curiosity to see the great camp of the gathered forces of the Greeks, may have free vent of their thoughts only in the odes which they sing

exclusively to themselves. But who are they, and why are they on the field of action? They have no relation whatever, and, perhaps, they are entirely unknown to the Greek chiefs of the camp at Aulis. They are women of Chalcis, who have left their city and crossed the waters of Euripus for a purpose entirely unrelated to the plot of the play. Their presence is due to the motive of mere curiosity, a quality strong with women. They have left their homes to see the great armaments of Greece kept in their neighborhood by adverse winds. It is only by chance that they witness a great tragic event. It is, therefore, natural that their presence and their words should be entirely disregarded by the Greek chiefs and their associates for the good reason that Agamemnon, or Menelaus, Clytaemnestra, or Iphigenia, Achilles, or the Messenger could have no excuse to take into their confidence the curious crowds which must have daily flocked from Chalcis or other places about Aulis to see the imposing spectacle of the forces of Greece gathered into one.

These examples should suffice us in drawing our conclusion. What is taken for a bold innovation in Euripides is only a natural course. Perhaps we might have had the same thing in a chorus of Sophocles or Aeschylus, if we had preserved for us more of their works. As it is, we have no play of either of the great writers in which a chorus is presented bearing the same relation to the plot as that of the *Phoenissae*, the *Andromache*, or the *Iphigenia at Aulis*. The nearest that we come to such a relation in Sophocles is in the chorus of the *Trachinian Women*. They are women of the city which has given shelter to Hercules and Deianira. Their relation to the hero and the heroine, especially to the latter, is similar to the relation of the Corinthian women to Medea, i. e., they are friends and sympathizers and are heartily recognized as such by Deianira. But their relation is of a closer and more intimate type, because there is no conflict against it, whereas the Corinthian women must sympathize with Medea against their own rulers. Moreover there is no criminal revengefulness to be found in the wife of Hercules as in Medea. Hence the chorus in their relation to the heroine are not hindered in any way by crime or conflict and can engage in dialogue more freely than the Corinthian women. Yet, even here, we find a certain reserve, a fondness for reflective thought which is natural with people not immediately affected by the evolved calamities.

ties. Aeschylus also furnishes us with the puzzling example of the chorus in the *Prometheus Bound*. The tender-hearted daughters of Oceanus come to the rocks of Scythia to comfort the great Titan who dares stand against the victorious Zeus. Their sympathy for the sufferer is sincere and pathetic, and it is only before them that Prometheus will give vent to his woe. Yet there is a restraint in this chorus, which, but for the existence of the play, we should never have imagined as Aeschylean. The daughters of Oceanus cannot help, cannot even follow Prometheus' gigantic will or thought, but they can sympathize with him because he suffers, as it appears to them, unjustly. In their position, they cannot indulge in great activity, nor can they freely express their thoughts. For there is Zeus, who can inflict terrible penalties at will, and there is Prometheus, who is too great and too wilful even to encourage them to advise. Now if we find in Aeschylus, the poet for whom the chorus stood generally as the chief actor, such a subordinate rôle as that of the Oceanides, why should we force on Euripides exclusively the novelty of mutilating choral dialogue? If we had in Aeschylus or Sophocles a chorus of the same nature as that of the Phoenician Women or of the Women of Chalcis, is there no good reason to believe that either of these poets might have done what Euripides did? To conclude, in certain plays of Euripides, the dialogue part of the chorus is eminently curtailed, but this is true only of those plays in which the choral reticence is in accordance with the character of the chorus, and, therefore, too natural to be considered as an arbitrary novelty introduced by Euripides.

3. THE CHORAL ODES

The next point to be considered is how far are the choral odes in Euripides, as a whole, consistent with the plot? Is the choral so ineffective that it may be detached from the play? Is it true that in the odes the *choreutae* become disinterested spectators of the action without motive or passion strong enough to make them participants of the plot? These questions have been partly answered in the discussion of the dialogue. But they involve a most intricate controversy, and they deserve a careful consideration. We may fairly assume that the originator of the controversy is Aristotle, who, in his *Poetic Art*, enjoins

that “the chorus, too, should be regarded as one of the actors; it should be a part of the whole and participate in the contest of action *not in the manner of Euripides but in that of Sophocles*. With the later poets, the parts sung by the chorus are not less inconsistent with the plot than they would be if they belonged to another tragedy. Hence, following the method established first by Agathon, they sing mere interludes. And yet what is the difference between singing interludes and taking a speech or episode from the part where it belongs in order to fit it somewhere else?”¹ What may Aristotle mean when he remarks that the chorus must take part in the action *not in the manner of Euripides but in that of Sophocles*? The Greek reads: μὴ ὥσπερ Εὐριπίδη ἀλλ’ ὥσπερ Σοφοκλεῖ. Hartung² found so little justification for this statement that he did not hesitate to attempt an emendation of the text into ὡς παρ’ Εὐριπίδη ἢ ὡς παρὰ Σοφοκλεῖ which would certainly give us a more plausible meaning, “in the manner of Euripides or of Sophocles,” and would, according to the emendator, more fittingly precede the following antithetical phrase τοῖς δὲ λοιποῖς. However, the fact is that Aristotle neither here nor elsewhere corroborates this strange assertion. Indeed, if we consider a previous statement by the same author,³ according to which Euripides is praised as the most tragic of the poets, *τραγικώτατός γε τῶν ποιητῶν*, it is difficult to overlook the inconsistency of this praise with the former fault-finding. The doubt which has been cast upon the authenticity of the passage has, as we see, a strong foundation. Yet it has given rise to a long series of unjust accusations against the choral parts of Euripides. His odes are called again and again irrelevant, while it has become the fashion to call his stasima interludes or *embolima*. There are even some who think that they do not differ much from the parabasis in

¹ Arist. *Art. Poet.* 1456 A, cf. Horat. *Ep.* 2, 3, 193:

Actoris partes chorus officiumque virile
defendat, neu quid medios intercinat actus
quod non proposito conducat et haereat apte.

Cf. the fragment of Accius found in Nonius 178, 23: “Sed Euripides, qui choros temerarius in fabulis. . . .”

² J. A. Hartung, *Euripi des Restitutus*. Hamburg and Gotha, 1844, ii, p. 369; also *Lehren der Alten über die Dichtkunst*. Hamburg and Gotha, 1845, pp. 157, 159, 160.

³ *Art. Poet.* 1453 A.

Aristophanes.¹ Of course, it is impossible to deny that more than once we come upon a stasimon in Euripides which, at first sight, strikes us as an irrelevant digression. But if we only take the time to think, we shall discover a higher relevancy than we imagine. Let us examine some of the most familiar "interludes."

In the *Medea* after the departure of Aegeus, the enraged daughter of Aeetes declares her plan to slay her children in order to take vengeance upon her faithless husband. The chorus of Corinthian women are overwhelmed with the terror of the deed, but, in the song which they sing before silent Medea, they go through one strophe and one anti-strophe with no allusion to the proposed deed: (v. 824 ff.)

Ἐρεχθεῖδαι τὸ παλαιὸν ὄλβιοι
καὶ θεῶν παῦδες μακάρων, ἵερᾶς
χώρας ἀπορθήτου τ' ἄπο, φερβόμενοι
κλεινοτάταν σοφίαν, αἰὲν διὰ λαμπροτάτου
βαίνοντες ἀβρῶς αἰθέρος, ἔνθα ποθ' ἀγνὰς
ἔννέα Πιερίδας Μούσας λέγοντι
ξανθὰν Ἀρμονίαν φυτεῦσαι.

Τοῦ καλλινάου τ' ἐπὶ Κηφισοῦ ροᾶς
τὴν Κύπριν κλῆζουσιν ἀφυσταμέναν
χώραν καταπνεύσαι μετρίας ἀνέμων
ἡδυπνόους αὔρας· αἰὲν δ' ἐπιβαλλομέναν
χαίταισιν εὐώδη ροδέων πλόκον ἀνθέων
τῷ Σοφίᾳ παρέδρους πέμπειν Ἐρωτας,
παντοῖας ἀρετᾶς ξυνεργούς.

Now at the first reading of this passage, we are tempted to ask with indignation what have these sentiments on the charms of Athens to do with a mother on her way to slay her children? Is this a logical plea for averting the deed? To justify the verses with the mere remark — more than once repeated — that the author intended to pay his compliments to his Athenian audience is somewhat trite. Undoubtedly, Euripides wrote these beautiful strophes to extol the city of Athens just as Sophocles devoted to the same purpose his famous ode in the *Oedipus at Colonus* (668 ff.):

¹ Cf. F. Helmreich, *Der Chor des Sophokles und Euripides nach seinem ηθος betrachtet*. Erlangen, 1905, p. 78.

Εὐίππου, ξένε τᾶσδε χώρας
 ἵκου τὰ κράτιστα γᾶς ἔπαυλα,
 τὸν ἀργῆτα Κολωνόν, ἐνθ'
 ἀ λίγεια μινύρεται
 θαμίζουσα μάλιστ' ἀηδῶν
 χλωραῖς ὑπὸ βάσσαις. . . .

Both poets were perfectly conscious of the effect that their notes would have on the Athenians who witnessed their plays. But Euripides as well as Sophocles is a dramatic artist, and it is difficult to assume that he would altogether sacrifice his love of art to court popularity. It is more probable that when he could combine art and national pride he did so most heartily. Can we artistically justify these verses? They are sung in the presence of Medea, who is standing before them in silence, plunged in her dark thoughts of revenge. The wife of Jason had just been assured by the benevolent king of Athens that he would give her a shelter in her exile, and *it is on that assurance that she undertakes to wreak her vengeance.* In her silence, she must be thinking of this land to which she is going, and this must make her consider what she leaves behind. She will have revenged herself on Jason, whom she had once loved. The chorus, in their eagerness to dissuade her from a deed which is to make *her* miserable not less than Jason, do not immediately cross Medea's will, knowing well the impulsiveness and stubbornness of the woman from the region of Phasis. Instead, they exalt the land in which her only hope lies. They sing of the charms of the city of Erechtheus. Above all, they linger on Aphrodite's blessings upon that land. Here, the breathing of the mother of love "is written in fragrance";¹ here, "strong loves" are "enthroned on wisdom." The praise of Athens would brighten Medea's hopes; the notes of love would melt her heart with old memories of the time when she herself had felt this strong love enthroned on wisdom. Under the weight of such reminiscences, her dark thoughts might have paled in the light of tenderer feelings, brighter hopes, wiser thoughts. At that point, when the Corinthian women believe that they have reduced Medea to a logical frame of mind, they think it is time to press their argument. They remind her that *her atrocious deed, if committed, might close even*

¹ From the translation of Gilbert Murray.

the gates of Athens upon her, and with that they add their prayers: "How wilt thou dare stand on the shores of the sacred streams? Will the land that protects its friends receive thee, the slayer of thine own children, who art polluted among women? . . . On our knees we fall and unto thee we pray on every side, in every way: slay not, oh, slay not thy children! . . ." In this light it seems very unjust to call the first part of the stasimon irrelevant in any respect.

Others vent their wrath upon *Hercules* and play the part of Eurystheus by subjecting the Dorian hero to posthumous labors. "Why," they ask, "should the old men of Thebes sing of the former deeds of Hercules in the hero's absence and immediately after the cruel tyrant has pronounced his atrocious sentence upon Megara and her children?" But what song would be more appropriate than this eulogy of the very hero who after accomplishing these great deeds and acquiring merited fame is treated so infamously by a petty tyrant when he is no more among the living? That Hercules is dead, every one seems to believe. The old men would gladly fight against the oppressor for the sake of their dead hero, if their weak frames were a match for the tyrant's lances. But since they are too feeble for that, they pour out their commiseration for their friend in a laudatory dirge about him. They are old and simple. Their emotions partake of this simplicity, and, in pathetic helplessness, they sorrow for their sorrowing friends, and add to the hopeless appeals of the children the mournful praises of the lamented champion. They think of him, who, having performed many a glorious deed, has now passed away from life, and sailed down into the world of many tears, where every labor ends. Thence he can return no more to help his own; in vain does his house look for him. . . . Then, turning to their own infirmity, "if the springtime of power were ours" they mourn, "and we could brandish our spears, we and the other mates of the Earth-born, valiantly would we stand before thy children; but now, happy youth has left us far behind. . . ." (348-441).

The next stasimon contains the famous choral ode on old age. It has been often criticized not only as estranged from the plot, but even as nothing less than a *parabasis* in the style of Aristophanes. A critic as careful and erudite as Wilamowitz, whose susceptibility to the charms of classic literature is undoubted, believes that in this song the chorus entirely forgot the character of the old Thebans whom they

impersonate, and, as if casting away their masks, they become all of a sudden a chorus of Athenian citizens.¹ Many others detect in the same stanzas the poet himself complaining of his own old age, and comforting himself with the gift of song that is left him. They agree that the verses are entirely foreign to the plot of the drama, and find no justification whatever from the dramatic point of view.

Let us consider the ode more closely. In the moment of highest suspense, when the wife of the absent Hercules, and his children, apparelled in the mournful insignia of death, come forth to meet their fate, and old Amphitryon challenges heaven and Zeus's heedlessness, the hero appears. Returning at last victorious from his expedition, he comes at the very nick of time to bring deliverance to his own. Yet the old men, who had been so anxious about the event before, forget all about it as soon as it has been averted, and deprecating the horrors of old age, they sing of the delights of the gift of song (637 ff.):

‘Α νέότας μοι φίλον αἰ-
ει· τὸ δὲ γῆρας ἄχθος
βαρύτερον Αἴγυας σκοπέλων
ἐπὶ κρατὶ κεῖται, βλεφάρων
σκοτεινὸν φάος ἐπικαλύψαν . . .
οὐ παύσομαι τὰς χάριτας
Μούσαις συγκαταμιγνύσ,
ἀδίσταν συνγιλαν.
μὴ ζώην μετ' ἀμονσίας,
αἰεὶ δ' ἐν στεφάνοισιν εἴ-
ην· ἔτι τοι γέρων ἀοι-
δὸς κελαδεῖ Μναμοσύναν·
ἔτι τὰν Ἡρακλέους
καλλίνικον ἀείδω. . . .

¹ Wilamowitz-Moellendorff, *Herakles*, *Commentar*, p. 174 (Berlin, 1889). Especially on verses 672–686, he remarks: “Da ist es der attische Bürgerchor, der am Dionysosfest zum Klange der Music den Reigen tritt.” If we compare these words with pp. 363–365 of the chapter on “the *Hercules* of Euripides,” we find a certain inconsistency for which I do not know how to account. Thus he affirms in these pages that in the later tragedies, the chorus approaches more and more the Pindaric models in that it becomes the mouthpiece of the poet. He finds an example of this tendency in the *Oedipus at Colonus* (896 ff.), but a greater abundance in Euripides. According to this, for whom does our chorus speak here? For the Athenian people or for the poet? Then is it not true that the Aeschylean choruses stand nearer to the thoughts of the poet than either the Sophoclean or the Euripidean?

Now Euripides may have been old when he wrote these verses, and he may have spoken in them his own feelings, too. We can only welcome this suggestion of the personal element under the impersonal garb of the chorus. But has he here any more than in other odes sacrificed art to his fitful personal feelings? Who are they who voice this intemperate utterance? Are they not weak old men as well? Are they not entitled to feel as Euripides did about old age, and about music, its only consolation? They have been eager to save from Lycus's cruelty the unprotected wife and children of their admired hero. But old age and its cursed weakness have hindered them and forced them to play the part of a grief-wounded spectator in a hideously criminal action. They have felt the shame of it, and already complained of their physical disability. In line three hundred and eleven, they have said to Megara:

"Had any outraged thee while yet mine arms
Were strong, right quickly had he ceased therefrom;
But now, I am naught."¹

Then Hercules appears, strong in his youth, untouched by the infirmities of age, and able to deliver his own. At the sight of this accomplishment, the old Thebans are touched all the deeper by the thought of their own weakness. Once, they, too, had the youthful vigor of this man. Once, they, too, were able to do deeds, if not Herculean, yet of manly valor. Now who considers them at all? When their manhood is gone, they are forced to see things that they would not abide if they had their youth. They long for the blessings that are gone, and they curse their present infirmities. What could be more human than this?² They even complain that the gods have wronged them. Who is the sufferer who does not blame higher powers personate or impersonate for his sufferings? Yet, suddenly, a ray of comfort lights upon them. With all their burden, the art of song is still with them. In minstrelsy, they may still sing of the blessings of youth, and

¹ Arthur Way's translation.

² I do not understand Decharme, when he remarks: "Quant au second stasimon, il se justifie mal. Un mot suffit à lui donner naissance. Hercule vient de dire que tout père aime naturellement ses enfants; et le choeur de s'emparer aussitôt de cette réflexion banale pour vanter la jeunesse, en lui opposant la vieillesse avec son cortège de misères. . . ." Paul Decharme, *Euripide et l'esprit de son théâtre*, Paris, 1893, p. 454.

raise their voices in praise of him who is now what they have been in youth, but nobler in race and nobler in deed, Hercules, the son of Zeus, who, avenging the sufferings of his own, avenges also the insults made upon their own age. Reading the stasimon in this light, we can find the action of the play imaged with a master's art throughout. Perhaps it requires a certain amount of subtleness, but is it not true that Euripides is the most subtle of the ancient dramatists?

Haigh cannot account for the odes which the Phoenician women sing after the departure of Polynices and after the revelation of the plan for self-sacrifice made by Menoeceus. "Odes of this kind," he observes, "have no real bearing upon the action, and for all practical purposes may be regarded as interludes."¹ In the first of these "interludes,"² the women from across the sea recall the adventures of Cadmus, his struggle with the dragon, the strange seed that produced the earth-born, and the blood which stained the city of Thebes in her birth. Then the women call upon their common ancestor Epaphus, child of Io beloved of Zeus, to aid the city of their relatives in its great danger. Is this an interlude? Undoubtedly, the choral is eminently retrospective. But is it not natural for the women who have come to Thebes from a distant land to bear more vividly in their minds the stories on which they base their relations to the city they now visit? Why should we think this more of an interlude than the song of the daughters of Danaus in the *Supplices* of Aeschylus,³ in which forty-eight verses are given to the account of Io's wanderings, and only a few lines at the beginning and the end remind us that it is a prayer to Zeus to save the persecuted maidens from defilement? Or is the reflectiveness of the Phoenician women less related to the story of Cadmus than the fortunes of the Danaides to the story of Io? But Cadmus was the founder of Thebes. This Cadmus came from the country of these

¹ A. E. Haigh, *The Tragic Drama of the Greeks*, Oxford, 1896, p. 253. Not more sparing is the scholiast on Aristophanes, *Acharn.* 443: Τοὺς δ' αὐτὸν χορευτὰς ἡλιθίους παρεστάναι. Καὶ διὰ τούτων τὸν Εὔριπον διασύρει. Οὗτος γὰρ εἰσάγει τοὺς χοροὺς οὐτε τὰ ἀκόλουθα φθεγγομένους τῇ ὑποθέσει, ἀλλ' ιστορίας τινὰς ἀπαγγέλλοντας ὡς ἐν ταῖς Φοινίσσαις, οὐτε ἐμπαθῶς ἀντιλαμβανομένους τῶν ἀδικηθέντων ἀλλὰ μεταξὺ ἀντιπίπτοντας.

² *Phoen.* 638-690.

³ Aesch. *Suppl.* 538-590.

women. The killing of the dragon was the original sin, the source of all woes for Thebes. Is it irrelevant for the chorus to think of the beginning of evils on the verge of a new and terrible misfortune which will be nothing but a new link to the old chain? Besides, does not this reminiscence of Cadmus broaden the atmosphere of the play, or enlarge the scope of the action? Is it to be condemned any more than the account of the fortunes of the various Greeks at Troy, given by Neoptolemus to Philoctetes? Must we accuse Sophocles, too, for acting irrelevantly?¹ Have not both tragedians sought the same goal by the same method? What if the one uses the actor as his medium, and the other the chorus?

The second of the so-called *έμβολα* of the same tragedy follows Menoeceus' resolution to die for his native city. This is a noble deed. The chorus feel its nobleness and ponder upon it. But what they sing so disgusts the scholiast that he exclaims with impatience:² "These are utterly unaccountable; they should either express their sympathy for the death of Menoeceus or commend the valor of the young man. Instead they tell the worn-out story of Oedipus and the Sphinx." Indeed, Euripides would have followed this advice if he were a scholar. It is good, however, that he is a faulty poet rather than a virtuous commentator. He thought somewhat differently of his song. While Menoeceus speaks, the Phoenician Women have already begun to meditate, and, when he is gone, they express their thoughts from the point they have reached. The race of Cadmus is not wanting in nobleness. The solution of the riddle of the Sphinx was a deed, the fame of which had reached throughout the world. It had come across the sea to their own land. That deed, also, was meant to save Thebes from the evils which the terrible monster had brought upon her. Yet what was the result of its nobleness? Had it not brought worse calamities? Now Menoeceus has gone to perform another deed as noble as the old one. What will be the end of it? Redemption or a greater calamity? Yet its nobleness carries away the Phoenician women, and praising the young prince's love of his country, they wish that they themselves had such children. To call this ode "an interlude having no real bearing upon the action," requires a reader whose mind is closed to the import of the tragedy, and who cannot understand the value of the

¹ Soph. *Philoct.* 329, 412 ff.

² Schol. to Eurip. *Phoen.* 1018 ff.

tragic irony concealed under the restrained utterances of the chorus. Such criticisms are indeed irritating. The very fact that the chorus consists of women from the country of which Thebes is a colony does by no means belittle the importance of the chorus, but widens and deepens its meaning, and wins a greater admiration for Euripides, who, instead of imitating Aeschylus by forming his chorus of Theban women, has struck a new channel, and put the wider saga of Thebes into the graceful creations of a group of journeying foreign women.

What shall we say of the stasima of the *Iphigenia at Aulis*, the play which above all other plays has been exposed to the war cry, "decadence!"? The long parodos (164-302), a reminder of Aeschylean eloquence, although atrociously mutilated by hair-splitting critics, is a beautiful descriptive choral furnishing the spectator with what the poet cannot possibly accomplish within the narrow limits of stage and plot, i. e., with a bird's eye view of the whole camp of the Greeks and of the most imposing figures of their army. As a matter of fact, the women of Chalcis represent the eye of Greece beholding with delight her flower and pride. But critics say: before their very eyes happens the quarrel between Agamemnon and Menelaus which reveals to them the plot used for alluring Iphigenia and Clytaemnestra to the camp, and yet, they seem entirely unconcerned with this stirring revelation. Instead, they sing in their following stasimon of evil love and its bitter fruit. They are transported by their vision of Paris, and have no word or thought for the unfortunate victim until the very chariot carrying her comes before them. I think, however, that they are most deeply concerned with what they have been listening to. I repeat that they represent Greece looking upon the great armament and anxiously anticipating the exaction of her rights. With the women of Chalcis, the great issue is not the sacrifice of Iphigenia, but the outcome of the great campaign which is to avenge the insult upon Grecian womanhood. When the agreement between the two brothers is reached, they have no thoughts for the allured victim, but for the prospect that divine help will be at last secured, and the great fleet will soon plough the Aegean Sea, sailing as a black avenger against the city of Troy. The bloody conflict, foreshadowed in their thoughts, reminds them of the origin of the evil, the impious love of Paris: (543 ff.)

Μάκαρες οὖ μετρίας θεοῦ
μετά τε σωφροσύνας μετέ-
σχον λέκτρων Ἀφροδίτας,
γαλανείᾳ χρησάμενοι
μανιάδων οἰστρων . . .
εἴη δέ μοι μετρία μὲν
χάρις, πόθοι δ' ὄστοι . . .

"Εμολες, ὦ Πάρις, οὐ τε σύγε
βουκόλος ἀργενναῖς ἐτράφης
Ίδαιαις παρὰ μόσχοις
βάρβαρα συρίζων . . .
ὅτε σε κρίσις ἔμηνε θεᾶν,
ἄ σ' Ἑλλάδα πέμπει . . .
ὅθεν ἔρις ἔριν
Ἐλλάδα σὺν δορὶ νανσὶ τ' ἄγει
Τροίας πέργαμα. . . .

It is evident that they favor the plan of the sacrifice in spite of their pity for the victim. When the chariot appears with Clytaemnestra and Iphigenia, they welcome them with joy and blessings thus endeavoring to dispel every suspicion of the plot under the sounds of good omen. To those who would demand a more open expression of their inner thoughts, I should answer that such a course on the part of those who have come to the camp as mere spectators would be a rather unpardonable insolence. They are only women and unrelated to the actors, a mere populace, who, like the people of the Homeric age, may assent or acclaim, but have no part in the forming and discussion of the various plans, the exclusive prerogative of the chiefs.

The above instances are some of the examples which offend many a critic's taste for choral expression. They all belong to the kind which Gilbert Murray calls "the normal chorus" to differentiate it from the "congruous chorus," whose world is blended with the world of the individuals, and from the "incongruous chorus," whose world deliberately clashes with that of the individuals.¹ In this normal use, he

¹ This and the following account of Gilbert Murray's views with the passages from his translation are quoted mainly from the account of his lecture in Boston given by the *Boston Evening Transcript* of April 2, 1912. Cf. the same author's account of the Euripidean chorus in *Euripides and his Age*, New York, 1913, pp. 226-243.

believes, the ideal world, represented by the chorus, is used to heal the wounds of the real and to translate horror into beauty. Iphigenia, for example, escaping with her brother, leaves behind her the chorus who had helped them to escape. From the place where they are deserted, they see a bird which wings by, bound across the water to Greece. They follow it with their eyes while they sing: (1089ff.)

Bird of the sea rocks, of the bursting spray,
 O halcyon bird,
 That wheelest crying, crying on thy way;
 Who knoweth grief can read the tale of thee:
 One love long lost, one song forever heard,
 And wings that sweep the sea.
 Sister, I too beside the sea complain,
 A bird that hath no wing,
 Oh, for a kind Greek market-place again,
 For Artemis that healeth woman's pain;
 Here I stand hungering.
 Give me the little hill above the sea,
 The palm of Delos fringed delicately,
 The young sweet laurel and the olive tree
 Gray-leaved and glimmering. . . .

In the *Hippolytus*, Gilbert Murray selects a simpler example. When Phaedra, wounded with mortification and shame, and embittered by a fitful hatred, goes off to take her life and to leave behind her the dark plan of her revenge, the chorus, weary of the heavy atmosphere of shame and crime, express the wish to be taken away from it: (732ff.)

Could I take me to some cavern for mine hiding,
 In the hill-tops where the Sun scarce hath trod;
 Or a cloud make the home of mine abiding,
 As a bird among the bird-droves of God!
 Could I wing me to my rest amid the roar
 Where the waters of Eridanus are clear,
 And Phaethon's sad sisters by his grave
 Weep into the river, and each tear
 Gleams, a drop of amber, in the wave. . . .

"Now some people," Gilbert Murray observes, "call these choruses unreal and irrelevant. Doubtless, if they were what these critics call relevant, they would say something about how sad it is when

young girls let their emotions get the better of them. Instead, the chorus somehow catches a higher relevancy, a greater beauty out of sorrow. It is like the memory. It gives a strange mellowness and mystery to what has happened, like Tennyson's beautiful lyric:

Break, break, break,
On thy cold gray stones, O Sea!

Everything seems so much more beautiful. ‘This is the reason why the past has such magical power,’ says Bertram Russell. ‘The past does not change or strive. Like Duncan, after life’s fitful fever, it sleeps well. What was eager and grasping, what was petty and transitory, has faded away; and the things that were beautiful and eternal shine out of it like stars in the night’.”

Thus far our examples have been selected from those which are generally black-listed under the title “irrelevant.” Yet there is another class of chorals in the Euripidean plays which for most of the accusers do not seem to exist at all. They, also, like Duncan, sleep well. For if they were spoken of, they would throw blemish on the much cherished theory that Euripides has played “hide and seek” with his choruses, and made them irreconcilable to the plot. The choral odes of the *Bacchantes*, and of the *Suppliants* are so prominent in this class, that they have not been overlooked even by the most enthusiastic upholders of the theory. But little consideration is taken of such plays as the *Heracidae*, the *Cyclops*, the *Ion*, the *Trojan Women*, the *Orestes*. Certainly no choral ode in the mentioned plays may be taken for a mere interlude, unless it be the anxious song which the Trojan Women sing after the departure of Talthybius with the child. Enwrapped in their cloud of woe, they have no tears for the son of Hector, who is taken away to die, but ponder on their own dark past. The gods are cruel to Troy. The walls which Phoebus had built fell in the old times before the force of Hercules, and, rebuilt, they lie again in ruins! It is in vain that a youth of the royal house of Troy with his delicate beauty fills the cup for the lips of the highest god. Aye, even the land that has given him birth, his mother, is now wasting in flames, while her cry of woe rises in vain like unto the cry of a mother-bird for her burning young. . . . This ode (799) forms a pathetic utterance of the Trojan Women standing not far from the smoking ruins of their

city and just about to cross the Aegean Sea to a land of bondage. But, appropriate though it is, it fits less into the context of the tragedy than any other ode of the plays enumerated.

In the *Heracleidae*, the stasima are not only concerned entirely with the plot, but have not even the natural reflectiveness of old age which we meet in choruses of old men. After the departure of the insolent herald, although a scene of reaction takes place between Iolaus and Demophon, in which the old men have their share, when they come to sing their stasimon, they are still under the indignation aroused in them by the insolence of Copreus, and even continue to menace the enemy in his absence (353–380). Their next stasimon does not differ from a speech of consolation addressed to Iolaus, who sinks to the ground at Macaria's noble resolution to sacrifice herself for the salvation of the others, and, except for the fact that it is in lyric metres and is accompanied with *emmeleia*, it makes not the slightest pause in the action. “It is the gods who give us joy and woe; it is vain to toil against them. Cast thee not down but endure what comes from the gods. . . . Her portion is undying fame for the generations to come as a reward for her noble deed. . . .” When Iolaus leaves the stage in order to join the battle, the chorus, anxious for the outcome, call upon divine help in a prayer which is not less warm and vivid than the prayer of the Theban women in Aeschylus' *Seven against Thebes*. Nor is their joyful outburst at the news of victory less proper for the occasion (763, 891 ff.).

In the *Cyclops*, the chorus consists of Satyrs, who, having been cast on the shores of Sicily, the island inhabited by one-eyed monsters, are forced to serve Polyphemus, the hideous hero of the play. In their bondage, they do not forget their nature, and they are full of jest in the most critical moments. They enter the stage driving in a flock of insubordinate goats and sheep, which with great difficulty they manage to push into the cave. As soon as they have done their task, they call on their absent joys, the Wine-god and the dancing Nymphs and the pleasures of love. Then Odysseus, stranded on the island by the same fate, breaks upon their monotony with the divine liquid. But Cyclops arrives on the spot and announces his monstrous plan of feasting on human flesh. The Satyrs' song is an address to Cyclops on his impious feast. When Odysseus expounds to them his plot and pledges

their assistance, they precipitously accept the proposition, and humor their hateful master as he comes forward steeped with wine. Then Cyclops drags reeling Silenus into the cave, and falls asleep. Odysseus prepares the fire brand, and the chorus, left alone, indulge in the hope of success. Their words, however, are not "practicable." Thus when the moment of action arrives, they shrink away in consternation, and only enjoy the results of Odysseus' revenge. The choral parts of the work, which until recently has been the only representative of the ancient Satyr Play, are so closely connected with the plot that we almost lose the chorus in the actor. The odes corresponding to the stasima of the tragedy are very short, and have wholly the power of speeches. Certainly, without this chorus, the *Cyclops* would very likely be a tragedy rather than a Satyr Play. Most of the comedy is furnished by the Satyrs, and, although they do not seem to take an effective part in the plot, they are of the utmost importance in accomplishing the ultimate purpose of a Satyr Play, i. e., in effecting the comic relief necessary after the emotional strain of the tragedies that had preceded it.

It would be wearisome to consider separately each stasimon of the plays we have mentioned. A rapid glance at Euripides himself would give a better impression of my assertions than my limited argument. I must, however, lay stress upon the fact that choral odes which are unquestionably parts of the plot and indispensable to the tragedies, are no fitful exceptions with Euripides, but are quite the rule. Because we have in Euripides a greater variety of choruses and a greater multiplicity of relations between chorus and actor, we cannot prove that the poet has detached the odes from the plots. In this respect, our poet has not brought decadence to the tragic chorus.

4. THE THEORY OF GRADUAL DECLINE

It remains now to consider the assertion which certain critics make that the importance of the chorus in Euripides follows a gradual decline, which may be traced chronologically. "If we compare his later plays with those of earlier date," says Haigh,¹ "there is a manifest

¹ A. E. Haigh, *The Tragic Drama of the Greeks*, Oxford, 1896. In very similar words speaks Otto Gallus, *Über die Bedeutung des Chors in der griechischen Tragödie*, Landskron, 1895, p. 61.

tendency to thrust the chorus more and more into the background. Its connexion with the story begins to be less intimate, its interest in the characters less keen and personal, than in former times; and it is evidently on the way towards assuming those insignificant functions, to which it was finally reduced." The distinguished scholar corroborates this statement by pointing to the contents of the choral odes. "In the earlier dramas of Euripides, the chorus still play as in Sophocles the part of interested and sympathetic witnesses. Their attention is absorbed by the incidents upon the stage; and the odes which they interpose between the intervals of the action consist either of fervent expressions of sympathy and concern or of reflexions upon the events which have just occurred. . . . But in the majority of the later tragedies . . . the chorus no longer appear to be deeply affected by the varying fortunes of the drama. Their attitude is less sympathetic; and instead of expressions of emotion or pensive meditations, they occupy the pauses of the play with long and ornate descriptions of some legendary event, taken from the family history of the leading characters." A further symptom of the decline, Haigh finds in the style and language of the choral odes. "The earlier lyrics of Euripides, are masterpieces of graceful beauty and imaginative power; but in those which belong to his later period the execution, on the whole, is far less perfect. In spite of numerous brilliant exceptions, there is a general tendency, in these later compositions, to subordinate sense to sound, and to think more of the music than of the language. The meaning is occasionally almost lost in a labyrinth of words, which recalls the inanities of the Italian Opera. The sentences are spun out to enormous length with strings of appositional clauses hung together; and the mind is floated along from phrase to phrase, from picture to picture, through a long series of bewildering images, with only a very dim conception of the general purpose of the whole. . . ."

How far is this criticism true? Even the critic whom we have just quoted finds there are some exceptions, which he recognizes as "numerous and brilliant," and admits that in some of the late plays, as in the *Bacchantes* and in the *Suppliants*, Euripides restores the chorus "to much of its original grandeur and significance." But are not the exceptions sufficient to prove the rule? Although we do not know the exact time of the composition of each Euripidean play, we are fairly sure

of at least nine plays: the *Alcestis*, the *Medea*, the *Hippolytus*, the *Troades*, the *Electra*, the *Helena*, the *Orestes*, the *Bacchantes*, and the *Iphigenia at Aulis*. About the others opinions vary. But to most scholars the dates given in the introduction of M. L. Earle's edition of the *Medea*¹ seem to be nearest to truth:

Title of Drama	B.C.
Cyclops.....	possibly 441
Alcestis.....	438
Medea.....	431
Heraclidae.....	probably 430
Andromache.....	perhaps 430
Hippolytus.....	428
Hecuba.....	apparently 425 or 424
Supplices.....	about 421
Hercules.....	" 421
Troades.....	415
Tauric Iphigenia.....	apparently 414 or 413
Electra.....	413
Helena.....	412
Ion.....	perhaps 412
Phoenissae.....	411-408
Orestes.....	408
Bacchae	apparently 407
Aulid Iphigenia.....	407

Those plays of Euripides which have come down to us cover a literary activity of about thirty-five years. If we divide these years into three periods of eleven to twelve years each, we find that in the earliest period, side by side with such plays as the *Cyclops*, the *Alcestis*, and the *Heraclidae*, we must count the *Medea*, which presents a chorus of considerably weaker connection with the play, and even the *Andromache*, the chorus of which is undoubtedly not less distant from the plot than that of the *Aulid Iphigenia*. On the other hand, in the last period, against the *Aulid Iphigenia*, the *Phoenissae*, and even the *Electra*, which Haigh and even Decharme might characterize as decadent, we can array not only plays like the *Troades*, and the *Tauric Iphigenia*, but the four plays in which the chorus is of pronounced freshness, beauty, vigor, and importance, i. e., *Helena*, *Ion*, *Orestes*, and the

¹ M. L. Earle, *Medea*, p. 28. Cf. Grace Harriet Macurdy, *The Chronology of the Extant Plays of Euripides*, Lancaster, Pennsylvania, 1905. Both exclude the *Rhesus* as non-Euripidean.

unparalleled *Bacchae*. Indeed, with the single exception of the ode which the chorus in the *Helena* sing after Menelaus enters the palace with Helena,¹ what fault is there to be found or what sign of decadence to be detected in any of these choruses?

Finally, in the middle period, we find no chorus to which we may apply Haigh's characteristics. If, however, we consider *Hippolytus* and *Hercules* as belonging to the decadent class in spite of the brilliant choral pearls which they include, let us remember that the *Hippolytus* is the earliest of this period, and that the *Hercules* falls in the same time with the *Supplices*, a tragedy in which the chorus is the chief actor, achieving an importance comparable to that of the chorus in the *Eumenides*, and by far superior to any chorus that we have in Sophocles. Hence, according to our comparisons, we should be more justified, if we asserted that the Euripidean choruses increase in importance with the age of the poet than if we believe with Haigh in a gradual decadence.

As to the other assertion that the later lyrics are, on the whole, far less perfect than the earlier ones, and that they are given more to sound than to sense and poetic beauty, I do not think it merits a lengthy refutation. What late plays Haigh had in mind when he wrote this, I cannot imagine. For even if we except the much-abused play of the *Aulid Iphigenia*, what better lyrics has Euripides written than those of the *Electra*, the *Helena*, the *Phoenissae*, and, above all, of the *Bacchantes*?

As we have already observed, we cannot prove the genius of Euripides declining with the years either in the other parts of his dramatic

¹ *Hel.* 1301–1369. Decharme, generally more lenient than others, pronounces this choral as the only one in the whole range of extant Greek Tragedy which may be denoted with the name of embolimon. (*Euripide et l'esprit de son théâtre*, p. 462.) It certainly has more than any other choral ode the characteristics of an embolimon. Yet, in vv. 1353–1369, certain reason is given by the chorus which deserves a careful consideration. For if Gilbert Murray's plausible theory, as explained in the fourth chapter of Harrison's *Themis*, is true, we must recognize in this stasimon the signs of some old religious tradition or rite by which the cult of Demeter is connected with the cult of Helena. (Jane Ellen Harrison, *Themis, a study of the social origins of Greek Religion; with an excursus on the ritual forms preserved in Greek Tragedy*, by Gilbert Murray; and a chapter on the origin of the Olympic Games by F. M. Cornford. Cambridge, University Press, 1912.)

art or in his tragic choral creations; and we must not find signs of decadence in his greater variety which may otherwise be accounted for by the greater number of works that have come down to us. We must remember that Aeschylus, Sophocles, and Euripides are by no means the only tragedians of their own times, but that they are the only ones whose greatness has successfully struggled against the rolling years. Neither in other respects nor in the treatment of the chorus, can we think of them as standing higher or lower on the decline. Aristotle explicitly tells us that it was Agathon who in his tragedies first used interludes, or *embolima*, which had nothing to do with the plot, and that it was neither Sophocles nor Euripides but the unknown *others* who followed or surpassed him. In Euripides we should rather find a poet who struggled against the wave of decadence and successfully endeavored to preserve for the tragic chorus a position of freshness and interest. He is no nearer to decadence than Aeschylus; and for his creativeness and inventiveness in his successful manipulation of the myths treated by all his predecessors without incurring once the charge of imitation, he must be considered one who perfected rather than as one who degraded the Athenian Drama.

II. CHARACTERISTICS OF THE EURIPIDEAN CHORUS

Thus far we have defended Euripides against such faults as are generally found with his chorus. We have discussed the comparative length of his choruses, their importance in the dialogue, and the consistency of their lyric parts. But we have not explained the points of difference between the Euripidean and the Sophoclean or Aeschylean treatment of the chorus, and, therefore, not yet detected the actual characteristics of the chorus in Euripides. Although our poet has by no means minimized the rôle of the chorus, it is impossible to imagine that he has introduced no change whatever in his treatment, and that he simply followed the path of his predecessors. Dealing with the same legends with which Aeschylus, Sophocles, and other contemporaries of these great poets had dealt, Euripides would find it difficult to satisfy his hunger for the fresh and the new by limiting himself to the old methods. The reader of Euripides' plays realizes this truth. Whether he studies a chorus which is inseparably connected with the plot, or a chorus which, according to his conceptions, is more or less

irrelevant, he is sure to feel the Euripidean touch. He feels that what he reads could not have been written either by Aeschylus or by Sophocles, but by another poet, less grandiloquent than the first, less serene than the second, but more fanciful, more subtle, more individualistic. What are the sources of this difference?

5. RELIGION IN THE CHORUS OF EURIPIDES

Let us first consider how far the chorus of Euripides is connected with what is the main source of the Greek Drama, i. e., religion. "The roots of the chorus," says Gilbert Murray, "are deep down in human nature, as deep as the springs of religious emotion. The *choros* of tragedy was a special kind of dance. It was a dance connected with the worship of heroes and the mighty dead, particularly the sort of hero that was expected to return, perhaps in his own person, perhaps in a re-birth. It is a sort of religion that has encircled the world."¹

With Aeschylus, the chorus is so steeped in religion that it often becomes a mere exponent of religious and ethical doctrines, or a participant and performer of religious rites. In the pouring of libations, in the invocation of the dead, in the prayers to the various divinities, the chorus take the leading part. Their presence has a deep motive never entirely estranged from a religious nature. The tender daughters of Oceanus come as sympathizers with the suffering Titan, and are deeply interested in the struggle of his unbending will and the supreme will of Zeus. In the *Suppliant Maidens*, the Danaides come to the land which nourished Io in order to take shelter under the protection of Zeus, and it is reverence for the gods which forms their chief reason for urging the Argives to help them. In the *Agamemnon*, the old men from the beginning to the end battle with the gods. In the *Eumenides*, the chorus consists of Furies who, in turn, have to struggle against more benevolent deities. All the choral parts are saturated with religious rites, thoughts, legends, problems. They are full of earnest prayers. In this way, the Aeschylean choruses are nearest to the primitive chorus; but elevated by Aeschylus' zealous endeavors, they accomplish the poet's higher aim of rousing religious emotion and, above all, imposing upon the audience a nobler religion centering in a nobler pantheon.

¹ *Boston Transcript*, April 2, 1912.

Sophocles, on the other hand, uses religion not for theological but for artistic purposes. Of course, he is not wanting in piety and reverence for the gods. But he belongs to a younger generation than that of Aeschylus, and he has grown with men who, though they clung to the old rites with mystic devotion, did not make religion the object of constant ardor as did Aeschylus. Sophocles loves the Athenian people and wishes to be loved by them. He, therefore, learns to love the religion of the people not so much because he believes it to be true — he does not seem to have an opinion of his own on the matter — but because it is the religion of the glorious state of Athens, and partakes of its resplendent beauty and of its magnificent dignity. Consequently, the Sophoclean choruses do not speak of religion with the divine inspiration of a prophet, but sing with the mystic emotion of a devoted priest. They look upon the gods with the reverence with which we look upon noble forms sculptured in marble. Their religion does not go further than the religion of the best class of the Athenian citizens. Without trying to improve upon these gods, they surround them with an idealizing halo which delights the Athenians because it is in perfect accordance with the tendency of their own minds. In the religious utterances of the Sophoclean chorus, the Athenians recognized with simple delight their own thoughts clad in the mellowing words of Sophoclean sweetness. When in the course of his tragedy, Sophocles sees that the audience would fall into a religious or moralizing mood, he makes his chorus experience the same feeling and express that feeling in modulated tones. Thus the Sophoclean choreutae become not only the friends of the hero or heroine, but the friends of the audience, and tend to become the ideal spectators of the tragedy, a quality which many critics apply indiscriminately to the choruses of all our tragedians.

What is true of the religion is also true of the morality of the chorus. It is, however, most difficult to disentangle religious from moral elements in the ancient drama. In this respect, the poet's genius made a great advance upon the primitive chorus by working an ethical tone into it, and by moulding its frantic expressions of religious exuberance into a unifying morality. Aeschylus walked this new path gloriously. His morality as well as his religion is overladen with the fiery enthusiasm and sweeping earnestness of the prophet. With his lessons, he

carries his audience away with an overwhelming power. In him we see the poet of the giants of Marathon and of Salamis, on whom he could work with the might of a mighty leader. But Sophocles replaced might with art. He looked upon his work with the eye of a sculptor, and, where he thought fit, he struck with his masterly chisel. Unlike Aeschylus, who forces his audience to listen to his lessons, Sophocles notes with a serene observer's eye the mood in which his audience is, and gently works with this mood toward a beautiful goal. Thus in the *Oedipus Rex*, when Iocasta's scorn at the divine oracles strikes the audience with restlessness, Sophocles immediately takes up the emotion, and, through his chorus, he expresses what the delighted Athenians recognized as their own feelings, mantled in far more beautiful words and sounds than they ever could utter (863 ff.). The Sophoclean moral lessons are not deep, but within reach of the plainest mind, and, therefore, all the more effective. Not without truth, Dio Chrysostom remarks that the beauty of the Sophoclean songs justifies the words of Aristophanes:¹

ὅ δ' αὖ Σοφοκλέους τοῦ μέλιτος κεχριμένου
ώσπερ καδίσκου περιέλειχε τὸ στόμα

The earnest admirers of Emerson whom I have met have emphasized to me this very Sophoclean quality of the American thinker and poet, his power to express in harmonious and moving words truths which they vaguely felt before. Might not the charm that Emerson exercises upon the minds of most Americans be used as an illustration of the charm which such a universal and yet essentially Athenian master exerted upon his fellow-citizens in his day?

But what is the way in which the chorus of Euripides perform their religious and ethical function? Euripides was a man who lived in doubt. If we may liken ancient with modern times, Aeschylus would in this respect be compared with Milton; Sophocles, with Tennyson; Euripides, with Matthew Arnold. Aeschylus and Milton had implicit faith in the divine agencies, good or evil. What they say about religion is, at the same time, their own sincere and unshakable belief. With both, the gods live and exercise their power whether they are Furies or devils, Jupiter or Jehovah, Apollo or Gabriel. In both, we find a

¹ Dio Chrysost. λόγ. 52. Cf. Aristoph. *Edit. Oxon.* fr. 581.

titanic conflict with regard to supreme authority, and in both the highest and best prove victorious over the inferior and worse agencies. Just as Jehovah triumphs over Satan, Jupiter wins the victory over the Titans. Sophocles and Tennyson accepted religion but avoided discussing it; or, if they ever came to doubts, their manner was calm, their attitude pious. This is clearly illustrated by the *Oedipus King* of the one and by the *In Memoriam* of the other. Likewise do we see the chorus of the Theban citizens of the *Antigone* acting and expressing themselves, after Antigone's farewell to life, with that stoical tranquillity with which King Arthur sees inside the dark walls of the nunnery his beloved queen prostrated, with tears of penitent sorrow before him.¹ Euripides and Matthew Arnold would have gladly lived under the spell of religion if only they could. But their earnest thoughts and truth-seeking meditations come into inevitable conflict with popular religious tradition. Their doubts find a fertile ground to grow, and soon both poets feel that the walls which protected their faith are torn down. They are driven by storms hither and thither, unreconcilable with the past, uncertain of the present, excluded from the future. Under such circumstances, Euripides could not give his chorus either the constructive religiousness of Aeschylus or the pious conservatism of Sophocles. His earnestness was Aeschylean, but the doubt was his own. He felt in himself a constant battle going on which he should express in his work. This he does with the utmost earnestness and seriousness, never lightly or jestingly as we are misled to believe by the original and ingenious but altogether unsound criticisms of Verrall and his school.² Nearer to truth is Nestle³ when he points out that those who think of Euripides as an atheist are unjust to our poet. If he had thought of the gods as Diagoras did,⁴ we could not explain his theory of the universe. Indeed, Euripides detached himself from the traditional religion with earnest and sincere regret. Often we see him full of long-

¹ Soph. *Antig.* 944 ff.; Tennyson, *Idylls of the King, Guinevere*.

² A. W. Verrall, *Euripides, the Rationalist*, Cambridge, 1895; *Essays on Four Plays of Euripides*, Cambridge, 1905. Cf. Gilbert Norwood, *The Riddle of the Bacchae*, Manchester, 1908.

³ Wilhelm Nestle, *Euripides, der Dichter der griechischen Aufklärung*, Stuttgart, 1901, chap. III, p. 51.

⁴ Aristoph. *Av.* 1072; *Nub.* 830; Diodor. 13, 6; Suidas and Hesychius under the word *Diagoras*.

ing for the lost faith and turning with eager soul to the pleasant and happy gods of Olympus. This longing is expressed by the words of the chorus in the *Hippolytus*:¹

'Η μέγα μοι τὰ θεῶν μελεδήμαθ', ὅταν φρένας ἔλθῃ,
λύπας παραιρεῖ· ξύνεσιν δέ τιν' ἐλπίδι κεύθων
λείπομαι ἐν τε τύχαις θυατῶν καὶ ἐν ἔργμασι λεύσσων.
ἄλλα γὰρ ἄλλοθεν ἀμείβεται, μετὰ δ' ἵσταται ἀνδράσιν αἰών
πολυπλάνητος αἰεί. . . .

This is one of the few instances in which we may suspect the chorus of speaking the sentiments of the poet with regard to religion. As a rule, the Euripidean choruses are far from expressing the poet's battling thoughts. They are the representative of the people, a plurality which Euripides not less than Socrates and Anaxagoras considered incapable of deep thought. Aeschylus, who believed in the thoughts and actions of the *πολλοὶ* whom he had seen in Marathon and Salamis, made his chorus, and, therefore, the people, the chief exponent of his religious conceptions. Euripides, who had seen the crowds going mad for a Cleon or Hyperbolus, had little respect for the people that had lost their ancient intelligence and virtue and blindly followed every crafty demagogue. He certainly thought them incapable of philosophic contemplation. His own thoughts he confides to a chosen few. The deep problems which burdened his mind, whether religious or moral, he expounded through the mouths of a few individuals rather than through those of his choruses. Religion for Euripides needed argument; the chorus could only listen to, but hardly mingle with a discussion. Hence the chorus could not be the religious exponent of Euripides as it had been of Aeschylus.

Are we then to understand that there are no religious touches to be found in the Euripidean chorus? This would be impossible. On the contrary, the religious touches are frequent and effective. But in most cases, they represent the thoughts of the chorus, and, therefore, of the people as Euripides conceived of them. Often the chorus lift their voices to a prayer. Thus the old Athenians, who are left alone on the stage in the *Heraclidae*, while beyond the walls of the city the battle rages that is to decide their own fortune and that of the children of

¹ Eurip. *Hippol.* 1104 ff.

Hercules, pray earnestly to Athena and Zeus to give victory to the champions of the weak. The friends of Electra in the *Orestes* pray to the implacable Furies to cease from pursuing the house of Tantalus. But such prayers might be addressed to the gods by any men of the people in time of similar distress, although they would not be able to reach the heights of our poet's lyric power. Nor do we find in them the ponderous fullness of Aeschylus or the mystic serenity of Sophocles. Their words grow out of their crying need not out of their constant faith. It is their passion not their reason that speaks.

Occasionally, they even seem to be interested in a religious thought. But we must not attribute such reasoning to Euripides' own mind or faith. Thus in the *Hercules*, the old Thebans, stirred by the consciousness of their weakness, pour their curses on old age, and, in truly human fashion, they throw the blame on some one else, in this case, on the gods: (655 ff.)

εἰ δὲ θεοῖς ἦν ξύνεσις
καὶ σοφία κατ’ ἄνδρας,
διδυμον ἀν ἥβαν ἔφερον
φανερὸν χαρακτῆρ’ ἀρετᾶς
ὅσοισιν μέτα. . . .

Euripides makes the old men sing these words in earnest, because their character is in harmony with the thought expressed. But it would be incredible to think of Euripides as sharing the old Thebans' view about life. What contributes to the progress of the play does not issue from the inner meditations of the poet. Let us not forget that what is fit for the old men of the chorus, who in their physical and intellectual infirmity are incapable of far-reaching thoughts, would be certainly preposterous if it came from Euripides himself, the serious thinker and the friend of the great philosophers of his age. The chorus itself is the *vulgus profanum*, which, in spite of its simple sincerity and its desire to explain what seems puzzling, cannot enter the meshes of intricate philosophical thought without stumbling into a chaos of inconsistencies. It dares think, to be sure, but it cannot go beyond the thought of a populace, which it clothes in words of Euripidean lyricism stirring our minds and arousing our emotions because of the naturalness with which they express the affections of the men or women composing the chorus. This intermingling of popular thought and

Euripidean lyricism makes it all the more difficult to disentangle the poet's subjectiveness from his objective creations, and explains to a large measure the confusion of the critics.

Thus Decharme¹ discovers Euripides in the doubts of the Chalcidian women about the divine origin of Helena. The simple women, with the sorrows and evils that the gathered host is to suffer and to inflict foreshadowed in their vision, cannot make up their minds whether Helena was daughter of Leda and of Zeus in his swan-like disguise, or whether mortal bards have invented the story:²

εἰ δὴ φάτις ἔτυμος ὡς
ἔτυχεν, ὅρνιθι πταμένω
Διὸς ὅτ' ἡλλάχθη δέμας, εἴτ'
ἐν δέλτοις Πιερίσιν
μῦθοι τάδ' ἐς ἀνθρώπους
ἥνεγκαν παρὰ καιρὸν ἄλλως . . .

But these words fit so well the character of the Chalcidian women that we may not with justice press them upon the poet. Helena, the cause of so many evils, the faithless wife, the destroyer of the very flower of Greece, — how could any believe her the offspring of the highest and best of the gods? The chorus might well doubt the truth of this story in their eagerness to avoid impiety by blaming the fancy of inventive poets rather than Zeus's daughter. After all, this doubt is not lasting. Just as any populace, the Euripidean chorus forget their doubts under the weight of different circumstances. Thus in the *Helena*, although some critics bracket verses 257–260, there is no dissenting view as to the authenticity of the words which the chorus of captive women sing in the presence of the Queen (213 ff.), and which most positively assume the truth of the same story denied in the *Aulid Iphigenia*:

. . . αἰών δυσαίων
τις ἔλαχεν ἔλαχεν, ὅτε σ' ἐτέκετο ματρόθεν
χιονόχρως κύκνου πτερῷ
Ζεὺς πρέπων δὶ' αἰθέρος.

If Euripides wished to prove the falsehood of the story why should he admit in the *Helena* what he had questioned in the *Aulid Iphigenia*?

¹ *Euripide et l'esprit de son théâtre*, p. 65 ff.

² Eurip. *Iphigen.* Aul. 794–800.

Would it not appear more probable, if we ascribe both passages to the chorus rather than to the poet?

Nor is the case different in the choral ode of the *Electra*, in which the chorus express their doubts about the story of the sun changing his course because of the fatal contest of Atreus and Thyestes (737 ff.):

λέγεται, τὰν δὲ πι-
στιν σμικρὰν παρ' ἔμοιγ' ἔχει,
στρέψαι θερμὰν ἀέλιον
χρυσωπὸν ἔδραν ἀλλά-
ξαντα δυστυχίᾳ βροτεί-
ῳ θνατᾶς ἐνεκεν δίκας.
φοβεροὶ δὲ βροτοῖσι μῆ-
θοι κέρδος πρὸς θεῶν θεραπεί-
αν. ὃν οὐ μνασθεῖσα πόσιν
κτείνεις, κλεινῶν συγγενέτειρ' ἀδελφῶν.

What has been attributed to the doubting poet fits well both the development of the play and the character of the singers. The fortune of Orestes and Electra has reached a very critical moment. Uncertain as to the issue of the contest, restless with anxiety and fear, the Argive women try to strengthen their hopes by recalling the just outcome of past trials, and they remember the story according to which the stars had once changed their course in defence of justice. But at the end of their song, fear overcomes their hope, and, with evident inconsistency which is nevertheless unquestionably human, they seem to express indirectly their doubt about the truth of the legend. For that very reason, our suspense is all the greater, and our joy all the stronger at the unexpected success. A masterstroke in the dramatic art of Euripides should not be obscured by the hypothesis of religious self-confession.

Nor is the religion of our poet misinterpreted only in the choral parts of his dramas. Scholars of rare critical acumen like to contrast the Aeschylean *Eumenides* with the Euripidean.¹ Aeschylus did not hesitate to bring the Furies before the eyes of the audience in form, speech, and action so that no one should question their presence. But

¹ Decharme, *Euripide*, etc., p. 68. Cf. Nestle, *Euripides, der Dichter der gr. Aufklärung*, p. 78 ff.

Euripides makes them empty apparitions, the imaginings of an hallucinated mind, phantoms which Orestes alone in his illness can see, and which are, of course, entirely unsuspected either by Electra or by the chorus (*Orest.* 255 ff.):

- OP. 'Ω μῆτερ, ἵκετεύω σε, μὴ πίστειέ μοι
 τὰς αἰματωποὺς καὶ δρακοντάδεις κόρας.
 αὗται γὰρ αὗται πλησίον θρώσκουσι μου.
 ΗΛ. Μέν', ὡς ταλαιπωρ', ἀτρέμα σοῖς ἐν δεμνίοις.
 'ορᾶς γὰρ οὐδὲν ὅν δοκεῖς σάφ' εἰδέναι . . .

From these verses, the conclusion has been drawn that Euripides did not believe in the existence of the awful Furies. But how can we assume this unbelief for Euripides without involving Aeschylus? Do these phantoms of the Euripidean Orestes differ at all from what we hear of in the end of the Aeschylean play of the *Choephoroe*? In the latter play, too, Orestes alone sees the terrible goddesses, while the chorus try in vain to rid him of his fancies. The hero is entirely absorbed in his own visions and grows more and more helpless as the numbers of the hideous apparitions increase (1044 ff.):

- OP. ⁷Α, ἀ.
 δμωαὶ γυναικεῖς αἴδε Γοργόνων δίκην
 φαιοχίτωνες καὶ πεπλεκτανημέναι
 πυκνοῖς δράκουσιν' οὐκέτ' ἄν μείναιμ' ἐγώ.
 ΧΟ. Τίνες σε δόξαι, φίλτατ' ἀνθρώπων πατρί,
 στροβοῦσιν; ἵσχε, μὴ φόβου νικῶ πολύ.
 OP. Οὐκ εἰσὶ δόξαι τῶνδε πημάτων ἔμοι.
 σαφῶς γὰρ αἴδε μητρὸς ἔγκοτοι κύνες.
 ΧΟ. Ποταίνιον γὰρ αἷμά σοι χεροῖν ἔτι.
 ἐκ τῶνδέ τοι ταραγμὸς ἐσ φρένας πίτνει.
 OP. ⁷Αναξ ⁷Απολλον, αἴδε πληθύουσι δή,
 κάξ ὁμμάτων στάζουσιν αἷμα δυσφιλές . . .

Are these Furies less phantom-like or less unreal than those of Euripides? Certainly we cannot conclude from such passages that Euripides did not believe in the existence of the goddesses of vengeance. After all, the Euripidean Furies are not less empty creations than Lyssa in the *Hercules* or Death in the *Alcestis*. If we deny the existence of the first simply because they do not appear, should we believe that Eurip-

ides considered Lyssa and Death as personal gods simply because he makes them walk on the stage ? Indeed, we are stepping on precarious ground. Let us rather confess that it is most difficult to distinguish the poet from the philosopher, and that the poet's own religion may be vaguely detected but never accurately determined.

What, however, the chorus has lost as a religious exponent in Euripides, has been skilfully balanced by realism. Indeed, it is through realism that the poet accomplishes the freshness and vividness of his choruses. He had to take away the religious potency which to his mind had grown obsolete in the chorus and to reserve it for argumentative treatment in the speeches of his individual characters. But to save the dramatic effect, he had to introduce another method of appeal. When Aeschylus brought the Eumenides on the Athenian stage, he relied on the religious belief of his audience to effect the awe at which he had aimed. In his day, Euripides doubted the wisdom of such an expedient, but he was sure that human hearts would always be open to pathos. Thus in his *Orestes*, it is not the Furies who make the chorus, but young women, friends of Electra, who come to sympathize with her sufferings. The murdered father is, indeed, avenged. But the unfortunate brother, the tragic avenger, is smitten with a terrible woe. Over him, as he lies in a restless slumber, they find Electra vigilant. The anxiety which she displays lest her friends awaken him, and the pathetic response of the chorus may not arouse awe among the spectators, but will always have a powerful effect on the human emotions of any audience in any age. In the *Prometheus Bound*, the daughters of Oceanus come in a winged chariot to witness the sufferings of the Titan. They are goddesses and they commune with gods. They come from their abode in the depths of the sea. The spectator rises to the divine heights and beholds a divine tragedy with inspired reverence. But in the *Hippolytus*, the sufferer is a woman; her passion is irresistible love, a subject which Aeschylus disdained and Sophocles touched most distantly. Euripides finds such a theme not unworthy of his Muse inasmuch as it is human. Yet he goes even further than that, in a manner which itself would suffice to stir an audience. He adds realism to realism, and pictures in the minds of his spectators a background which is bound to heighten their emotions. The Trozenian women, as they enter, say whence and why they come (121 ff.):

'Ωκεανοῦ τις ὕδωρ στάζουσα πέτρα λέγεται,
 βαπτὰν κάλπισι ρύτὰν πα-
 γὰν προϊεῖσα κρημνῶν·
 ὅθι μοὶ τις ἦν φίλα
 πορφύρεα φάρεα
 ποταμίδι δρόσῳ
 τέγγονος, θερ-
 μᾶς δ' ἐπὶ νῶτα πέτρας εὐ-
 αλίου κατέβαλλ'. ὅθεν
 μοὶ πρώτα φάτις ἥλθε δεσποίνας . . .

The picture of women gathered by the banks of a river and listening to the tale of another woman while they are washing is pleasant in its humbleness, and moving in its lifelikeness. But to the Athenians, who were accustomed to such pictures, this had a deeper meaning. It brought to each Athenian's mind vivid associations. As boys they had followed their mothers into the country where, by the bank of a river or brook, they had played and sported the day away while their mothers and sisters washed the raiments white, and engaged in gossip. The little and petty yet real and vivid adventures which they may have had were suddenly brought before them, while they sat in the theatre by the side of the poet. With a few strokes the picture immortalized by Homer in the Nausicaa episode and vivified in realism rises before them. The effect of the description is by no means less than the mother's hopeful cry "The sun! the sun!" at the sight of the first rays of the rising sun while her child struggles with death behind her, in the *Ghosts* of Ibsen. The same realistic touch we discover in the different interpretations which the Trozenian women give to the grief of Phaedra (141 ff.):

. . . ἡ σὺ γ' ἔνθεος, ὡς κούρα,
 εἰτ' ἐκ Πανὸς εἴθ' Ἐκάτας
 ἡ σεμνῶν Κορυβάντων φοι-
 τᾶς ἡ ματρὸς ὄρεια;
 — σὺ δ' ἀμφὶ τὰν πολύθηρον Δι-
 κτυνναν ἀμπλακίαις ἀντε-
 ρος ἀθύτων πελάνων τρύχῃ; . . .
 — ἡ πόσιν . . .
 ποιμαίνει τις ἐν οἴκοις κρυ-
 πτὰ κοίτα λεχέων σῶν; etc.

With the first verses of the chorus in the *Hippolytus*, we may compare those of the captive Greek maidens in the *Helena*. The exiled Queen is bewailing her evil fortunes now increased by Teucer's news, and her maidens come hastily to her (179 ff.):

κυανοειδὲς ἀμφ' ὕδωρ
ἔτυχον ἔλικά τ' ἀνὰ χλόαν
φοίνικας ἀλίου πέπλους
ἀνγαῖσιν ἐν χρυσέαις
ἀμφὶ δύνακας ἔρνεσιν
θάλπουσα· (ποτνίας δ' ἐμᾶς),
ἐνθεν οἰκτρὸν ἀνεβόασεν,
ὅμαδον ἔκλινον, ἄλυρον ἔλεγον,
ὅτι ποι' ἔλακεν αἰάγμα-
σι στένουσα, Νύμφα τις
οῖα Νᾶς
ὅρεσι φυγάδα νόμον ἰεῖσα
γοερόν, ὑπὸ δὲ πέτρινα γύαλα
κλαγγαῖσι
Πανὸς ἀναβοῦ γάμους.

The same artist, the same art. He is constantly at work touching clay with clay, and moving human beings with pictures of human things. For a dramatist no way is surer than this. We may often grow forgetful of the gods; but who can detach humanity itself from his own life?

To repeat our argument, the Euripidean choruses do not engage in philosophic speculations with regard to religion, and if they ever seem to philosophize, it is a sort of popular philosophy they express, not the poet's own views. This is true of all the plays almost without exception. Even the *Supplices* illustrate this point of view in spite of the nature of the play in which Aeschylus would have found a splendid opportunity to revel in religious thought. Although the Suppliant Mothers never forget piety, which is particularly expressed in their prayers to the gods, yet they are so absorbed in their own woes that they think more of them than of the gods. Even when the battle which is to decide the issue of their supplication rages on, the unfortunate women cannot lift their voices to a constant prayer. Their ode is full of painful uncertainty and dismay, and it is only toward the end that they address a few verses to the gods.

Is then the tragedy of the *Bacchae* not an exception to this rule? It is neither in the importance of the chorus nor in the consistency and sequence of the lyric parts that the *Bacchae* of Euripides is unparalleled by any of his extant tragedies. In these respects there are other plays that equal it. But in its religious mood it is undoubtedly unique. From the very opening of the tragedy to the end, we feel that we breathe a religious atmosphere which we cannot find in any other work of the same writer. We are constantly in the shadow of religion and we meet with a sanctity of feeling and with a piety of thought which are peculiarly reminiscent of Aeschylus. It is true, Euripides has shown signs of such piety in other plays besides this, nor is the *Ion* the only example we could cite. But in all the others, human nature and human affections are the centre of the poet's attention, whereas in the *Bacchae*, the religion of the people is praised to such a high degree and with such seriousness that, at first thought, Euripides seems to have changed entirely. Yet, the play is Euripidean after all, and Euripides is very difficult to convert to old views. He is the same poet, a lover of simplicity, a pursuer of covert truth. The past still holds him fast with the sweet bonds of memory, and with sincere longing does he look back to the years of his childhood, when, far from philosophical doubts, he venerated the religion of the people with a candid and simple soul. Meanwhile, time passes away, and the boy of yesterday is now a man. When the age of simplicity is past, he feels the hunger for truth, and in its pursuit, he enters a long and hard struggle in which the bitterness of the loss constantly detracts from the recent gains of thought. He sometimes vacillates, but he never becomes a cynic or a derider, as Verrall seems to believe. He has made his choruses representatives of the Athenian populace that he might interpret rather than condemn the simple, passionate, impulsive world. In the chorus of the *Bacchae*, the people have their best interpreter. Euripides is in this play so affected by the simple faith of the humble that he seems to forget his philosophy in his poetic appreciation. Not that there is nothing to betray Euripidean doubts. In the attitude of Pentheus, we discover what Euripides might call his worse self, the impersonation of the spirit of revolt which the friend of Anaxagoras must have often felt rising from the depths of his earnest longing for truth rather than the pretences of sacred legend. But there is also no

doubt that Euripides has in this tragedy taken a decided stand against the spirit of scrutiny in religion, and for once, at least, in his creations, he pays unqualified respect to the popular pantheon. Against the woe-breeding scepticism of Pentheus, the chorus explain the vanity of wisdom, and with a sentiment and lyricism that is almost convincing, prove unwise the wise, who buy unhappiness with their wisdom. Not that we do not find similar arguments in other plays. But in the *Bacchae*, the contrast between religion and wisdom is so prominent that it becomes the very theme of the play. With a wonderful power, the religion of the people is amplified and exalted. Thus it seems as if old Olympus is restored before us, and from the tranquil twilight of its peaks the Homeric gods rule with relentless power. Them we must obey; else sorrow shall wait for us.

The students of Euripides have conjectured more than one explanation of this wonderful declaration. The favored supposition is that the drama is due to the effect that the poet's journey to Macedonia had on his thoughts. Detached in the last period of his life from the atmosphere of Athens, which was pregnant with philosophic controversy and blatant free thought, in the austere background of immense forests haunted by wolves and fawns, of lofty mountain-tops boldly piercing the skies, of precipitous rocks shaded with pine, entwined with ivy and bryony, and rising over eternally murmuring springs, Euripides' mystic tendencies welled into a current of power that carried him away. The sacred haunts of Pieria were about him. The whispers of the great oaks spoke forth the divine will of Zeus from the ground of aged shrines. The crystal palaces of the immortals stood in magnificent splendor above the clouds that crowned the highest peaks above the Pierian valleys and glens. Undoubtedly, in these very forests, the orgiastic rites of the Dionysiac cult were still performed in all their primitive fervor, and the poet must have seen many a woman of Macedonia inspired by the Bacchic touch, and joining in the orgies of the Wine-god with a wild enthusiasm which to the thought of Euripides had been long ago dead. These things did not happen in Athens. Their simple and unquestioning faith stirred in Euripides the flame that had inspired his childhood. Just as in later times, another poet, the trumpet-voiced Lucretius, felt the overpowering mysticism of a shepherd's pipe in the wilderness, Euripides let the magic trance

guide his spirit, and he wrote a tragedy, the soul of which is legendary religion. There is little scrutiny and less doubt, but almost a blind acceptance of the divine agency and of the power of faith which we can find only in Aeschylus.

The chorus consists of fifteen Eastern women, who enter in front of the palace of Pentheus, "the light of the sunrise streaming upon their long white robes and ivy-bound hair." At one side is visible the sacred tomb of Semele, a little enclosure overgrown with wild vines, with a cleft in its rocky floor from which there issues at times steam or smoke. The women wear fawnskins over their robes, and some of them carry timbrels, some pipes and other instruments. They enter stealthily till they see that the place is empty, and then begin their mystic song of worship (64 ff.):¹

A maiden:

From Asia, from the dayspring that uprises,
To Bromios ever glorying we came.
We laboured for our Lord in many guises;
We toiled, but the toil is as the prize is;
Thou Mystery, we hail thee by thy name!

Another:

Who lingers in the road? Who espies us?
He shall hide him in his house nor be bold.
Let the heart keep silence that defies us;
For I sing this day to Dionysus
The song that is appointed from of old.

All:

Oh, blessed he in all wise,
Who hath drunk the Living Fountain,
Whose life no folly staineth,
And his soul is near to God;
Whose sins are lifted, pall-wise,
As he worships on the Mountain,
And where Cybele ordaineth,
Our Mother, he has trod:
His head with ivy laden
And his thyrsus tossing high,
For our God he lifts his cry:
"Up, O Bacchae, wife and maiden,
Come, O ye Bacchae, come;

¹ From Gilbert Murray's translation of the *Bacchae*.

Oh, bring the Ivy-bestower,
God-seed of God the Sower,
Bring Bromios in his power
From Phrygia's mountain dome;
To street and town and tower,
Oh, bring ye Bromios home " . . .

As we perceive, the whole song is full of orgiastic religious emotion. With exultant heart, and mind entirely swayed by religion, they sing and dance in the hyporchematic manner, and we feel as if we were initiated into the Bacchic cult. We are forced to listen to every word by the stream of emotion that carries each word forward. In accordance with their frantic piety is the Bacchae's boldness in the dialogue parts. When Pentheus contends against Teiresias in terms of impious invective upon the new god, they seem to forget the natural hesitancy which marks such choral interruptions of the dialogue, and they boldly rebuke the impious king for his blindness (263):

τῆς δυσσεβείας. ὡς ξέν', οὐκ αἰδήθ θεούς,
Κάδμον τε τὸν σπείραντα γηγενῆ στάχυν,
Ἐχίονος δ' ὥν πᾶς καταισχύνεις γένος;

In the same controversial spirit they praise Teiresias for his defence of their god, and, later, sing their next ode in which, with indignation and revengefulness, they call upon the Mother of the Gods to smite the arrogance of the king. Then suddenly falling into a reflective mood, they give a warning to the tyrant (370 ff.):

'Οσία πότνια θεῶν,
'Οσία δ' ἀ κατὰ γᾶν
χρυσέαν πτέρυγα φέρεις,
τάδε Πενθέως ἄτεις; . . .
— ἀχαλίνων στομάτων
ἀνόμου τ' ἀφροσύνας
τὸ τέλος δυστυχία·
δὲ τὰς ἡσυχίας
βίοτος καὶ τὸ φρονεῖν
ἀσάλευτόν τε μένει καὶ
συνέχει δώματα· πόρσω
γὰρ ὅμως αἰθέρα ναίον-
τες δρῶσιν τὰ βροτῶν οὐρανίδαι . . .

At first reading, these words seem to be of a great weight which has induced many to suspect a personal belief of Euripides hiding in them. But this view is no more Euripidean than it is Aeschylean or Herodotean.¹ It is rather a popular dogma with the Greeks which appears again and again in the various writers of ancient Greece. Thus in Herodotus, the doctrine that extreme happiness involves extreme danger and sorrow is appealed to as a common law, and he is only one of a whole legion of writers in whom the same sentiment is often expressed. Nemesis treads upon the footprints of *hybris* constantly. Aeschylus himself gives us the valuable testimony that this doctrine was already an old tradition in his age, from which he alone dared depart (*Agam.* 750 ff.):

παλαιφατος δ' ἐν βροτοῖς γέρων λόγος
τέτυκται, μέγαν τελε-
σθέντα φωτὸς ὅλβον
τεκνοῦσθαι μηδ' ἄπαιδα θυήσκειν,
ἐκ δ' ἀγαθᾶς τύχας γένει
βλαστάνειν ἀκόρεστον οἰζύν.
δίχα δ' ἄλλων μονόφρων εἰ-
μι. τὸ δυσσεβὲς γὰρ ἔργον
μετὰ μὲν πλείονα τίκτει,
σφετέρᾳ δ' εἰκότα γέννα.
οἴκων δ' ἄρ' εὐθυδίκων
καλλίπαις πότμος ἀει . . .

This testimony, I believe, settles the question. Through the words of the Bacchae which we have quoted, we do not hear any philosophic view of the poet, but a traditional maxim of the populace which commands our attention because of the fine raiment in which it appears. But even more puzzling seems to be what the same maidens sing a little later (395 ff.):

¹ Herod. 1, 5; especially the story of Polycrates, 3, 39–46; cf. 3, 40: *ἔμοι δὲ αἱ σαὶ μεγάλαι εὑρυχίαι οὐκ ἀρέσκουσι, τὸ θεῖον ἐπισταμένω ὡς ἔστι φθονερόν*, etc. Aesch. *Pers.* 821 ff., especially 92 ff.:

δολόμητιν δ' ἀπάταν θεοῦ
τὶς ἀνὴρ θνατὸς ἀληξει; . . .
φιλόφρων γὰρ παρασαλνει
βροτὸν εἰς ἄρκνας ἄτα . . .

τὸ σοφὸν δ' οὐ σοφία
τό τε μὴ θυητὰ φρονεῖν·
βραχὺς αἰών· ἐπὶ τούτῳ
δέ τις ἀν μεγάλα διώκων
τὰ παρόντ' οὐχὶ φέροι· ματ-
νομένων οὖδε τρόποι καὶ
κακοβούλων παρ' ἔμοι-
γε φωτῶν.

Thus any man who endeavors to attain greatness through power or wisdom forfeits his own happiness, and cannot escape the envy of the gods. In this thought, the chorus of the Bacchae are certainly in advance of the popular doctrine which was in vogue among the Athenians and the other Greeks. Not without good reason should we suspect here Euripides himself complaining against his own fate. For he, too, possessed this bitter gift of wisdom for which he paid in sorrow, the same penalty paid by Anaxagoras, Phidias, and Pericles before him, and by Socrates after him. Thus, although these words do not formulate the personal belief of Euripides, they imply what the poet had suffered by not making the chorus's sentiment his own canon. But he has so disguised his just complaint in the words and character of the Bacchae, and he is so far from expressing any pride for his wisdom and understanding that he even lets the chorus, which are the people, have precedence in condemning with apparent justice this bootless possession. Nor do the sentiments expressed fit any less the nature and character of the Bacchae. Thus, like diamonds, which gather and reflect light without losing their own properties, the Euripidean choruses may sometimes reflect or rather imply the meditations of the poet without violating their own nature. The mask is never dropped, but within the laws governing his dramatic technique we may here and there find in unsuspected corners throughout his plays reminiscences of the poet's personality, a personality which permeates the whole of his work but cannot be easily detected with certainty. Except for this implication, the chorus of the Bacchae follow here as well as in all their utterances the popular doctrine. In the words that follow soon afterwards with regard to Venus and Love, we recognize again popular feelings re-echoed ever since Mimnermus:¹

¹ Eurip., *Bacch.* 403 ff. Cf. the fragment of Mimnermus:
Tis δὲ βίος, τι δὲ τερπνὸν ἄτερ χρυσένης Ἀφροδίτης;

*ικοίμαν ποτὶ Κύπρον
νᾶσον τὰς Ἀφροδίτας,
ἴν' οἱ θελξίφρονες νέμον-
ται θυατοῖσιν "Ερωτες . . .*

The same thought underlies the whole ode to the end. They praise the new god, who loves the lowly with their passions, and does not envy the great, the friend of peace, the lover of joys. Power and wisdom are vanity. The portion of the multitude should be preferred:

*τὸ πλῆθος ὁ τι
τὸ φαυλότερον ἐνόμισε χρῆ-
ται τε τόδ' ἀν δεχοίμαν.*

When the disguised god is led bound into the palace to be imprisoned, the chorus raise their anxious cries to Dionysus to come and save them from the hand of violence. Then the miraculous voice is heard, an earthquake shakes the pillars of the palace, fire leaps forth from the tomb of Semele, and the maidens, obeying the voice, cast themselves in awe upon the ground to be lifted up by the delivered god, who appears before the portals of the palace, followed by Pentheus. Then, while the king is in the palace donning the shameful apparel suggested by the god, the Bacchae sing of their longing for the orgiastic rites, and of their desire “to dance with delicate foot through the dark hours of the night, lifting their heads high into the balmy air like fawns sporting on the grass of the laughing meadow . . . delighting in spaces unhaunted by man and in the young plants of the shadowy forests.” Again they return to popular philosophy. Pentheus is the enemy of their god and, therefore, hateful to them. They wish for his punishment, and sing in Euripidean measures of the traditional joy of overcoming one’s enemy. Then, in words that remind us of the Hebraic tendencies of Aeschylus, they sing of the slow but sure advance of the divine vengeance. But soon they return to the popular creed to chide those who scrutinize divine things, and to praise those whose fortune is moderation.

When Pentheus in the disguise of a woman passes before them following unsuspectingly the revengeful god who leads him into the meshes of a horrible fate, the Bacchae have no feeling of sympathy.

On the contrary, in their eagerness to see vengeance accomplished, they follow the king into the mountain forests, and see with great joy his tortures at the hands of his own kin. Their exultation at this repulsive vision is so elevated through religious transportation and lyric ecstasy that it appears even just and sanctified. The rapid metre, the restless rhythm, the intense feeling beat their words into a storm of passion, and they sing and dance in the tumultuous manner of the hyporcheme, if this form of dance-song is to be found in the Greek tragedy. In the same manner, they receive the news of the great disaster, and they give vent to their joy in spite of the messenger's threats. Then Agave comes with the horrible trophy in her hands, boasting in the hallucination of her accomplishment. The Bacchae continue to indulge in their joy which, under the horrible circumstances, seems to assume the form of loathsome malevolence, but soon the mother's sorrow drives them into silence. Their last words are those we find at the close of many a Euripidean play, but nowhere do they fit better than here:

πολλαὶ μορφαὶ τῶν δαιμονίων,
πολλὰ δ' ἀέλπτως κραίνοντι θεοῖ·
καὶ τὰ δοκηθέντ' οὐκ ἐτελέσθη,
τῶν δ' ἀδοκήτων πόρον ηὔρε θεός.
τοιόνδ' ἀπέβη τόδε πρᾶγμα.

Thus in the *Bacchae* the chorus becomes again a primitive chorus, and seems even to take on the religious significance which was of primary importance in the earliest poets and of uttermost gravity in Aeschylus. There is, however, a serious difference. The religious lessons which were expounded by Aeschylus and his predecessors through the chorus were certainly the belief of the poets themselves, whether they shared this belief with the people or endeavored to improve and transcend popular doctrines. But what the Euripidean chorus have to say about religion represents only popular doctrine, not the poet's own belief. To this rule, even the *Bacchae* makes no exception. True, the religious sentiments of the play often rise to such an ecstasy that to many, clad as they are in the powerful splendor of the choral odes, they appear to be the sentiments of the poet himself. Thus even scholars of first rank take the words of the *Bacchae* as a confession of the conversion of Euripides from his free thought to the popu-

lar religion.¹ This error would be avoided, if we accept the religious references of the Euripidean chorus not as representing the belief of the poet, as is the case with the Aeschylean chorus, but as issuing from the religious and moral convictions of the populace enhanced by the poet's sympathetic treatment.

6. THE HUMANITY OF THE CHORUS IN EURIPIDES

For Euripides and his age, the fountain of religion so dear to Aeschylus was dry. Neither the people nor the chorus were able to understand and express the thoughts of a few scrutinizing individuals. But even when philosophy grew above the chorus, the power of humanity remained untouched. Indeed, humanity goes so far as to embrace religion, inasmuch as the religious motive is applied in the case of the chorus not to instruct but to rouse emotion. Taking the people's religion as an active force independently of its truth, the Euripidean choruses base their strength and effectiveness on realistic touches, on familiar pictures, on pathetic notes, and on lyrical outbursts of passions deeply human. Thus they come much nearer to being real men and women than the choruses of either Aeschylus or Sophocles.

If we examine the nature of the Aeschylean choruses, we are inclined to see in them symbols of mighty forces or principles, the personifications of certain classes, the incarnations of some ideas, the embodiments of some cities. At any rate, they stand apart and face the world of the individual as enemies or friends, as judges or comforters, but from a superior or, at least, a different plane. In the Suppliant Maidens, we see Persecuted Maidenhood. In the daughters of Oceanus, Tender Pity. In the old men of Argos of the *Agamemnon*, Battling Thought. In the Libation Bearers, Rankling Revenge. In the Eumenides, Everlasting Remorse. In the Women of Thebes, a City. In the Persians, a Nation. The choruses of Sophocles are drawn nearer to the individuals, but seem to keep a respectful aloofness, a modest hesitancy that stamps them as spectators rather than as actors. They wish to behold rather than mingle with the world of

¹ Gomperz, *Griechische Denker*, ii, p. 12; Patin, *Tragiques Grecs*, i, 46; cf. Decharme, *Euripide*, p. 75; Nestle, *Eurip.* p. 75. Also Wilamowitz, *Herakles*: Einleitung, p. 379; *Comment.* p. 54, and the fine criticism of Murray, *Euripides and his Age*, p. 179.

the individuals, and they do not enter it unless they are compelled by the stream of circumstances. Their deeds are temperate, their feelings modest. They know the value of restraint and they never lose sight of their dignity. Even in their *kommoi*, they reach neither the Aeschylean depth nor the Euripidean pathos. They moan as thoughtful friends would moan; they act as sensible friends would act; and they speak as prudent friends would speak. They are men and women, yet wrapped in a world of their own, in an atmosphere of calm reflection and of undisturbed serenity. They are ideal spectators with an ideal mind and an ideal attitude without losing their right of action or of intervention.

With Euripides, the veil of ideality is torn away, and the chorus often forget that they are the representatives of the people, whose influence is strong though mute, and whose power is great though impersonal. They assume more of flesh and bone, and they are men and women, just as thoughtless, impulsive, and reckless as the mobs that crowded the Athenian assembly to applaud a Cleon or a Hyperbolus. Their feelings are real, their thoughts depend on their moods. Their principles are drowned in their sympathies, and their moral contemplations spring from the circumstances. The Corinthian women come to stand by Medea, and under the sway of their impulse for her, they do not care to know the way of her revenge upon Jason, if it can only be accomplished. When she unfolds her plan of revenge, they show no sympathy whatever for Jason, and urge her to enact her plan although they know not what it is. Without hesitation, they promise the silence which the princess of Colchis skilfully imposes upon them. Their words are few and determined (267):

δράσω τάδ'· ἐνδίκως γὰρ ἐκτείσῃ πόσιν,
Μῆδεια!

But when they hear that the plan includes the death of the children, their impulse revolts against the deed. They attempt to dissuade her, but their efforts are vain. They see that she is resolved, and are anxious to keep themselves pure from the stain of so horrible a crime. Their natural weakness, however, is in their way, and they spend so much time in choosing between their instinct and their duty as Medea's confidants that, when they finally declare for the former, they find the

deed accomplished, and can do nothing but break their vow of silence and tell Jason what has been perpetrated.

Hypocrisy is not a less human characteristic of many a Euripidean chorus. The women of Chalcis give a joyful welcome to Clytaemnestra in order to encourage the queen's hopes, although they know that they are false (598 ff.):

Στῶμεν, Χαλκίδος ἔκγονα θρέμματα,
τὴν βασίλειαν δεξώμεθ, ὅχων
ἀπὸ μὴ σφαλερῶς ἐπὶ γαῖαν,
ἀγανῶς δὲ χεροῦν μαλακῇ ρώμῃ,
μὴ ταρβήσῃ . . .

Likewise, in the *Electra*, the women of the country show a merry face to the tyrannous mother that she may not suspect Aegisthus' end or her own danger. The more flattering the words appear the more artful is their dissimulation. Their verses are fraught with a certain latent acerbity and a horrible irony that render the passage infinitely tragic (988 ff.):

ΧΟ. Ἰώ,
βασίλεια γύναι χθονὸς Ἀργείας,
πᾶν Τυνδάρεω,
καὶ τοῖν ἀγαθοῖν ἔνγγονε κούροιν
Διός, οἱ φλογερὸν αἰθέρ' ἐν ἄστροις
ναίουσι, βροτῶν ἐν ἀλὸς ροθίοις
τιμὰς σωτῆρας ἔχοντες·
χαῖρε, σεβίζω σ' ἵσα καὶ μάκαρας
πλούτου μεγάλης τ' εὐδαιμονίας.
τὰς σὰς δὲ τύχας θεραπεύεσθαι
καιρός. χαῖρ', ὦ βασίλεια.

We may cite one instance after another to show the humanity and individual clearness of the Euripidean choruses. Their self-consciousness often makes them forget their friends and think entirely of themselves. The Trojan Women upon hearing the lamentations of Hecuba come upon the stage not so much to fulfil their choral function in consoling her as to be informed of their own fortune. They have learned that the Achaeans are embarking, and they ask Hecuba what are the enemies' plans with regard to the captive women of Troy.

Their song is a lamentation about themselves rather than about their queen.¹ In a similar play, the *Hecuba*, the chorus consisting again of Trojan women appear before Hecuba's tent to announce to the unfortunate queen the new atrocity of the Achaeans, who have decided to sacrifice Polyxena to the shade of Achilles. They are followed by Odysseus, who comes to drag the victim to the sacrificial altar. When this is done, and Hecuba lies prostrated on the ground and overcome by the fearful blow, the captive women do not attempt to comfort her. Why should they? Her grief is too deep for any comfort. Their compassion is silenced by the immensity of her woe, and their attention absorbed by their own sorrows. Have they not lost all? Are they not left alone, without hope, without relatives, without country, the captives of their destroyers? From their agony rises their pathetic questioning of the sea breeze to tell them of the place where they are to serve (444 ff.):

XO. Αὔρα, ποντιὰς αὔρα,
ἄτε ποντοπόρους κομί-
ζεις θοὰς ἀκάτους ἐπ' οἶδμα λίμνας,
ποὶ με τὰν μελέαν πορεύ-
σεις; τῷ δουλόσυνος πρὸς οἰ-
κον κτηθεῖσ' ἀφίξομαι; ή
Δωρίδος ὄρμον αἴλας;
ή Φθιάδος . . .

We have already had occasion to note the human touches of the chorus in the *Hercules*, and similar examples may be found in the *Rhesus*, the *Phoenissae*, the *Orestes*, and other plays. The guards of the *Rhesus* are drawn with exquisite realism. The captive women in Tauris never forget their character as captives wasting their lives among barbarians, far from their own land. The women of Phthia in the *Andromache*, are ever conscious of their birth and of their native pride that together with Andromache's noble dignity prevents them from winning a foreign woman's confidence. All the choruses whether of men or women live, speak, and act like men and women of the common people, τὸ πλῆθος . . . τὸ φαυλότερον, to use Euripides' own words. Never do they rise above this level except in the *Bacchae* and in the

¹ Eurip. *Troiad.* 153, 511, 799 ff.

Aulid Iphigenia. Even in the exceptions, the level is not much higher. A certain fancifulness may obscure the realism of the one, and a veil of symbolism may affect the humanity of the other. But neither the chorus of the *Bacchae* rise above popular doctrine, nor the women of Chalcis forget their own human characteristics in blending themselves with the women of greater Greece.

More than once we have already come upon examples of Euripidean pathos. It is one of the favorite human touches with which our poet perfects the humanity of his choruses. The funeral *kommos* as we find it in the *Hippolytus*, the *Alcestis*, the *Andromache*, the *Troades*, and the *Supplices*, gives us the most splendid examples. In none of these funeral responsive songs do we find the Aeschylean sublimity. Aeschylus on such occasions strives to rouse in the hearts of the spectators an awe which springs from the heaviness with which supernatural powers visit human sin. Euripides is satisfied with pathos. The sufferings of humanity seem to absorb his sympathy, and this sympathy he wishes to impart to the spectator by simply displaying the pain of the sufferer in all its pathetic aspects. He likes to lay his hand upon the wounds of men and watch the agony that rises therefrom without looking for the divine hand that deals the wound. He is the poet of an individualistic age. Mankind under the weight of a war that obeyed no principle and heeded no justice forgot the watchful eyes of the gods who, darkly working out their inscrutable will, had in past times smitten the arrogant and delivered Greece from the power of the foreign intruder. In the days of Euripides, men suffered without reason and without sin. The individual, at least, had begun to entertain such thoughts. Concentrating his thoughts upon himself, man began to efface from his mind the mountain-tops of Olympus, over which eternal calm reigned, undisturbed by rain or snow and permeated with the simple twilight of the Homeric faith. The clouds which threatened his own existence were so dark as to obliterate these beautiful visions of the child. Thus wherever he saw pain, he looked for no justice, and sought no divine agency. He was impelled to forget the mighty spirits, that had ruled the universe, by the constant uncertainty of the life before him, a life fraught with unaccountable confusion and irremediable woe. Euripides lived in this age and felt its pulse. He cared not for the giants who were dead. The heroes of Aeschylus or of Sophocles — what were

they to him? Human suffering he saw in himself and about him, and, unable to interpret it in the resigned artistic serenity of Sophocles, he plunged into it to meet sorrow with sorrow and pathos with pathos.

To recapitulate: The choruses of Euripides have retained their gravity, although they have relinquished their function as religious and moral teachers, because they have increased in human interest. There is no idealism in them. Their effect is won through direct appeal to human emotions, through realism, and through lyricism. They stir with their pictures and actions, they touch or soothe with the sounds of their songs. No religion or morality is strong with them except as popular forces. They flee to them for refuge like common men and women in the time of need. But if their human desires are baffled, with an inconsistency deeply human, they dare revolt against religious and moral agencies, and assert the voice of their own flesh. For Sophoclean moderation, we should not look here. As in the populace, so in the Euripidean chorus, excess is joined to every action and feeling. Wisdom, indeed, is not the lot of the many.

7. ACTION IN THE EURIPIDEAN CHORUS

The question of action has been already touched in our discussion of the dialogue and of the choral odes. But we must make clear how far the Euripidean chorus interferes with the action of the drama. Can we consider the chorus as an actor? If by action we understand physical doing, then action on the part of the chorus is very rare. But this does not differentiate the chorus from any other actor. Physical action on the Greek stage is generally avoided. The exceptions to this rule are very few. Thus in Aeschylus, we see Prometheus chained before our eyes, and the Egyptian herald attempting to drag the daughters of Danaus by violence from the altars of suppliance. In Sophocles, we have the suicide of Ajax and the painful sufferings of Philoctetes. Euripides furnishes us with more numerous examples: the binding of Dionysus in the *Bacchae*, and Agave's play with the head of her own son; the violence of the herald and Alcmena's revengefulness in the *Heraclidae*; Orestes' unrestrained threat as he lifts his sword to strike Hermione; Polyneices' fearful approach to his paternal palace; Hercules' awakening in the midst of his bleeding victims. In spite of

all these examples, however, physical action is usually done off the stage, and the audience is informed about it through a messenger's report to the chorus or to another actor. Taking into account this disregard for physical struggle in the Greek drama, we may not consider it as a characteristic of the Greek chorus that they do not engage in physical action. It would be far more awkward and offensive to the Greek sense of symmetry to engage twelve or fifteen persons than a single actor in an act, if that act is of a physical nature. Yet even that is not entirely impossible.

Two examples of physical action by the chorus are found in Aeschylus. At the end of the *Agamemnon*, the old men of the chorus are so overcome by indignation that they dare engage in an actual struggle against Aegisthus and his attendants. Likewise, we must count as physical action the resistance of the Danaides to the violence of the herald in the *Supplices*. Sophocles, the poet of moderation and restraint, would hardly manifest any fondness for such a measure. Yet even he allows his chorus in the *Ajax* to leave the stage and engage in search for their chief. It is, however, in Euripides that we discover a chorus engaging in action decidedly physical. The first example appears in the *Helena*. When Theoclymenus becomes aware of his deception, he turns his wrath upon his sister and rushes into the palace to slay her. From accomplishing this deed, he is prevented by the chorus of the women, who not only obstruct his way, but seize his garments, and struggle to hold him back until the Dioscuri appear to settle all difficulties. The passage is composed in rapid trochees reflecting the great suspense that is created by the dialogue and action of the speakers (1626 ff.):¹

ΧΟ. οὐτος ὡς, ποῖ σὸν πόδ' αἴρεις, δέσποτ', ἐσ ποῖον φόνον;
 ΘΕ. οἰπερ ἡ δίκη κελεύει με· ἀλλ' ἀφίστασ' ἐκποδῶν.
 ΧΟ. οὐκ ἀφήσομαι πέπλων σῶν· μεγάλα γὰρ σπεύδεις κακά.
 ΘΕ. ἀλλὰ δεσποτῶν κρατήσεις δοῦλος ὦν;
 ΧΟ. φρονῶ γὰρ εὖ.
 ΘΕ. οὐκ ἔμοιγ', εἰ μὴ μ' ἔάστεις —
 ΧΟ. οὐ μὲν οὖν σ' ἔάπομεν.

¹ Note especially the plural in vs. 1630 ἑσσομεν and 1640 ήμων ἐκόντων from which we may conclude that it is not only the corvphaeus but several members of

Of equal importance is the example found in the *Rhesus*. The chorus of guards, who had left the stage, catch sight of two shadows by the tent of Rhesus slipping away in the dark, and immediately rush in pursuit. The unknown persons are Diomedes and Odysseus. The guards overtake them in front of Hector's tent, and obstruct their way in all directions, calling to each other for assistance, and lowering their spears against the intruders. Then some of the guards actually seize the spies, and threaten to slay them unless they give the signal (674 ff.):

XO. ἔα ἔα.

— βάλε βάλε βάλε βάλε
— θένε θένε
— τίς ἀνήρ; λεύσσετε· τοῦτον αὐδῶ.
— κλῶπες οἴτινες κατ' ὄρφνην τόνδε κινοῦσι στρατόν.
— δεῦρο δεῦρο πᾶς.
— τούσδ' ἔχω· τούσδ' ἔμαρψα.
— τίς ὁ λόχος; πόθεν ἔβας; ποδαπὸς εἶ;

ΟΔ. οὐ σε χρὴ εἰδέναι· θανῆ γὰρ σήμερον δράσας κακῶς.

XO. οὐκ ἐρεῖς ξύνθημα, λόγχην πρὶν διὰ στέρνων μολεῖν;

ΟΔ. ἵστω· θάρσει.

XO. πέλας ἵθι. παῖς πᾶς.

ΟΔ. ἢ σὺ δὴ Ἀρῆσον κατέκτας;

XO. ἀλλὰ τὸν κτενοῦντά σε . . .

ΟΔ. ἵσχε πᾶς τις.

XO. οὐ μὲν οὖν.

ΟΔ. ἀ. φίλιον ἄνδρα μὴ θένης.

XO. καὶ τὶ δὴ τὸ σῆμα;

ΟΔ. Φοῖβος.

XO. ἔμαθον· ἵσχε πᾶς δόρυ.

— οἵσθ' ὅποι βεβᾶσιν ἄνδρες;

ΟΔ. τῇδε πῃ κατείδομεν.

ἔρπε πᾶς κατ' ἵχνος αὐτῶν —

— ἢ βοὴν ἐγερτέον;

— ἀλλὰ συμμάχους ταράσσειν δεινὸν ἐκ νυκτῶν φόβῳ . . .

A third example is furnished by the *Heraclidae*. When the hateful tyrant Eurystheus, conquered and captured, is dragged before Alcithoe the chorus that join in the action. Gilbert Murray emends the text in this passage in order to ascribe the choral part to a *θεράπων*. It is one of the very few points in which I cannot follow him.

mena, the old queen attempts to slay him and thus satisfy her long and rankling hatred. But the old Athenians of the chorus interfere between her and the captive (961 ff.):

ΧΟ. οὐκ ἔστ' ἀνυστὸν τόνδε σοι κατακτανεῖν.
 ΘΕ. ἄλλως ἂρ' αὐτὸν αἰχμάλωτον εἴλομεν;
 ΑΛ. εἴργει δὲ δὴ τὶς τόνδε μὴ θνήσκειν νόμος;
 ΧΟ. τοὺς τῆσδε χώρας προστάταισιν οὐ δοκεῖ.
 ΑΛ. τί δὴ τόδ'; ἐχθροὺς τοισίδ' οὐ καλὸν κτανεῖν;
 ΧΟ. οὐχ ὄντιν' ἀν γε ζῶνθ' ἔλωσιν ἐν μάχῃ . . .

These examples should suffice to explode the theory that it is impossible for the chorus of the Greek tragedy to engage in physical action. Like any other actor, the chorus avoid such an ultra-realism; but with men like Aeschylus and Euripides, who did not shrink from extremities altogether, even this medium is utilized. On the other hand, physical action is often threatened without coming to fulfilment. In the *Hippolytus*, when the chorus hear the cries of the nurse calling for help in behalf of Phaedra, who has committed suicide, they deliberate whether they should go into the palace and give assistance, but the thought that there will be many an attendant within the palace to respond to this need holds them back (782). In the *Hecuba*, the painful cries of Polymestor undergoing a fearful punishment in the hands of the embittered queen and of her fellow-captives agonize the women of the chorus. Fearing lest the king escape, they are about to rush in and help Hecuba; but before they move, Polymestor comes forth blind and helpless to prevent them from a vain attempt (1042 ff.). Likewise in the *Andromache*, the women of Phthia are kept from rushing into the palace by the appearance of Hermione, the very person for whom they would leave the stage (815 ff.). In the *Medea*, at the pitiful appeals of the children that are being murdered, the Corinthian women rush toward the entrance, and beat helplessly on the barred doors while they endeavor with vain chidings to prevent the inhuman mother from dealing her intended blow (1271 ff.). We have already referred to the scene in the *Hercules* in which the old companions of Amphitryon raise their staves, and threaten to meet violence with violence in behalf of the wife and children of Hercules.

Dramatic action, however, does not necessarily imply physical doing. Actors take part in the dramatic conflict not so much with

their hands as with their thought and mind. Nor must we forget that mental struggle as well as any turn in the dialogue which tends to arouse emotion is dramatic action. To use S. H. Butcher's words,¹ action "embraces not only the deeds, the incidents, the situations, but also the mental processes, and the motives which underlie the outward events or which result from them. It is the compendious expression for all these forces working together towards a definite end." With this Aristotelian conception of dramatic action, of $\pi\rho\acute{\alpha}\xi\varsigma$, in mind, we must admit that the chorus of Euripides take a great part in the action of the play, certainly not less than the chorus of Sophocles, although considerably less than that of Aeschylus. The creation of atmosphere, the instrumentality toward effecting the proper mental attitude on the part of the audience, the occasional clue toward revealing a character are too self-evident to the average reader to be made the subject of discussion. At times they even become necessary to develop the plot of the drama. More than once, they are indispensable for stating the antecedent events and creating a setting, and they always play an important expository rôle. We have had occasion more than once to refer to the importance that the chorus assumes in the *Ion*. The women attending Creusa become sometimes the key for turning the plot. It is their knowledge of the secret agreement between Xuthos and Ion that puts them in power for a while to close or continue the action of the play. Their decision to inform their mistress makes it possible for the conspiracy to form itself; and their presence of mind in the critical moment saves her from being instantly killed by her son. Again in the *Rhesus*, the guards awaken Hector to announce the results of their watch. This announcement begins the action by bringing about the despatch of Dolon to espy the enemy's camp. Later, it is they who, with Aeneas, persuade Hector to accept Rhesus as an ally. As to the scene in which they seize Odysseus and Diomedes, and are deceived into releasing them, we have already discussed its importance. In the *Helena*, it is the chorus who instruct the exiled queen to consult Theonoe on the fate of Menelaus, and it is they who by joining their prayers to those of Helena win the prophetess to their side, and persuade her to be silent with regard to Menelaus' presence and to the

¹ S. H. Butcher, *Aristotle's Theory of Poetry and Fine Art*, London, 1895, pp. 310 ff.

plan of escape. In the *Bacchae*, it is the presence of the chorus that makes it possible for the messenger to unfold his awful tale, and thus prepare the entrance of the ill-fated Agave. In the *Tauric Iphigenia*, the chorus ineffectually but very dramatically attempt to prevent the messenger from meeting the king and announcing Iphigenia's escape. In the *Hippolytus*, it is the faithfulness of the Trozenian women to the dead queen that brings about the catastrophe of the play with the fulfilment of Theseus' curse on the innocent hero. In the *Hecuba*, it is the Trojan women who begin the action by bringing to the fallen queen the news that the Greeks have decided to sacrifice her daughter to the shade of Achilles.

From these examples, which are not the only ones, we may safely conclude that the chorus in Euripides as well as in Sophocles and Aeschylus takes an important part in the action; that Euripides at times, as is the case in the *Hercules*, the *Ion*, the *Helena*, and the *Alcestis*, makes his chorus a more important actor than Sophocles; that at least once, in the tragedy of the *Suppliant Women*, he approaches the Aeschylean heights by making the chorus the chief actor; but that in some cases, as in the *Electra*, and in the *Aulid Iphigenia*, the chorus takes in the action a part which is considerably less than that of any Sophoclean chorus, a fact, however, which is justified by the nature and character of the persons that compose such a chorus.

8. THE SECOND CHORUS IN EURIPIDES

More than once, we meet in Euripides with what we may call a second chorus, who sometimes are mute, but sometimes take part in the lyric lines of the play. Such a second chorus may be reasonably suspected in the *Heraclidae*. In the opening of this play, Iolaus, in stating the cause of his supplication, indicates that the younger sons of Hercules are sitting before him on the altar, while the older ones wander from land to land seeking protection.¹ From the words of the same speaker, we are also informed that the daughters of Hercules are also present although not visible as they sit with their mother in suppliance within the walls of the temple. But it is not impossible that they, too, follow Alcmena when she comes forth to receive the glad

¹ Eurip. *Heraclid.* 9-11, 23-25, 31-34, 45-50, 67-72, 123-127.

news.¹ This supposition is strengthened by the plural used in verse 658: *οὐκ ἴσμεν ἡμεῖς ταῦτα*. However that may be, it is certain that the sons are present from the beginning to the end of the play in their suppliant posture on the altar. Their number is nowhere indicated, but it is very probable that it is equal to the number required to make up a chorus.

But the *Hippolytus* and the *Supplices* furnish us with two certain examples of a second chorus. In the first play, before the entrance of the Troezenian women, Hippolytus returns from the chase with a garland in his hands, which he dedicates to Artemis, and hangs on her altar before the palace. In this act, he is attended by servants, his fellow-huntsmen, who apparently stand about the altar and sing a fitting hymn to the divine huntress (58ff.). Thus they perform what is distinctly a choral function. They are even led by a coryphaeus. For when the offering is made and Hippolytus entirely overlooks the goddess of love, the attendants are disturbed, and one of them, assuming the part of a leader, attempts to induce his master to pay some respect to the altar or statue of Aphrodite, which stands on the other side not far from the entrance of the palace. A lively dialogue ensues without result. Hippolytus refuses to follow a wise council, and enters the palace to be followed soon by the attendants, who do not forget to pray to the injured goddess as they pass by the altar. In the *Supplices*, besides the chorus of the suppliant mothers of the chiefs slain in Polynices' expedition against Thebes, who in the opening of the play with the olive boughs and fillet of suppliance sit about the altar in the forecourt of the temple of Demeter and Persephone in Eleusis, there sit also as suppliants a chorus of children, the sons of the same chiefs, as it appears from the dialogue between Aethra and Theseus (98 ff.):

ΘΗ. οἱ δ' ἀμφὶ τόνδε ("Ἄδραστον) παιῶνες; ή τούτων τέκνα;
ΑΙ. οὐκ, ἀλλὰ νεκρῶν τῶν ὀλωλότων κόροι.

When the mothers rise to take their place in the orchestra, the children remain in the place of suppliance on the altar whence they rise only when Adrastus, who seems to perform the function of a coryphaeus for them, leads them to the place of the funeral pyre in order to have

¹ Eurip. *Herachid.* 39-44, 642-645, 656-658.

them carry back the ashes. This is evident from the words which Adrastus addresses to the children as he leads them out (948):

. . . ὅταν δὲ τούσδε προσθῶμεν πυρὶ¹
οστᾶ προσάξεσθ' . . .

Near the end of the play (1113–1164), they return with their sad burden, and engage in a pathetic *kommos* with the mothers of the dead until they are interrupted by Theseus.

The preceding examples are found in the extant plays. That Euripides has used a second chorus in other plays also which have not come down to us is made evident by the ancient commentaries. The scholiast on the fifty-eighth verse of the *Hippolytus* informs us that there were such supplementary choruses in at least two other plays, the *Alexandros* and the *Antiope*. In the first, the second chorus consisted of shepherds. In the other, the main chorus was composed of old men of Thebes, whereas the supplementary chorus evidently consisted of young women, attendants of Dirce. That the hymn to the goddess of the chase was sung by the huntsmen themselves in the *Hippolytus* and not by the chorus standing behind the stage is ascertained from the same passage of the scholiast, which explains that the two choruses in the *Antiope* were on the stage at the same time, i. e., the one did not enter after the departure of the other, in which case the same persons might be used for both. To quote the words of the scholiast: έτεροι εἰσι τοῦ χοροῦ, καθάπερ ἐν τῷ Ἀλεξάνδρῳ οἱ ποιμένες. Ἐνταῦθα μὲν οὖν δύναται προσποχήσασθαι τοῖς ἀπὸ τοῦ χοροῦ, ἐκεῖ δὲ συνεστῶτος τοῦ χοροῦ ἐπεισάγει τοιοῦτο ἄθροισμα, ὡς καὶ ἐν τῇ Ἀντιόπῃ δύο χοροὺς εἰσάγει, τόν τε τῶν Θηβαίων γερόντων διόλου καὶ τὸν μετὰ Δίρκης.

We cannot, however, say that the novelty of a supplementary chorus belongs to the inventiveness of Euripides. In this as in other bold attempts, the real innovator is Aeschylus. The most interesting example is furnished by the last play of the *Oresteia*. In the *Eumenides*, we not only have a second chorus of Athenian women escorting with dance and song the appeased Furies, but even a third, though mute, chorus of Athenian citizens, who form the reverend court of the Areopagus. Here, it seems, we catch sight of the origin of the second chorus. When the ancient tragic chorus of fifty was discontinued on account of the limitations which expense of outfit and refinement of the lyric and

orchestic art imposed upon the drama, the tragedians divided the original number into four parts of twelve and assigned one to each of the four plays of the tetralogy. Occasionally, however, the chorus of one tragedy were used as mute supernumeraries or were assigned an insignificant part in some other play if the dramatist found fit to do so. The *Eumenides* is an excellent justification of this theory. At least, there can be little doubt that the venerable Areopagites of the trial scene are the old Argives of the *Agamemnon*, and that the women who sing the prosodion at the end are the faithful attendants of Electra in the *Choephoroe*. Thus the very same persons were utilized without even changing their garments or appearance.

In this method then, the master is Aeschylus. Sophocles—so far as we know—did not care to utilize a medium which was evidently intended to titillate the senses through its spectacular effect rather than promote the real art of the drama. But Euripides, the popular poet, eagerly took the artifice from Aeschylus and adorned it with his own fancy, pleasing the citizens of Athens with a spectacle of fifteen huntsmen, or shepherds, or Peloponnesian children in mourning.

9. THE HYPORCHEME

1. *On the Hyporcheme in General*

We come, at last, to the most puzzling question of the *hyporcheme*. Authorities differ even in their conception of its nature. What does this lyric or orchestic term that we find in the Greek authors signify? The name itself is criticized as bad by Wilamowitz. In discussing the character and form of the dithyramb, he traces the development of this kind of melic poetry to the time when it abandoned its strophic form and assumed a freer metrical and orchestic movement, about the exact trend of which we neither know nor can know anything. “This,” he observes, “is not only true of the dithyramb, but of other songs, too, besides those composed for the Dionysiac cult; the grammarians in default of any special name have designated them as Dance Songs, ὑπορχήματα, and arranged them in special books. It is a bad name; because Dance Songs they all are.” The same scholar is more impatient in a note attached to the passage just quoted. To use his own

words, “ von was die Modernen Hyporchema nennen und zum Beispiel in den Tragikern so bezeichnen, ist nichts weder überliefert noch an sich berechtigt. Die moderne metrische Kabbala ist ganz unerträglich, aber auch das Altertum hat unleidlich viel mit Worten gekrämt, die freilich sehr bequem sind das mangelnde Verständnis zu verhüllen.” Numerous, however, is the band of those who take the opposite view, including, among others, Decharme, Walther, Bernhardy, Sommerbrodt, Muff, and Smyth.¹

Wilamowitz's objection to the name itself does not seem excusable. The word is of a most ancient origin and is supported by no less authority than Plato. In the *Ion* (534B), he observes that each poet is ascribed by divine dispensation a particular gift and can compose well only in his special field ἐφ' δὴ Μοῦσα αὐτὸν ὥρμησεν, ὃ μὲν διθυράμβους, ὃ δέ ἐγκώμια, ὃ δέ ὑπορχήματα, ὃ δέ ιάμβους. . . . By Plato's time, then, the word did not only exist but it had become a technical term to designate a particular species of melic song. The verb, however, of the same root, ὑπορχέεσθαι, is found first in the *Choephoroe* of Aeschylus (1025):

. . . πρὸς δὲ καρδίᾳ φόβος
ἀδειν ἔτοιμος ἡδὲ ὑπορχεῖσθαι κότῳ.

where, as Smyth observes, the antiquity of the word is bespoken by its metaphorical use.² Thus, both the word itself ὑπόρχημα, and its technical use come from the very best period of Greek.

Of course, if we interpret the term as songs fit for dance, as Wilamowitz seems to conceive of them when he calls them merely Dance Songs, “ Tanzlieder,” then the word does not describe the thing adequately. But the preposition ὑπό indicates not only two actions going on at the same time, but two actions of the same kind. Thus the word would designate songs to which at least two orchestric movements, one subject to the other, were adapted. I am aware

¹ Wilamowitz-Moellendorff, *Was ist eine griechische Tragödie*, pp. 73–76, and note 38. Decharme, *Euripide*, etc., p. 494. H. Walther, *Commentatio de Graecorum hyporchematis*. Christian Muff, *Die Chorische Technik des Sophokles*, Halle, 1877, pp. 38–39, 67, 116, 173, 193. H. W. Smyth, *Greek Melic Poets*, Introd., pp. lxx ff. Julius Sommerbrodt, *Scaenica*, Berlin, 1876, pp. 220–222.

² See note in Smyth's *Greek Melic Poets*, p. lxx.

that this interpretation comes into direct conflict with much of our ancient tradition, although passages may be quoted in its favor. But the whole question is so confusing that I have thought it safer for myself and fairer for the reader to quote the various conflicting authorities verbatim.

The view that a hyporcheme is a song sung to, or by, a group of persons dancing uniformly is supported by the *Odyssey*, by Athenaeus, by Proclus, and by the grammarian of the *Etymologicum Magnum*. In the eighth book of the *Odyssey* (256–267), we find the first description of this dance song among the Phaeacians:

'Ως ἔφατ' Ἀλκίνοος θεοείκελος, ωρτο δὲ κῆρυξ
οἴσων φόρμιγγα γλαφυρὴν δόμου ἐκ βασιλῆος.
αἰσυμνήται δὲ κριταὶ ἐννέα πάντες ἀνέσταν
δήμιοι, οἱ κατ' ἄγωνας ἐν πρήστεσκον ἔκαστα,
λείηναν δὲ χορόν, καλὸν δ' εὔρυναν ἄγωνα.
κῆρυξ δ' ἐγγύθεν ἥλθε φέρων φόρμιγγα λίγειαν
Δημοδόκω. ὁ δ' ἔπειτα κί' ἐς μέσον· ἀμφὶ δὲ κοῦροι
πρωθῆβαι ἵσταντο, δαήμονες ὀρχηθμοῖο,
πέπληγον δὲ χορὸν θεῖον ποσίν· αὐτὰρ Ὁδυσσεὺς
μαρμαρυγὰς θηεῖτο ποδῶν, θαύμαζε δὲ θυμῷ.
αὐτὰρ ὁ φορμίζων ἀνεβάλλετο καλὸν ἀείδειν
'αμφ' Ἀρεος φιλότητος ἐνστεφάνου τ' Ἀφροδίτης . . .

Such a kind of Dance Song Proclus seems to have in mind when he defines the hyporcheme as “a melody sung with dance” and especially adapted for divine subjects. His division of melic songs according to subject-matter is of particular importance although somewhat puzzling in the light of other evidence:¹ περὶ δὲ μελικῆς ποιήσεως φησιν ὡς πολυμερεστάτη τε καὶ διαφόρους ἔχει τομάς. ἂ μὲν γὰρ αὐτοῖς μεμέρισται θεοῖς, ἂ δὲ ἀνθρώποις, ἂ δὲ εἰς τὰς προσπιτπούσας περιστάσεις. Καὶ εἰς θεοὺς μὲν ἀναφέρεσθαι ὑμνον, προσόδιον, παιᾶνα, διθύραμβον, νόμον, ἀδωνίδια, ιόβακχον, ὑπορχήματα . . . (p. 320, 33): ὑπόρχημα δὲ τὸ μετ' ὀρχήσεως ἀδόμενον μέλος ἐλέγετο. Καὶ γὰρ οἱ παλαιοὶ τὴν ὑπὸ ἀντὶ τῆς μετὰ πολλάκις ἐλάμβανον. Εὑρετὰς δὲ τούτων λέγουσιν οἱ μὲν Κούρητας, οἱ δὲ Πύρρον τὸν Ἀχιλλέως, ὅθεν καὶ πυρρίχην εἶδός τι ὀρχήσεως λέγουσιν. . . .

¹ Proclus, *Chrestomathy*, in the *Bibliotheca* of Photius, 522. See edition of Immanuel Bekker, Berlin, 1824, p. 319, ll. 32 ff.

A like inference we may draw from the description we find in the *Etymologicum Magnum* under the word *προσώδιον*: 'Ιστέον ὅτι τῶν μελῶν καὶ τῶν ὕμνων τὰ μὲν καλεῖται προσώδια, τὰ δὲ ὑπορχήματα, τὰ δὲ στάσιμα. . . . Τπορχήματα δέ, ἄτινα πάλιν ἔλεγον ὄρχούμενοι καὶ τρέχοντες κύκλῳ τοῦ βωμοῦ, καιομένων τῶν Ἱερείων . . . ὅτε δὲ περιέτρεχον τὸν βωμόν, ἀπήσαν πρότερον μὲν ἀπὸ τοῦ ἀριστεροῦ μέρους ἐπὶ τὸ δεξιόν, κατὰ μίμησιν τοῦ ἡωδιακοῦ κύκλου, ἐπεὶ καὶ αὐτὸς τὴν ἐναντίαν τῷ οὐρανῷ ποιεῖται κίνησιν, ἀπὸ δυσμῶν ἐπὶ ἀνατολὰς φερόμενος. Ὕστερον δὲ πάλιν ἀπὸ τοῦ δεξιοῦ ἐπὶ τὸ ἀριστερὸν ἥεσαν κατὰ μίμησιν τοῦ οὐρανοῦ. τελευταῖον δὲ πάντα τὸν βωμὸν περιέτρεχον. Besides the fact that we have here a uniform orchestic movement, it is interesting to note the description of this movement about the altar which suggests a great similarity to many a popular dance of the modern Greeks. The dancers took first a few steps from the left to the right in imitation of the direction of the zodiac, then a few steps from the right to the left in imitation of the movement of the sky, and finally they went about the altar completing a whole circle. In perfect accord with this conception of the hyporcheme is the statement we find in Athenaeus (14, 30, p. 631 C). ή δ' ὑπορχηματική ἔστιν ἐν ᾧ ἄδων ὁ χορὸς ὄρχεῖται.

The other and more plausible view according to which hyporcheme is a *melos* adapted for at least two different orchestic movements, one subordinated to the other, is corroborated by Lucian and by the *Iliad*. Lucian, who certainly was a careful student of the classical period of Greek, in his important essay on *Dance* (16) speaks clearly of two such movements as we have already referred to. "In Delos," he observes, "even the sacrifices are performed with music and dance. Παιδῶν χοροὶ συνελθόντες ὑπ' αὐλῷ καὶ κιθάρᾳ οἱ μὲν ἔχόρευον, ὑπωρχοῦντο δὲ οἱ ἄριστοι προκριθέντες ἐξ αὐτῶν. Τὰ γοῦν τοὺς χοροὺς γραφόμενα τούτοις ἄσματα ὑπορχήματα ἐκαλεῖτο καὶ ἐμπέπληστο τῶν τοιούτων ή λύρα." Stephanus follows the same opinion, as appears from his comments on this passage: "Cum vero Lucianus dicat chorum χορεῦσαι and ceteros ὑπορχήσασθαι videtur ὑπορχοῦμαι potius significare choro choreas ducenti quasi subsulto, ut ὑπάδω, praecantori succino; et ὑπορχήματα cantilenae ad quas eius modi chori saltabant."¹

¹ Steph. *Thes. Ling. Graec.* s.v.

Even more interesting is the famous description from the eighteenth book of the *Iliad* of the shield of Achilles:¹

'Εν δὲ χορὸν ποίκιλλε περικλυτὸς ἀμφιγυήεις,
τῷ ἵκελλον οἰόν ποτ' ἐνὶ Κνωσσῷ εὑρεῖη
Δαιδαλος ἡσκησεν καλλιπλοκάμῳ Ἀριάδνῃ.
Ἐνθα μὲν ἡθεοὶ καὶ παρθένοι ἀλφεσίβοιαι
ώρχεῦντ', ἀλλήλων ἐπὶ καρπῷ χεῖρας ἔχοντες.
Τῶν δ' αἱ μὲν λεπτὰς ὅθύνας ἔχον, οἱ δὲ χιτῶνας
εἴσατ' ἐννήτους, ἥκα στιλβόντας ἐλαῖω.
καὶ β' αἱ μὲν καλὰς στεφάνας ἔχον, οἱ δὲ μαχαίρας
εἶχον χρυσέις ἐξ ἀργυρέων τελαμώνων.
οἱ δ' ὅτε μὲν θρέξασκον ἐπισταμένοισι πόδεσσι
ρεῖα μάλ', ὡς ὅτε τις τροχὸν ἄρμενον ἐν παλάμησιν
ἐξόμενος κεραμεὺς πειρήσεται, αἱ̄ κε θέησιν,
ἄλλοτε δ' αὐτὸν θρέξασκον ἐπὶ στίχας ἀλλήλοισι.
πολλοὶ δ' ἴμερόεντα χορὸν περιτσαθ' ὅμιλος
τερπόμενοι· δοιῶ δὲ κυβιστητῆρε κατ' αὐτὸν
μολπῆς ἐξάρχοντες ἐδίνενον κατὰ μέσσους.

As we see, there are in this dance of Cretan origin three groups of dancers: young men with their golden swords form the first group following, probably, some lively movement of a war-like character; the second group consists of virgins, with diadems on their heads and clothed with fine raiment, whose movement might well have been simpler and of a more tender mood; finally two more skilful artists, serving, as it seems, as leaders, whirled swiftly in their midst, *μολπῆς ἐξάρχοντες ἐδίνενον κατὰ μέσσους*. From this passage as well as from that in Lucian, we may conclude that the same persons sang and danced at the same time. This, at least, was the more ancient custom. But Lucian informs us in another chapter of the same essay on *Dancing* (30) that this custom was discontinued in later times because the dancing shortened the breath and, therefore, disturbed the singing: *πάλαι μὲν γὰρ οἱ αὐτοὶ καὶ ὕδον καὶ ωρχοῦντο. εἰτ' ἐπειδὴ κινουμένων τὸ ἀσθμα τὴν φόδην ἐπετάραττεν, ἀμεινον ἐδοξεν ἄλλους αὐτοὺς ὑπάδειν*. However this may be, it seems more in accordance with the meaning of the word to accept at least two

¹ Hom. *Il.* 18, 590. Cf. G. S. Farnell, *Greek Lyric Poetry*, London, 1891, p. 5, and K. O. Mueller, *Die Dorier*, 1824, i, ch. 8.

varying orchestric movements in the hyporcheme. To reconcile this with the evidence for the mere Dance Song of one uniform movement, we might suppose that the original term was later extended to include Dance Songs of a similar theme although of a single movement. It is worthy of our consideration that the oldest reference to a hyporcheme, which we find in the *Iliad*, supports the theory of a double dance, and that no less an authority on ancient dancing than Lucian corroborates the same theory.

Likewise doubtful is the birthplace of the hyporcheme. Crete and Sparta, Cyprus and even Troy, if we are to give any weight to the story about Pyrrhus, claim its origin. A verse from the second Pythian hymn of Pindar (127) and the explanation offered by the scholiast have been again and again called into court to settle the dispute. Pindar refers to a Castorean song tuned to the Aeolian lyre, which he had sent to Hiero before he composed the second Pythian hymn:

τὸ Καστόρειον
δ' ἐν Αἰολίδεσσι χορδαῖς
θέλων ἄθρησον χάριν ἐπτακτύπου
φόρμιγγος ἀντόμενος.

The scholiast explaining this Castorean song informs us that it is a hyporcheme, and that it is called Castorean because the Dioscuri, according to some, were the inventors of dance. Incidentally, he adds most interesting although somewhat contradictory details about the tradition and nature of the hyporcheme: Τὸν ἐπίνικον ἐπὶ μισθῷ συντάξας ὁ Πίνδαρος ἐκ περιττοῦ συνέγραψεν αὐτῷ προΐκα ὑπόρχημα οὖν ἡ ἀρχή,

Σύνες ὅ τι λέγω
ζαθέων ἱερῶν ἐπώνυμε . . .

ὁ δὴ Καστόρειον εἶπε διὰ τὴν ἔνοπλον ὥρχησιν κατ' ἐνίους τοὺς Διοσκούρους εὑρεῖν. Ὁρχηστικοὶ γάρ τινες οἱ Διόσκουροι. Οἱ δὲ Ἐπίχαρμος (in the *Muses* quoted by Athenaeus 4, 184 f.) τὴν Ἀθηνᾶν φησι τοὺς Διοσκούρους τὸν ἐνόπλιον νόμον ἐπαυλῆσαι, ἐξ ἐκείνου δὲ τοὺς Λάκωνας μετ' αὐλοῦ τοὺς πολεμίους προσιέναι. Τινὲς δὲ ῥυθμόν τινά φασι τὸ Καστόρειον, χρῆσθαι δὲ αὐτῷ τοὺς Λάκωνας ἐν τῇ πρὸς τοὺς πολεμίους συμβολῇ. Διέλκεται δὲ ἡ τῆς πυρρίχης ὥρχησις, πρὸς ἣν τὰ ὑπορχήματα ἐγράφησαν. Ἔνιοι μὲν οὖν φασι πρῶτον Κούρητας τὴν ἔνοπλον ὥρχησασθαι ὥρχησιν, αὐθις δὲ

Πύρριχον Κρῆτα συντάξασθαι, Θαλήταν δὲ πρῶτον τὰ ἐς αὐτὴν ὑπορχήματα. Σωσίβιος δὲ τὰ ὑπορχηματικὰ μέλη πάντα Κρητικὰ λέγεσθαι. "Ενιοι δὲ οὐκ ἀπὸ Πυρρίχου τοῦ Κρητὸς τὴν Πυρρίχην ὀνομάσθαι, ἀλλ' ἀπὸ Πύρρου τοῦ Ἀχιλλέως παιδὸς ἐν τῇ Εὑρυπύλῳ τοῦ Τηλέφου νίκῃ. Ἀριστοτέλης δὲ πρῶτον Ἀχιλλέα ἐπὶ τῇ Πατρόκλου πυρῷ τῇ πυρρίχῃ φησὶ κεχρῆσθαι, ἦν παρὰ Κυπρίοις φησὶ πρύλιν λέγεσθαι, ὡστε παρὰ τὴν πυρὰν τῆς πυρρίχης τὸ ὄνομα θέσθαι. . . . Thus in the same passage four different opinions are given and various authorities are quoted, among them Pindar, Sosibius, Epicharmus, and even Aristotle.

Athenaeus evidently believes Sparta to be the place of origin of the hyporcheme. This, at least, may be inferred from his remarks on hyporchematic dancing (14, 30, p. 631 C): ὁρχοῦνται δὲ ταύτην παρὰ τῷ Πινδάρῳ οἱ Λάκωνες, καὶ ἔστιν ὑπορχηματικὴ ὁρχηστικὴ ἀνδρῶν καὶ γυναικῶν, and from his quotation of the Epicharmean passage already noted by the Pindaric scholiast:¹ καὶ τὴν Ἀθηνᾶν δὲ φησιν Ἐπίχαρμος ἐπανλῆσαι τοῖς Διοσκόροις τὸν ἐνόπλιον.

It is, however, most probable that the country of the hyporcheme is Crete. To this conclusion we are led by most of the ancient testimonies which have come down to us and also by the Pindaric scholion. From the latter, we learn that Sosibius believed all hyporchematic songs to be Cretan, and that, according to some traditional evidence, Pyrrichus, likewise a Cretan, is accredited with the invention of the hyporcheme. To this we may add: the dance description from the *Iliad*, which points again to a Cretan origin and cites Cnossus as the birthplace and Daedalus as the first master; also the tradition preserved by Proclus,² according to which the Cretan Couretes are given as the inventors; and the statement of Athenaeus himself in the fourth book (4, 10, p. 181 B), in which he gives various authorities for the Cretan origin in contradiction of the passages quoted above:

τοῖς μὲν οὖν Κρησὶν ἡ τε ὁρχηστικὴ ἐπιχώριος καὶ
τὸ κυβιστᾶν. Διό φησι πρὸς τὸν Κρῆτα Μηριόνην. (Π 617)

Μηριόνη, τάχα κέν σε καὶ ὁρχηστήν περ ἔοντα
ἔγχος ἐμὸν κατέπανσε διαμπερές, εἰς σ' ἔβαλόν περ.

¹ Athen. 4, p. 184 f. Cf. Aug. O. Fr. Lorenz, *Leben und Schriften des Koers Epicharmus*, Berlin, 1864.

² Proclus, *Chrestom.* in Phot. *Biblioth.*, ed. Bekker, p. 239.

ὅθεν καὶ Κρητικὰ καλοῦσι τὰ ὑπορχήματα. (Simon. fr. 31)
 Κρῆτα μὲν καλέουσι τρόπον, τὸ δ'
 ὅργανον Μολοσσόν.

This passage is of particular value inasmuch as it adds evidence from as ancient and reliable authority as Simonides, who himself was a poet of hyporchemes. Finally, we must quote the pertinent comments of Eustathius on the dance described in the *Iliad* (18, 590) which point to Crete as the place where men and women first danced together: ὅτι τῆς ὄρχήσεως εἰς δύο εἰδη διγρημένης εἴς τε τὸ ἐνόπλιον, ὁ τῇ πυρρίχῃ καὶ Κουρητικῇ κινήσει ἀπείκασται, καὶ εἰς τὸ Ἰλεων, ὁ πρέπον ἔστιν εἰρήνη κατὰ τὰ βακχικὰ σχήματα, ἐνταῦθα δὲ ποιητὴς ἀμφότερα παραδείκνυσι. . . . Σημείωσαι δὲ ὅτι τῶν ῥήθεντων δύο εἰδῶν ὄρχήσεως, ἥγουν τοῦ ἐνόπλιου καὶ τοῦ Ἰλεων, τὸ μὲν πρώτον ὁ ποιητὴς ἐνταῦθα διὰ τῶν μαχαιροφόρων παιδῶν ἐνδείκνυται, τὸ δὲ δεύτερον διὰ τῶν παρθένων, αἱ καλὰς εἶχον στεφάνας. Φασὶ δὲ οἱ παλαιοὶ ὅτι διακεχωρισμένως χορεύοντων τὸ πρὶν ἀνδρῶν τε καὶ γυναικῶν πρῶτοι οἱ μετὰ Θησέως σωθέντες ἐκ τοῦ Λαβυρίνθου ἐπτὰ ἡᾶθεοι καὶ τοσαῦται παρθένοι ἀναμιξ ἔχόρευσαν ὑπὸ καθηγητῇ τῷ Δαιδάλῳ κατὰ Κνωσσόν, πόλιν Κρήτης, περὶ ἃς ἀλλαχοῦ τε καὶ ἐν τοῖς τοῦ περιηγητοῦ δὲ ἐρρέθη, ἀφ' ἃς καὶ τὰ Κνώσσια παρὰ Σοφοκλεῖ ὄρχήματα (Aj. 699).

We may, therefore, with safety accept Crete and the Cretan city of Cnossus as the birthplace of the hyporcheme. Thence it travelled across the sea and about the seventh century before Christ it was transferred to Sparta by a Cretan, the Gortynian Thaletas, who was the first to compose hyporchemes for the Spartans. Then it spread over the whole of Peloponnesus and reached as far as the Aeolian city of Thebes. Its highest development was attained in the age of Pindar and Xenodamus, according to Eustathius.¹ The first was a Theban whose fame filled the whole of the Hellenic world, the other was a Cytherean, who spent his life in Sparta. It was a Peloponnesian of the city of Phlius, the melic and dramatic poet Pratinas, who brought this melic form to Athens. Plutarch lends his authority to this tradition by what he says in his essay on *Music*:² ἡ μὲν οὖν πρώτη κατάστασις τῶν περὶ τὴν μουσικὴν ἐν τῇ Σπάρτῃ,

¹ Eustath. *Commentary on Odyssey*, 8, 264.

² Plutarch, *Moralia*, ed. Bernardakis, Leipzig, 1895, vi, p. 495.

Τερπάνδρου καταστήσαντος, γεγένηται· τῆς δευτέρας δὲ Θαλήτας τε ὁ Γορτύνιος καὶ Ξενόδαμος ὁ Κυθήριος καὶ Ξενόκριτος ὁ Λοκρὸς καὶ Πολύμνηστος ὁ Κολοφώνιος, καὶ Σακάδας ὁ Ἀργεῖος μάλιστα αἰτίαν ἔχουσιν ἡγεμόνες γενέσθαι. Τούτων γὰρ εἰσηγησαμένων τὰ περὶ τὰς γυμνοπαιδίας τὰς ἐν Δακεδαίμονι λέγεται κατασταθῆναι, τὰ περὶ τὰς ἀποδείξεις τὰς ἐν Ἀρκαδίᾳ, τῶν τε ἐν Ἀργείῳ τὰ ἐνδύματα καλούμενα. Ἡσαν δ' οἱ περὶ Θαλήταν τε καὶ Ξενόδαμον καὶ Ξενόκριτον ποιηταὶ παιάνων, οἱ δὲ περὶ Πολύμνηστον τῶν ὄρθιων καλουμένων, οἱ δὲ περὶ Σακάδαν ἐλεγείων. Ἀλλοι δὲ Ξενόδαμον ὑπορχημάτων ποιητὴν γεγονέναι καὶ οὐ παιάνων, καθάπερ Πρατίνας. Καὶ αὐτοῦ δὲ τοῦ Ξενοδάμου ἀπομνημονεύεται ἄσμα, ὃ ἐστι φανερῶς ὑπόρχημα. Κέχρηται δὲ τῷ γένει τῆς ποιήσεως ταύτης Πίνδαρος. ὁ δὲ παιὰν ὅτι διαφορὰν ἔχει πρὸς τὰ ὑπορχήματα, τὰ Πινδάρου ποιήματα δηλώσει· γέγραφε γὰρ καὶ παιᾶνας καὶ ὑπορχήματα.

The question of the nature and character of the hyporcheme is even a more difficult one to determine, and the difficulty is increased by the importance of the issue involved. Through the conflicting testimonies of antiquity, we must reach a definite idea as to what the hyporcheme really is and as to its admissibility to the tragic choral parts. Indeed, if we are to trust Athenaeus and his division of the various kinds of dances, we must distinguish three different dramatic dances, the tragic, the comic, and the satyric, from the lyric dances, which are the gymnpaedic, the pyrrhic, and the hyporchematic. The same author, comparing the two classes, places the tragic dance, which he also calls *emmeleia* beside the gymnpaedic; the pyrrhic beside the satyric; and the comic, which he also calls *cordax*, beside the hyporchematic. The last two, he observes, are playful (Athen. 14, 28, p. 630 C): *συνέστηκε δὲ καὶ σατυρικὴ πᾶσα ποίησις τὸ παλαιὸν ἐκ χορῶν, ὡς καὶ ἡ τότε τραγῳδία. διόπερ οὐδὲ ὑποκριτὰς εἶχον. Τρεῖς δ' εἰσι τῆς σκηνικῆς ποιήσεως ὄρχήσεις: τραγική, κωμική, σατυρική· ὅμοιως δὲ καὶ τῆς λυρικῆς ποιήσεως ὄρχήσεις τρεῖς: πυρρίχη, γυμνοπαιδική, ὑπορχηματική. Καὶ ἔστιν ὅμοια ἡ μὲν πυρρίχη τῇ σατυρικῇ· ἀμφότεραι γάρ διὰ τάχους· πολεμικὴ δὲ δοκεῖ εἶναι ἡ πυρρίχη· ἔνοπλοι γάρ αὐτὴν παῦδες ὄρχοῦνται. Τάχους δὲ δεῖ τῷ πολέμῳ εἰς τὸ διώκειν καὶ εἰς τὸ ἡττωμένους φεύγειν μηδὲ μένειν μηδ' αἰδεῖσθαι κακοὺς εἶναι (orac. Herod. 1, 55). 'Ἡ δὲ γυμνοπαιδικὴ παρεμφερῆς ἔστι τῇ τραγικῇ ὄρχήσει, ἥτις ἐμμέλεια καλεῖται· ἐν ἐκατέρᾳ δὲ ὄρᾶται τὸ βαρὺ καὶ σεμνόν. 'Ἡ δ' ὑπορχηματικὴ τῇ κωμικῇ οἰκειοῦται, ἥτις καλεῖται*

κόρδαξ. Παιγνιώδεις δ' εἰσὶν ἀμφότεραι . . . (p. 631 C) Ἀριστόξενος δὲ φησιν (F H G. 2, 284) ως οἱ παλαιοὶ γυμναζόμενοι πρῶτον ἐν τῇ γυμνοπαιιδικῇ εἰς τὴν πυρρίχην ἔχωρουν πρὸ τοῦ εἰσιέναι εἰς τὸ θέατρον. Καλεῖται δ' ἡ πυρρίχη καὶ χειρονομία. 'Η δ' ὑπορχηματική ἐστιν ἐν ᾧ ἄδων ὁ χορὸς ὥρχεῖται· φησὶ γοῦν ὁ Βακχυλίδης (Fr. 23 B 4). οὐχ ἔδρας ἔργον οὐδὲ ἀμβολᾶς. καὶ Πίνδαρος δέ φησιν (Fr. 112 B 4):

Λάκαινα μὲν παρθένων ἀγέλα.

'Ορχοῦνται δὲ ταύτην παρὰ τῷ Πινδάρῳ οἱ Λάκωνες, καὶ ἐστιν ὑπορχηματικὴ ὥρχησις ἀνδρῶν καὶ γυναικῶν. . . .

According to this testimony not only must we banish the hyporcheme from tragedy but we must consider tragic and hyporchematic dances as two very dissimilar things. Certainly the gravity and dignity of the tragic dance cannot be reconciled with the playfulness and lightness that are attributed by the same author both to the hyporcheme and to the licentious cordax. But with that exuberant inconsistency which is one of the characteristics of Athenaeus, we find our author contradicting himself in another passage where he confesses that the hyporcheme, so far from being licentious, is full of nobility and manly dignity, and fitting to be danced by men of free birth (14, 25, p. 628C): *καὶ πρὸς γυμνασίαν δὲ καὶ ὀξύτητα διανοίας συμβάλλεται ἡ μουσική . . . οὐ κακῶς δ' ἔλεγον οἱ περὶ Δάμωνα τὸν Ἀθηναῖον ὅτι καὶ τὰς ὥδας καὶ τὰς ὥρχησεις ἀνάγκη γίνεσθαι κινουμένης πῶς τῆς ψυχῆς· καὶ αἱ μὲν ἐλευθέριοι καὶ καλαὶ ποιῶντι τοιαύτας, αἱ δὲ ἐναντίαι τὰς ἐναντίας . . . καὶ γὰρ ἐν ὥρχησει καὶ πορείᾳ καλὸν μὲν εὔσχημοσύνη καὶ κόσμος, αἰσχρὸν δὲ ἀταξία καὶ φορτικόν· διὰ τοῦτο γὰρ καὶ ἔξ ἀρχῆς συνέταττον οἱ ποιηταὶ τοῖς ἐλευθέροις τὰς ὥρχησεις καὶ ἔχρωντο τοῖς σχήμασι σημείους μόνον τῶν ἀδομένων, τηροῦντες ἀεὶ τὸ εὐγενὲς καὶ ἀνδρῶδες ἐπ' αὐτῶν, ὅθεν καὶ ὑπορχήματα τὰ τοιαῦτα προσηγόρευον. Εἰ δέ τις ἀμέτρως διαθείη τὴν σχηματοποιίαν καὶ τὰς ὥδαῖς ἐπιτυγχάνων μηδὲν λέγοι κατὰ τὴν ὥρχησιν, οὗτος ἦν ἀδόκιμος. Διὸ καὶ Ἀριστοφάνης ἡ Πλάτων ἐν ταῖς Σκευαῖς, ως Χαμαιλέων φησὶν (fr. 28 K), εἰρηκεν οὕτως (636 K):*

ώστ' εἴ τις ὥρχοιτ' εὖ θέαμα ἦν· νῦν δὲ δρῶσιν οὐδέν,
ἀλλ' ὥσπερ ἀπόπληκτοι στάδην ἐστῶτες ὡρύονται.

⁷ Ήν γὰρ τὸ τῆς ὥρχησεως γένος τῆς ἐν τοῖς χοροῖς εὔσχημον τότε καὶ μεγαλοπρεπὲς καὶ ὥστανεὶ τὰς ἐν τοῖς ὅπλοις κινήσεις ἀπομιμούμενον.

"Οθεν καὶ Σωκράτης ἐν τοῖς ποιήμασι τοὺς κάλλιστα χορεύοντας ἄριστους φησὶν εἶναι τὰ πολέμια λέγων οὕτως (II, 287B⁴):

οἱ δὲ χοροῖς κάλλιστα θεοὺς τιμῶσιν ἄριστοι ἐν πολέμῳ.

More consistently and with a better knowledge of the subject speaks Plutarch in the ninth book of his *Sympodiac Problems* (chap. 15, p. 748A). The Chaeronean writer emphasizes the mimetic nature of the hyporcheme, so that what Simonides had said about the art of painting, he applies to dancing by calling dancing silent poetry, and poetry speaking dance. Moreover, he observes, the metrical movement of the hyporchematic songs is so rapid that even reading the words invites the hands and feet of the reader to dance. To prove this, he quotes from some hyporchemes by Simonides, whom he considers the master of this form of melic poetry. The passage is of great value for our knowledge of the ancient orchestric art and is worthy of quotation: *καὶ ὅλως ἔφη μεταθήσειν τὸ Σιμωνίδειον ἀπὸ τῆς ζωγραφίας ἐπὶ τὴν ὄρχησιν· ποίησιν γὰρ εἶναι τὴν ὄρχησιν σιωπῶσαν, καὶ φθεγγομένην ὄρχησιν πάλιν τὴν ποίησιν· ὅθεν εἴπεν οὕτε γραφικῇ μετεῖναι ποιητικῆς οὕτε ποιητικῇ γραφικῆς, οὐδὲ χρῶνται τὸ παράπαν ἀλλήλαις. Ὁρχηστικῇ δὲ καὶ ποιητικῇ κοινωνία πᾶσα καὶ μέθεξις ἀλλήλων ἐστί, καὶ μάλιστα μιμούμεναι περὶ τὸ ὑπορχημάτων γένος ἐνεργὸν ἀμφότεραι τὴν διὰ τῶν σχημάτων καὶ ὀνομάτων μίμησιν ἀποτελοῦσι. Δόξειε δ' ἀν ὥσπερ ἐν γραφικῇ τὰ μὲν ποιήματα τοῦς χρώμασιν ἐοικέναι τὰ δ' ὄρχηματα ταῖς γραμμαῖς, ὑφ' ὧν δρίζεται τὰ εἰδη. Δηλοῦ δ' ὁ μάλιστα κατωρθωκέναι δόξας ἐν ὑπορχήμασι καὶ γεγονέναι πιθανώτατος ἑαυτοῦ τὸ δεῖσθαι τὴν ἐτέραν τῆς ἐτέρας· τὸ γὰρ*

*ἀπέλαστον ἵππον ἦ κύνα
Ἄμυκλαίαν ἀγωνίω
Ἐλελιξόμενος ποδὶ μίμεο καμπύλον μέλος διώκων.*

ἢ τὸ
οῖος ἀνὰ Δώτιον ἀνθεμόεν πεδίον
πέταται θάνατον κερούσσα τε
εὐρέμεν ματεύων ἐλάφῳ
τὰν δ' ἐπ' αὐχένι στρέφοισαν ἐτερον κάρα πάντ' ἐπ'
οἰμον . . .

καὶ τὰ ἔξῆς μονονοὺ λειόθεν τὴν ἐν ὄρχήσει διάθεσιν τὰ ποιήματα καὶ παρακαλεῖν τῷ χεῖρε καὶ τῷ πόδε, μᾶλλον δ' ὅλον ὥσπερ τισὶ μηρίνθοις ἔλκειν τὸ σῶμα τοῦς μέλεσι καὶ ἐντείνειν, τούτων δὲ λεγομένων καὶ ἀδομένων

ἡσυχίαν ἄγειν μὴ δυναμένοις. Αὐτὸς γὰρ ἐαυτὸν οὐκ αἰσχύνεται περὶ τὴν ὥρχησιν οὐχ ἡττον ἢ τὴν ποίησιν ἐγκωμιάζων,

ὅπα δὲ γαρῦσαι
σύν τ' ἐλαφρὸν ὥρχημ' ἀοιδᾷ ποδῶν μιγνύμεν·
Κρήτα μιν καλέουσι τρόπον, τὸ δ' ὥργανον Μολοσσόν.

It was this passage, it seems, that convinced Budaeus to accept *ὑπορχεῖσθαι* and *προσχηματοποιεῖσθαι* as synonyms, and to interpret *σχηματοποιεῖσθαι* as “gesticulationi servire, vel schemata saltationis cuiusque imitari.”¹ This mimetic and interpretative character of the hyporcheme is also recognized by Eustathius in his commentary on the description of the dance among the Phaeacians in the *Odyssey* (8,264): ‘Ιστέον δὲ ὅτι δοκοῦσιν ἐνταῦθα οἱ ὥρχούμενοι πρωθῆβαι πρὸς ὧδὴν ὥρχεῖσθαι τὴν τοῦ Δημοδόκου· δ δὴ καὶ ἐν τῇ κατὰ τὴν Ἰλιάδα ὥπλοποιά φαίνεται. Κιθαρίζοντος γὰρ ἐκεῖ παιδὸς χαίρουσιν ἄλλοι μολπῆ καὶ ὥρχηθμῷ. Ἐν οἷς ὑποσημαίνεται φασι τὸ ὑπορχηματικὸν εἶδος, ἀνθῆσαν ἐπὶ Ξενοδήμου καὶ Πινδάρου. Ἐστι δέ, φασιν, ἢ τοιαύτη ὥρχησις μίμησις τῶν ὑπὸ τῆς λέξεως ἐρμηνεούμενων πραγμάτων. Ἡν παρίστησι Ξενοφῶν ἐν τῇ Ἀναβάσει ὥρχήσεις ἴστορῶν σὺν ὥπλοις καὶ ἄλματα ὑψηλὰ καὶ κοῦφα καὶ μετὰ μαχαιρῶν. Ἐναρμόνια δηλαδὴ καὶ αὐτὰ ὅποια καὶ τὰ τῶν ἐνταῦθα βηταρμόνων. Ὄν τῆς ἀρετῆς παράδειγμα καὶ Τελέστης ὥρχηστής, φασιν, Αἰσχύλου, οὕτω τεχνίτης, ὥστε ἐν τῷ ὥρχεῖσθαι τοὺς Ἐπτὰ ἐπὶ Θήβας φανερὰ ποιῆσαι τὰ πράγματα δι’ ὥρχήσεως. Ὁτι δὲ ἡ ὥρχησις ἐσπουδάξετο ποτε, δηλοῦσι καὶ οἱ περιφδόμενοι ὥρχηστοδιδάσκαλοι, καὶ οἱ ζηλώσαντες αὐτὴν σοφοί. Σοφοκλῆς οὖν καλός, φασι, τὴν ὥραν γινόμενος, δεδίδακτο ἐξ ἔτι παιδῶν καὶ ὥρχηστικὴν καὶ μουσικήν. καὶ Σωκράτης δὲ πολλάκις ἐν τῷ καταλαμβάνεσθαι ὥρχούμενος ἔλεγε τοῖς γνωρίμοις, παντὸς εἶναι μέρους τὴν ὥρχησιν γυμνάσιον.

After a diligent examination of the preceding ancient testimonies, we may assert with certainty that the nature of the hyporcheme was essentially mimetic, and that its verses were composed in so rapidly moving rhythm that both song and dance rendered the moods of the participants restless and impatient. Religious fervor, exuberant joy, and intense fear or other exciting passion might be the cause of this restlessness and impatience. Consequently, there must have been many hyporeches which on

¹ See Stephanus, *Thesaurus Ling. Graec.* s.v. ὑπορχέομαι.

account of exuberant playfulness resulting from extreme or unexpected joy could be compared in their violence of movement and mood to the comic dance cordax. For there is no doubt that the cordax deserves fully the appellation given to it by Athenaeus *παιγνιώδης*. But it does not follow from this that all hyporchemes were of jesting lightness and inconsistent with the dignity of a tragic chorus. Restlessness and impatience, as we have seen, are the result not only of joy but of fear and of any other passion as well. It was this realm of passion in its light and somber aspects that the ancient poets entered to make an emotion fit for hyporchematic expression. That solicitude and concern of the most serious sort could be made a theme for a hyporcheme is proved by the famous hyporcheme of Pindar, which though mutilated, is sufficiently clear as to its subject-matter, mood, and form. The poet in awe at the eclipse of the sun, fears lest some calamity overwhelm Thebes, his native city, and prays to the Sun-god to avert the evil from his people (fr. 107):

'Ακτὶς Ἀελίου, τὶ πολύσκοπε μήσεαι, ὡ μάτερ ὁμμάτων;
ἄστρον ὑπέρτατον ἐν ἀμέρᾳ κλεπτόμενον,
ἔθηκας ἀμάχανον ἴσχυν
πτανὸν ἀνδράσι καὶ σοφίας ὁδὸν·
ἐπίσκοπον ἀτραπὸν ἐσσυμένα
ἔλαύνεις τι νεώτερον ἢ πάρος;
ἀλλά σε πρὸς Διὸς ἵππους ἵσθεας ἱκετεύω
ἀπῆμον' ἐς οἴμον τινα τράπαιοις Θήβαις,
Ω πότνια πάγκοινον τέρας.
Πολέμου δ' εἰ σῆμα φέρεις τινός,
ἢ καρποῦ φθίσιν, ἢ ινιφετοῦ σθένος
ὑπέρφατον, ἢ στάσιν οὐλομέναν,
ἢ πόντου κενέωσιν ἀμ πέδον,
ἢ παγετὸν χθονός, ἢ νότιον θέρος
ὑδατὶ ἤ ακότῳ διερόν,
ἢ γαῖαν κατακλύσαισα θήσεις
ἀνδρῶν νέον ἔξ ἀρχῆς γένος,
ὅλοφύρομαι οὐδέν, ὅτι πάντων μέτα πείσομαι.

The great majority of the hyporchemes were evidently composed in honor of various gods and especially of Apollo. In this belief we are assured by the testimonies of Menander and Proclus,

the rhetoricians. We have already cited Proclus,¹ who in his *Chrestomathy* quoted by Photius informs us that of the melic forms of poetry the hymn, the dithyramb, the nome, the adonidion, the iobacchus, and the hyporcheme were composed in honor of gods only. Menander, on the other hand, is more specific, and using hymn as a general term of all melic song addressed to gods, he sets paeans and hyporchemes as especially adapted to Apollo's cult:² καὶ τούτους αὖ —τὸν ὑμνούς— διαιροῦμεν κατὰ θεὸν ἔκαστον· τὸν μὲν γὰρ εἰς Ἀπόλλωρα Παιάνας καὶ Ὑπορχήματα νομίζομεν, τὸν δὲ εἰς Διόνυσον Διθυράμβους καὶ Ἰοβάκχους, καὶ ὅσα τοιαῦτα εἱργται Διονύσου, τὸν δὲ εἰς Ἀφροδίτην Ἐρωτικούς. To the Apolline cult they seem to be ascribed by Lucian, too, whose passage on the hyporchemes sung and danced by boys during the sacrifices at Delos we have already quoted at the beginning of this chapter.³ Nor can we draw a different conclusion from the hyporchematic allusions found in Callimachus' second hymn to Apollo.⁴ But there is sufficient evidence that the hyporcheme was not limited exclusively to Apollo. We have already quoted the Pindaric fragment addressed to Helios. In another fragment, Bacchylides (fr. 23) appeals to Athena in hyporchematic numbers. Pindar composed a hyporcheme even in honor of a man, Hiero of Syracuse, which we have seen referred to as "the Castorean song" in the second Pythian hymn (127).

The instrument used for accompaniment in the hyporcheme was originally the lyre. It is the only instrument referred to by

¹ Proclus, *Chrestom.* in Phot. *Biblioth.*, p. 522, ed. Bekker, Berlin, 1824, p. 319.

² Walz, *Rhein. Graec.*, Stuttgart and Tübingen, 1836, ix, p. 129.

³ Lucian, *De Saltat.* 16.

⁴ Callim. *Hymns*, 2, 11 ff.:

δψόμεθ', ὡς Ἐκάεργε, καὶ ἐσσόμεθ' οὕποτε λιτοί·
μήτε σιωπῆλην κιθαριν μήτ' ἄψιφον ἵχνος
τοῦ Φοίβου τοὺς παῖδας ἔχειν ἐπιδημήσαντος,
εἰ τελέειν μέλλουσι γάμον πολεῖην τε κυρεῖσθαι,
ἐστήξειν δὲ τὸ τεῖχος ἐπ' ἀρχαῖοισι θεμέθλοις.
ἡγαστάμην τοὺς παῖδας, ἐπεὶ χέλυς οὐκέτ' ἀεργός.
εὐφημεῖτ' ἀτοντες ἐπ' Ἀπόλλωνος ἀοιδῇ.
εὐφημεῖ καὶ πόντος, δτε κλειούσιν ἀοιδὸν
ἢ κιθαριν ἢ τόξα, Δυκαρέος ἔντεα Φοίβου . . .

Homer in the dance descriptions we have previously examined. But soon the flute travelled from Asia across the Aegean and at the time of Thaletas it was established in Sparta, whence it passed to other Peloponnesian cities, and by the end of the sixth century it had invaded Athens. We have already noted how tradition makes Athena initiate the Dioscuri into the secrets of flute music. In Athens, it was first used to accompany the Dionysiac dances in the days of Pratinas to the disgust of that poet, who even wrote a hyporcheme in which he violently attacked the novel instrument and defended the rights of the time-honored lyre (fr. I, Bergk, iii, 558):

Τίς ὁ θόρυβος ὅδε; τί τάδε τὰ χορεύματα;
 τίς ὑβρις ἔμολεν ἐπὶ Διονυσάδα πολυπάταγα θυμέλαν;
 ἔμός, ἔμὸς ὁ Βρόμιος· ἔμὲ δεῖ κελαδεῖν, ἔμὲ δεῖ παταγεῖν
 ἀν' ὄρεα σύμενον μετὰ Ναιάδων
 οἵα τε κύκνον ἄγοντα ποικιλόπτερον μέλος.
 τὰν ἀοιδὰν κατέστησε Πιερὶς βασίλειαν· ὁ δ' αὐλὸς
 ὑστερον χορεύετω· καὶ γὰρ ἐσθ' ὑπηρέτας
 κώμῳ μόνον θυραμάχοις τε πυγμαχίαισι νέων θέλει παροίνων
 ἔμμεναι στρατηλάτας.
 παῖς τὸν φρυνίου
 ποικίλου πνοὰν ἔχοντα·
 φλέγε τὸν ὀλεσιοκάλαμον,
 λαλοβαρυόπα παραμελορυθμοβάταν θ',
 ὑπαὶ τρυπάνῳ δέμας πεπλασμένον·
 ἦν ἰδού· ἂδε σοι δεξιὰ
 καὶ ποδὸς διαρριφά, θριαμβοδιθύραμβε·
 κισσόχαιτ' ἄναξ, ἄκουε τὰν ἐμὰν Δούριον χορείαν . . .¹

His wrath, however, was spent in vain. The flute not only established itself permanently, but it was reconciled with the lyre, in common with which it accompanied many a dance and song. Thus, according to the testimony of Simonides himself, Plutarch's unexcelled master of the hyporcheme, the cretic measure and a ruder form of the flute, which the poet calls molossus were most fitting for that kind of melic form. Likewise, we have seen Lucian testify that in Delos the boys danced and sang to the accompaniment of both flute and lyre.²

¹ For the text see H. W. Smyth, *Greek Melic Poets*, p. 71.

² See passages quoted above, pp. 146, 153. Plutarch, *Sympos. Probl.* 748. Lucian, *De Saltat. 16.*

2. The Hyporcheme in Tragedy

Thus far we have discussed the hyporcheme apart from its relation to tragedy. It remains now to approach the more difficult and more elusive question whether this melic form is found at all in the tragic poets. We have already seen how impatiently Wilamowitz rejects this theory. Yet if our conclusion about the nature and character of the hyporcheme is true, its total absence from tragedy would be by far more surprising than its appearance. Again and again in various tragedies we come upon a dramatic situation in which the chorus is forced through restlessness and impatience to sing in rapid rhythm and dance in a movement with the mimetic element predominant. It is true that we have not a single ancient testimony referring directly to a hyporcheme in the tragic drama. But we must consider that ancient testimonies about the hyporcheme are altogether scarce and inadequate, as we have had opportunity to see from the quotations we have collected. It would be, therefore, highly improbable that in this scarcity of evidence we have even the essential facts with regard to the history and influence of this melic form. One thing, however, is absolutely certain. All ancient references to the hyporcheme show most clearly that it was a very common dance song used for a great variety of themes and occasions and, to speak in the words of Lucian (*De Saltat.* 16), "lyric poetry was full" of such songs, *ἐμπέπληστο τῶν τοιούτων ἡ λύρα*. From Lucian and Plutarch as well as from Athenaeus and Eustathius we gather the same impression in spite of the indefiniteness and negligence of statement. As a matter of fact, this very indefiniteness is a proof of the wide spread of the hyporcheme. It is natural, when we refer to something commonly known to limit ourselves to mere allusions which are sufficient to meet the understanding of the general public. It would, however, be worth our labors if we endeavored to find some foothold through this vagueness and obscurity of the ancient testimonies.

In the first place, when Athenaeus (14, 630D) names three modes of dancing as appertaining to the stage, the tragic, the comic, and the satyric, he does not give us an exhaustive or even a comprehen-

hensive and distinct classification. It is not probable, and we have good reason to doubt that there was only one kind of tragic or comic or satyric dance. Of course, we hear often of the tragic emmeleia, of the comic cordax, and of the satyric sikinnis. But that they were not the only kinds of dance used on the stage, is made clear by Lucian's statement in the twenty-second chapter of his essay on *Dancing*: Τὰ μὲν γὰρ Διονυσιακὰ καὶ Βακχικὰ οἶμαι σε μὴ περιμένειν ἐμοῦ ἀκοῦσαι ὅτι ὄρχησις πάντα ἦν· τριῶν γὰρ οὐσῶν τῶν γενικωτάτων ὄρχήσεων, κόρδακος, καὶ σικιννίδος, καὶ ἐμμελείας, οἱ Διονύσου θεράποντες οἱ Σάτυροι ταύτας ἐφευρόντες ἀφ' ἑαυτῶν ἐκάστην ὡνόμασαν. Thus the emmeleia, cordax, and sikinnis were not the only kinds of Dionysiac dance, but the most usual ones, and, therefore, it would be quite possible to find some other kind of dance in the drama not included among the above-named three kinds.

Moreover, we have at least one testimony to the effect that the hyporcheme was used in tragedy. Eustathius¹ in his commentary on the dance description of the *Odyssey* believes that the dance in question is hyporchematic and goes on to give a definition and examples of this kind of dance. "This dance," he says, "is an imitation of the things expressed through the words." Then he gives as an example of a perfect dancer of this kind, the Aeschylean actor Telestes, "who was such an artist that when he danced the *Seven Against Thebes* he made the action clear through mere dancing." But we may even cite Aeschylus and Sophocles as corroborating our theory. It is certain that Aeschylus understood well what a hyporcheme was when he conceived of "fear singing and dancing in company with anger" ὑπορχεῖσθαι κότῳ (*Choeph.* 1025). Even more important is the authority of Sophocles, who, just as Simonides calls the hyporcheme Κρῆτα τρόπον, makes Ajax's sailors dance "self-taught Nysian and Cnossian dances," a fact which did not escape the attention of Eustathius in his commentary on the dance of the *Iliad*.² Indeed, every sign is in favor of accepting the joyful song of the sailors as a hyporcheme: the dancers are rendered impatient and restless by passing unexpectedly from grief to extreme joy; the rhythm of their song moves in

¹ *Odyssey*, 8, 264; see p. 145 above.

² Eustath. *Il.* 18, 590; see pp. 147 and 150 above.

rapid and excited measure; their dance is swift and boisterous; the gods appealed to are Pan, the Arcadian, and above all Apollo, the Delian, the very patron of the hyporcheme. But let us look at the words themselves (*Aj.* 693):

XO. Ἔφριξ' ἔρωτι, περιχαρής δ' ἀνεπτάμαν ίώ ίώ Πάν, Πάν,
 ὁ Πάν Πάν ἀλίπλαγκτε Κυλλαΐας χιονοκτύπου
 πετραῖς ἀπὸ δειράδος φάνηθ', ὁ θεῶν χοροποί' ἄναξ,
 ὅπως μοι Νύσια Κυνώσι' ὄρχήματ' αὐτοδαῆ ξυνών ιάψῃ.
 Νῦν γὰρ ἐμοὶ μέλει χορεύσαται.
 'Ικαρίων δ' ὑπὲρ πελαγέων μολών ἄναξ Ἀπόλλων ὁ Δάλιος εὔγνωστος
 ἐμοὶ ξυνείη διὰ παντὸς εὑφρων

Here is certainly an example of a tragic hyporcheme fairly supported by internal and external evidence from Sophocles himself according to Eustathius. From this sure foothold may we not look more safely for other examples?

Let us return to Aeschylus. Of the three tragedians, he alone has been unanimously stripped of the hyporchematic form. Yet Eustathius most definitely cites the Aeschylean actor Telestes as an unexcelled dancer of this very kind of mimetic dance, and tells us that he danced the *Septem* with such consummate skill that he made the action clear through his dancing. Aside from this evidence, the signs of the hyporchematic mood in the *Septem*, the *Prometheus*, the *Choephoroe*, and the *Eumenides*, are, I believe, unmistakable. In the first play, the chorus of Theban women, as they enter or rather as they rush panic-stricken on the stage, sing and dance what corresponds in every respect to a hyporcheme. Overwhelmed with agony and fear, they gather in rapidly moving measures from all directions, and dancing in unrestrained restlessness they run to the gates of the walls to see how the affairs of their native city stand. What they sing is especially adapted to imitative dance. From the beginning to the end of the song every verse is full of the clamor of war. We can almost hear the galloping of horses, the clanging and clashing of shield and spear, and see the clouds of dust enveloping the flying riders. Swept away by their fearful imaginings, the women wave their hands, sway their bodies, and move their feet,—living pictures of what they

imagine they see. The dochmiac metre, in which they sing, with its restless movement and thirty various forms is particularly illustrative of the hyporchematic restlessness and not very far from the cretic rhythm which was the original rhythm of the hyporcheme. Thus with the resolution of one long syllable into two short, whether we have $\text{u} \frac{1}{2} \text{ u} \frac{1}{2}$, $\text{u} - \text{u} \text{ u} \text{ u} -$, or $\text{u} \text{ u} \text{ u} \frac{1}{2} \text{ u} \frac{1}{2}$, we have, by right division, a cretic rhythm $\text{u} \frac{1}{2} | \frac{1}{2} \text{ u} \frac{1}{2}$, $\text{u} \frac{1}{2} | \frac{1}{2} \text{ u} \frac{1}{2}$, or $\text{u} \text{ u} \text{ u} \frac{1}{2} | \text{u} \frac{1}{2}$. However this may be, we are as near to a hyporcheme in this song as possible. A glance at the words will prove the strongest argument (78 ff.):

θρέομαι φοβερὰ μεγάλ’ ἄχη·
μεθεῖται στρατός· στρατόπεδον λιπῶν
ῥεῖ πολὺς ὅδε λεώς πρόδρομος ἵπποτας·
αἰθερία κόνις με πείθει φανεῖσ’,
ἄναυδος σαφῆς ἔτυμος ἄγγελος. —
ἔτι δὲ γᾶς ἐμᾶς πεδί’ ὀπλόκτυπ’ ὡ-
τὶ χρίμπτει βοάν· ποτάται, βρέμει δ’
ἀμαχέτου δίκαν ὕδατος ὀροτύπου. —
ἴω ίώ θεοί
θεαί τ’ ὄρόμενον κακὸν ἀλεύσατε. —
βοῷ ὑπὲρ τειχέων
ὅ λεύκασπις ὅρνυται λαὸς εὐ-
τρεπῆς ἐπὶ πόλιν . . .

We might assert that the litanies of the same women by which they interrupt the dramatic dialogue between the scout and the king are not very far from the hyporchematic manner. For in them, too, they exhibit an intense restlessness that finds expression in prayers not less ardent than Pindar's hyporchematic prayer to the eclipsed sun. But lest we appear too suspicious, let us seek for more certain examples. In the *Choephoroe* (935 ff.), when the faithful servants of the House of Agamemnon see at last Clytaemnestra, the faithless wife and cruel mother, dragged by her own son to an inhuman but just punishment, they are overwhelmed by the stupendousness and atrocious justice of the deed, and they express their state of mind in measure and movement that illustrate with wonderful skill the joy, the awe, and the reverence that

result from so terrible an event. The dochmiac rhythm is preferred here, too, in which the resolved paeon is frequently substituted for the bacchius. The ghastly joy of this hyporcheme reminds us of the manner of Sophocles, who almost always uses this form of melic poetry to express intense joy just before a great calamity occurs.

The third Aeschylean hyporcheme, we find in the *Eumenides* (490 ff.). When Athena discloses her plan for the trial between Orestes and the Furies, the Avengers of kindred blood sing and dance impatiently in cretic measures often mingled with lekythia, which are not very far from cretic cadence, if we separate the short syllable of the second trochee: — u — | u | — u — :

Νῦν καταστροφὰλ νέων
θεσμίων, εἰ κρατή—
σει δίκα (τε) καὶ βλάβα
τοῦδε ματροκτόνου . . .

Finally, the daughters of Oceanus, who come to comfort Prometheus (686 ff.), when they hear from Io the unspeakable sufferings which that unfortunate woman had to bear in exchange for Zeus's favor, are so perturbed that they sing and dance a short but none the less restless hyporcheme in cretics mingled with other measures equally reflective of concern:

Ἐα ἔα, ἄπεχε, φεῦ·
οὐποθ' (ώδ') οὔποτ' ηὔχουν ξένους
μολεῖσθαι λόγους εἰς ἀκοὰν ἐμάν,
οὐδ' ὥδε δυσθέατα καὶ δύσοιστα
πήματα, λύματα, δείματα κέν—
τρῳ ψύχειν ψυχὰν ἀμφάκει·
ἴω ἴω μοῖρα μοῖρα,
πέφρικ' εἰσιδοῦσα πρᾶξιν 'Ιοῦς.

Sophocles is the favorite of all those who believe in the existence of the hyporcheme in tragedy. All find certain examples in his dramas, although there is some discrepancy as to the exact number. Thus Bernhardy and Sommerbrodt¹ find only two hyporcemes,

¹ G. Bernhardy, *Griech. Literat.*, ii, 1 (3), 631. Julius Sommerbrodt, *Scaenica*, Berlin, 1876, p. 221.

one in the *Trachinian Women* and another in the *Ajax*. To these, Christian Muff adds a third from the *Antigone*.¹ Walther consents to this and adds two more, one from the *Oedipus King* and the last from the *Philoctetes*.² Whatever the number may be, Sophocles for the most part has used this melic form in such a manner as to increase the tension of the tragic irony by making the chorus sing a joyful hyporcheme just before the occurrence of some fearful disaster.³

We have already had occasion to examine the hyporcheme of the *Ajax*. In the *Antigone*, the chorus of Theban citizens are joyfully affected by Creon's change to more human counsels and sing a hyporcheme, instead of a stasimon (1115 ff.). This was first noticed by Boeckh.⁴ Here as well as in the *Ajax*, the exuberant joy of the hyporcheme is followed by extreme sorrow immediately afterwards, when the messenger comes to announce the frustration of all hopes, and the death of Antigone and Haemon.

Likewise, we have no doubt that what the chorus of Theban citizens sing in the *Oedipus King*, after the departure of the attendants to fetch the old shepherd who is to reveal the parentage of the king, is a hyporcheme. Deluded by vain hopes, they believe that they are about to hear of some divine parentage, and gladly pray to the mountain-god Cithaeron, Phoebus, Pan, and other gods patrons of the dance, to inspire them in their joyful song. The hyporcheme is very similar to that of the *Ajax*, and I cannot understand Muff's easy consent to Westphal's rejection of this song from the hyporchematic class.⁵ Westphal rejects the hyporcheme for three reasons: first because it is not supported by ancient testimony; second, because its verses are composed in dactylo-epitrites; and third, because it would be ridiculous for old men to dance a hyporcheme. But if we are to reject this hyporcheme for the lack of ancient evidence, we can hardly retain any hyporcheme in the drama. That dancing old men would appear ridicu-

¹ Ch. Muff, *Die Chorische Technik des Sophokles*, Halle, 1877, p. 39.

² H. Walther, *Commentatio de Graecorum hyporchematis*, ref. to by Muff.

³ Cf. *Aj.* 693; *Antig.* 1115; *Oed. R.* 1086; *Philoct.* 507, 391; *Trach.* 205, 633.

⁴ *Abhandl. d. Berl. Akademie*, 1824, p. 88; Muff, *op. cit.*, p. 116.

⁵ Muff, *op. cit.* p. 177, and quotation from Westphal's *Metrik*, p. 679.

lous “οὐ φροντὶς Ἰπποκλείδη.” Dancing was never ridiculous for the old men of Greece even when it had the liveliness of a hyporcheme. According to tradition, even old Socrates took his exercise in dancing, and when he was discovered by his friends in this pastime, he said that dancing was a good exercise for every limb. Then the Theban citizens who compose the chorus in this tragedy are not old men, but in their full manhood, of the same age as Oedipus. Even if they are old men, in what do they differ from the old men of the *Antigone*, who, as Muff believes, most surely dance a hyporcheme? As for the metrical objection, the ancients were so versatile in their use of various metres, and the hyporcheme could be so varying in mood and theme that we cannot with any amount of positiveness deny the possibility of the dactylo-epitrite in the hyporcheme. On the contrary, it is very unlikely that Pindar should overlook his favorite metre in the multitude of the hyporcemes which he wrote.

The Trachinian women seem to dance a hyporcheme twice, if we consider as a hyporcheme the song they sing when the messenger announces the future return of Hercules (205-225). It is, however, more probable that it is a paean since we find in it phrases as παιᾶνα παιᾶν' ἀνάγετε and ιώ ιώ παιᾶν, although even good scholars like Schmidt, Nauck, and Muff¹ declare it a hyporcheme. Just like the hyporcemes we have already discussed, this song, too, whether a paean or a hyporcheme, is a song of joy rendered tragic by the following announcement of Lichas that Hercules is in love with Omphale, a fact that drives Deianira to despair. A surer example of the hyporcheme is the ode which the same women sing in joyful expectation of the return of Hercules while he is being rent to death by the fatal present of his unsuspecting wife (632-646).

All these Sophoclean examples, through the untimely joy they exhibit, render the sorrow that follows more intense. The only exception to this rule is the hyporcheme we find in the *Philoctetes*. In this play the chorus of sailors, who accompany Neoptolemus, when their master tries to deceive the unfortunate hero by manufacturing the false story of his quarrel with the chiefs of the Greeks

¹ See Muff, *Die Chor. Technik d. Soph.*, p. 196.

before Troy, contribute their share in the deception by conjuring Mother Earth to witness the supposed truth of Neoptolemus's words. Of course, even here we have the hyporchematic restlessness. The sailors are well aware that suffering has taught Philoctetes to be cautious and suspicious of everything. The fortune of their expedition depends on the success of their deception. Will the plan of wily Odysseus prove successful, or will Philoctetes suspect the truth, in which case their very lives would be at stake ? This song is certainly nearer to the hyporchematic manner than that which the same sailors sing later (507) when, overcome with pity for the great sufferings of Philoctetes, they urge their chief to have compassion on him. Yet even that would be a justifiable hyporcheme.

The question whether Euripides has used the melic form in his tragic chorus is more elastic. Very few are inclined to follow Decharme in attributing any hyporcheme to Euripides. Most of the scholars, and among them Smyth, deny that it is found in any of the extant plays. Even those who yield some hyporcemes to our poet limit their number to two or three instances. Yet dance as such seems to be better developed in Euripides than either in Sophocles or in Aeschylus. Elaborate and difficult movements would be just the things to draw the attention of Euripides because of the demand of his age. Dancing was coming more and more to the foreground as a source of amusement throughout Greece, and the way to mime and pantomime was wide open. Probably, this was one of the reasons for the decadence of the tragic chorus after Euripides. The tragedians could not render their chorus so competently and pleasingly as professional dancers, who could imitate everything, and go through a rapid succession of movements with comparative ease owing to their habitual training. The Euripidean chorus made a bold stand in competition with the professional dancers. For that purpose Euripides was sufficiently determined and wealthy. Thus the lively hyporchematic manner is more often employed by Euripides than either by Sophocles or by Aeschylus. Again and again we come upon a choral song in most restless and rapid measure, and particularly adapted for mimetic dance. From a host of songs of this kind, Decharme declares only three to be hypor-

chemes: one in the *Electra*, one in the *Hercules*, and one in the *Bacchae*.

Especially interesting is the example taken from the *Electra* (859 ff.). The women of the country who come as friends of Electra, when they hear that Aegisthus is dead, express their great joy by singing and dancing the first strophe of the hyporcheme. Then Electra interrupts the song of her friends to make a joyful address to the sun. A little later, when she enters her hut to look for the crown which she is to place on Orestes' head, the women continue their hyporcheme to the end. It is quite possible that, while Electra sings her iambs which she addresses to the sun, the women of the chorus go through the movements of the dance to the tune of the lyre or flute and to the song of Electra while they themselves keep silent. In that case, we have the revival of the ancient manner we meet in the eighth book of the *Odyssey*, where one plays on the lyre and sings while the rest dance.

In the *Hercules*, I find at least three hyporchemes. The first is that which the old Thebans sing while the tyrant Lycus meets his just punishment at the hands of the returned hero. The second follows the entrance of Iris and Lyssa, and is somewhat commatic in character, being divided among the chorus, who have the main part, Amphitryon, and the messenger. The third follows the fearful report of the messenger (735–821, 875–921, 1016–1038).

The best examples, however, of Euripidean hyporcheme are found in the *Cyclops*, the *Bacchae*, and the *Rhesus*, of which three the choral part is mainly hyporchematic. The mimetic element in all these three plays is preëminent, and it entirely fills each chorus with imitative impulse. The Satyrs who compose the chorus of the *Cyclops* give us the best example of that hyporcheme which Athenaeus had in mind when he ranked the hyporcheme side by side with the comic cordax, and which, in common with the comic dance, he characterized as *παιγνιώδες*. The parodos with the unfortunate Satyrs chasing after the rebellious goats, a task to which they have been unwillingly forced by an unconvivial master, is especially adapted for hyporchematic dance and song (41 ff.):

παῖς γενναῖλων μὲν πατέρων
 γενναῖλων τ' ἐκ τοκάδων,
 πᾶ δή μοι νίση σκοπέλους;
 οὐ τᾶδ' ὑπήνεμος αὔρα
 καὶ ποιηρὰ βοτάνα;
 δινάέν θ' ὕδωρ ποταμῶν
 ἐν πίστραις κεῖται πέλας ἄν-
 τρων; οὐ σοι βλαχαὶ τεκέων;
 — ψύττ'. οὐ τᾶδ' οὐ; οὐ τᾶδε νεμῆ
 κλιτὺν δροσεράν;
 ὡή, ρίψω πέτρον τάχα σου
 — ὑπαγ' ὁ ὑπαγ' ὁ κεράστα —
 μηλοβότα στασιωρὸν
 Κύκλωπος ἀγροβότα . . .

Nor are the rest of the choral songs of this play any less hyporchematic than the one we have just cited. They are all short, of a light and playful mood, and of a comic impatience and restlessness.

In sharp contrast with the Satyr chorus is the chorus of the Bacchantes. They give us the best illustrations of a tragic hyporcheme that results from religious exultation. In all their songs, the metre is resistlessly rapid, the feeling intense, the word expression overflowing with images and highly mimetic. The orgiastic spell runs through all their utterances and the hyporchematic form is the ideal lyric expression of their inner fervor. The best hyporchemes of the play are two. The more mimetic is that which they sing while in their imagination they follow Pentheus to the mountain glens and witness his horrible end (977):

"Ιτε θοαὶ Λύστας κύνες ἵτ' εἰς ὅρος,
 θίασον ἔνθ' ἔχουσι Κάδμου κόραι,
 ἀνοιστρήσατέ νιν
 ἐπὶ τὸν ἐν γυναικομίμῳ στολῷ
 λυσσώδῃ κατάσκοπον μαινάδων·
 μάτηρ πρῶτά νιν λευρᾶς ἀπὸ πέτρας
 ἡ σκόλοπος ὄψεται
 δοκεύοντα, μαινάσιν δ' ἀπύσει·
 τίς ὁδὸς ὄρειδρόμων
 μαστὴρ Καδμείων ἐς ὅρος ἐς ὅρος ἔμολ·"

ἔμολεν, ὡς βάκχαι; τίς ἄρα νιν ἔτεκεν;
οὐ γὰρ ἐξ αἴματος
γυναικῶν ἔφν, λεαίνας δέ τινος
ὅδ' ή Γοργόνων Λυβυσσᾶν γένος.

The other is charged with excessive joy when they hear of the fulfilment of their expectations and of the horrible death of their god's enemy. Joy coming after a most sorrowful calamity rouses a storm of compassion and awe that rages far above the tragic irony of the Sophoclean hyporcheme. But Euripides always prefers extremity of passion (1153):

ἀναχορεύσωμεν Βάκχιον,
ἀναβοάσωμεν ρυμφορὰν
τὰν τοῦ δράκοντος Πενθέος ἐκγενέτα.
ὅς τὰν θηλυγενῆ στολὰν
νάρθηκά τε, πιστὸν "Αἰδαν,
ἔλαβεν εὔθυρον,
ταῦρον προηγητῆρα συμφορᾶς ἔχων.
βάκχαι Καδμεῖαι,
τὸν καλλίνικον κλεινὸν ἐξεπράξατε
ἐς στόνον ἐς δάκρυα.
καλὸς ἀγών, χέρ' αἴματι στάζουσαν
περιβαλεῖν τέκνου . . .

The chorus of guards in the *Rhesus* furnish the unique example of the pyrrhic hyporcheme and offer the best explanation of the Pindaric scholion:¹ Τινὲς δὲ ῥυθμόν τινά φασι τὸ Καστόρειον, χρῆσθαι δὲ αὐτῷ τοὺς Δάκωνας ἐν τῇ πρὸς τοὺς πολεμίους συμβολῇ. Διέλκεται δὲ ή τῆς πυρρίχης ὅρχησις, πρὸς ἦν τὰ ὑπορχήματα ἐγράφησαν. Certainly the war spirit so characteristic of the pyrrhic dance is the main note of the choral part of the *Rhesus*. The members of the chorus are armed just as any dancers of the pyrrhic would be. The feeling is always intense, as is natural with guards who keep watch in sight of the camp fires of the enemy in an open space. An unrelaxed strain is felt in all their songs and actions from the beginning to the end of the play. The parodos is certainly a hyporchematic pyrrhic dance in which the guards come before the tent

¹ See p. 148 of this paper.

of Hector in full armor, and Hector appears to take the part of a leader, likewise armed. This reminds us most vividly of the dance description of the *Iliad*. We only miss the part of the maidens in white raiment. But the very best example of hyporchematic pyrrhic dance is that which the same guards perform as they pursue, surround, and arrest Odysseus and Diomedes. Here we have an actual attack. The armed dancers rush from all directions with rapid steps and motions, lower their spears and point them at the fleeing spies, who are also armed and seem to perform the part of leaders in this dance. Evidently they thrust forward their shields in defence and retreat as the pursuers advance. The words are broken and vehement, reflecting a most excited state of mind. I believe we have here the most rapid and restless of all extant hyporchemes, and the unique example of a pyrrhic song and dance (672-729).

We might cite other examples of the use of the hyporcheme by Euripides. But I believe the examples we have quoted thus far are sufficient to prove that Euripides, far from neglecting this melic form, has even brought it to its perfection by making it the dominant expression of at least three of his plays which furnish us the best examples of three varying moods — the playful, the religious, and the warlike — of the hyporcheme. A master in the choral art, Euripides could not but be a master of the orchestric side of this art.

CONCLUSION

I conclude with the belief that Euripides, far from causing the degeneracy of the tragic chorus, has done his utmost to invest it with its due significance. He had to struggle against other poets of his time, who, unable to treat the chorus with his art, and conscious of the ineffectiveness of its functions as a religious and moral exponent, preferred to reduce the tragic chorus to a conventional, incoherent, and unwieldy factor, used to close the acts with mere musical interludes. But Euripides saw the impossibility of achieving the restitution of the chorus by burdening it with the functions of a religious or moral teacher, which with difficulty were preserved and developed by as ardent a master as Aeschylus. Sopho-

cles, facing the same problem, made his chorus an ideal spectator, whose work, besides the limited action in which it engaged, was to assume the moods of the audience and, by satisfying the spectators through its sympathetic attitude, to inculcate in them ethical lessons which, after all, were not deeper than the running popular morality of the day. Euripides could have followed the same course; but impatient of imitation, and too involved in the sufferings of humanity to assume Sophocles' resigned attitude and repose in art, he found a way of sustaining the dignity of the chorus by increasing its realism. His chorus is drawn with the people as its model, the people, who, being exposed to emotion and to sorrow, cannot be a moral or religious teacher nor enter upon philosophic speculations, but who, being susceptible of anger, joy, grief, and of all the storms of passions, show more flesh than reason and intellect. He injected more blood into his choreutae, brought them nearer to living common men and women whether wrathful or patient, daring or timid, cruel or tender, passionate or impassionate, impulsive or docile, selfish or generous, and let them interest the spectators by their kinship to them, enhanced by the poet's art through a finer fancy, a deeper emotion, and a stronger pathos than the Athenians were likely to express. Passion rules the wide realm of life. This material he moulds into musical words, sonant measures, and smooth-flowing rhythms, all filled with familiar but poetic images drawn from real life and with that divine spirit which is the enviable possession of the great minds of all ages. Other poets did their best to reduce the choral part of the ancient tragedy. But Euripides has done his best to assert the significance of the chorus as a legitimate component of the drama and there is no degradation or decadence to be found in him.

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SUMMARIES OF DISSERTATIONS FOR THE DEGREE
OF PH.D., 1915-16

LESTER BURTON STRUTHERS.—*Quo modo Claudius Claudianus praeceptis rhetoricae in laudationibus scribendis usus sit quaeritur.*

THAT the panegyrics of the poet Claudius Claudian show the influence of the teachings of the *rhetores* doubtless no one would deny; yet until the present time no study of these panegyrics has been made with the purpose of showing definitely that there has been such an influence, and of discussing the passages which give evidence of it. My task, then, has been one of exposition. I have compared the extant writings of the *rhetores* to determine the principles which they prescribe for the composition of encomia, and have studied Claudian's panegyrics to show how far he writes in accordance with these rules.

The praise of a man's deeds is the kernel from which the formal panegyric has developed. Before the Sophists and Aristotle, the origins of panegyric are to be seen in Simonides, in Bacchylides, and in Pindar. These origins the Sophists studied as a basis for their work. Isocrates it is who by his innovations really evolved the encomium as a literary *genre*. These innovations were the use of prose, the treatment of contemporary events, and the introduction of a man's deeds as the foundation for the praise of his moral character. This last innovation is highly important, for all the following *rhetores* define the panegyric of a man as a laudation based on his deeds.

Having determined what a panegyric aims to do, each of the *rhetores* turns to the treatment of the various heads, or *τόποι*, into which an encomium may be divided. They arrange these *τόποι* in various orders, often omitting some of them. But from a study of the extant treatises I agree with the thesis of Theodore C. Burgess that the *rhetores* set forth as the normal *τόποι* these eight, and usually in the order here given: *προοίμιον*, *γένος*, *γένεσις*, *ἀνατροφη*, *ἐπιτηδεύματα*, *πράξεις*, *σύγκρισις*, *ἐπίλογος*. After noting that individual writers of panegyrics in prose show great freedom in the use of these *τόποι* and in the arrangement of them, I give at the end of Chapter I a brief summary of the panegyricists before Claudian who wrote in verse.

In Chapter II, I deal with Claudian's use of these *τόποι*, and in so doing discuss also many definite detailed principles which the *rhetores* have laid down for writing particular portions of a panegyric. I have treated each of the eight *τόποι* mentioned above in a separate section of the chapter. In each case I have compared what the several *rhetores* say about that *τόπος*, and have given a detailed description of it. Next I have turned to Claudian, and have given several examples which show how consistently and how carefully the poet has done what the *rhetores* prescribe. In connection with this subject, there has often been an opportunity to treat precepts of another sort, as, for instance, those dealing with the selection of distinctly laudatory material, the suppression of certain damaging facts, the distortion of the truth, or the invention pure and simple of material with which to praise a character. Likewise I have discussed Claudian's use of the stock examples and the set similes which the rhetoricians describe.

In Chapter III the *De Consulatu Stilichonis* has received separate treatment. To have dealt with it in Chapter II would have been confusing, because of the wealth of material already in hand there, because of the length of the poem, and because of the difficult question whether or not Book III is an integral part of the poem. Consequently the portions of this panegyric which fall under the various *τόποι* have been indicated in order, and the relation of each passage to the rules of the *rhetores* has been discussed. It is clear that the *ἐπιλογος* occurs in Book II, vv. 424-476. It is my belief that Book III is an addendum which partakes of the nature of the *πράξεις*. In my opinion, however, Claudian has here followed less exactly and less skilfully the precepts of the rhetoricians.

In conclusion I have given a tabular view of passages from the various panegyrics arranged as they fall under the eight *τόποι*. This shows that six of the encomia furnish examples of virtually all of the *τόποι*. This table and the discussion in Chapters II and III show how consistently, and with how much order Claudian has observed the laws for writing a panegyric. From the entire exposition it is clear that the laudatory poems of Claudian, both in general plan and in treatment of details, are composed in conformity with the precepts laid down by the *rhetores*.

GENERAL INDEX

- Aesop, 74.
 Alcmaeon, theory of brain of, 68.
 Alexandrinism, 59.
 Anaxagoras, theory of growth of, 69.
 date of banishment of, 70.
 impious talk of, 70.
 Archelaus, 67.
 Aristotle, his criticism of Plato, 52 sqq.

Catharsis, 53, 54.
 Cicero, his conception of eloquence, 37
 sqq.
 the source of his conception is Plato,
 41 sqq.

 Democritus, 68.
 $\delta\acute{\nu}\sigma$, 69.
 Diogenes of Apollonia, his teaching, bur-
 lesqued by Aristophanes, 68.

 $\epsilon\lambda\delta\sigma$, 49 sqq.
 Empedocles, 67.
 $\epsilon\pi\alpha\gamma\omega\gamma\eta$, 73.
 $\epsilon\pi\phi\acute{e}r\acute{e}\iota$, 75.
 Euripidean chorus, action in, 135-140.
 characteristics of, 109-170.
 choral odes of, 91-105.
 humanity of, 130-135.
 in dialogue, 82-91.
 length of choral parts in, 77-82.
 religion in, 110-130.
 theory of gradual decline of, 105-
 109.
 Evolution of genres, discussed, 2 sqq.

 Genres, mixture of, in Horace, 27 sqq.
- HACK, R. K., The Doctrine of Literary Forms, 1-65.
 Horace, *Ars Poetica*, the criticism of,
 5 sqq., 62, 63.
 Ars Poetica, analysis of, 17-21.
 dependence upon Aristotle, 60, 61.
 Hyporcheme, 143-170.

 $\iota\delta\acute{\nu}\alpha\tau\bar{o}\bar{v}\,\dot{\alpha}\gamma\alpha\theta\bar{o}\bar{v}$, 71.

 $\kappa\omega\nu\omega\iota\alpha$, 75.

 Leucippus, 68.

 Mathematics, as studied by Pythagoreans, 72.
 Myers, F. W. H., on Wordsworth's theory of poetry, 32.

 Norden, E., his conception of literary history, 2 sqq.
 his analysis of the *Ars Poetica*, 9-12.

 PARKER, C. P., The Historical Socrates in the Light of Professor Burnet's Hypothesis, 67-75.
 Parmenides, unhistorical nature of, 73.
 $\pi\alpha\rho\omega\sigma\iota\alpha$, 75.
 PHOUTRIDES, A. E., The Chorus of Euripides, 77-170.
 Plato, doctrine of ideal forms, 43 sqq.
 extension of Socratic philosophy, 74.
 myth in *Phaedo*, 74.
 Phaedrus of, 74.
 Republic of, 72 sq.

- | | |
|---|---|
| Propriety, doctrine of, and relation to
law of perfect form, 22, 42, 51.
Pythagorean dualism, 75.

Science and poetry, 44 sqq.
<i>σηπεδόνα</i> , 67.
Socrates, and the plane tree, 74.
and the Pythagoreans, 71 sq.
biological interest of, 69. | conversion of, 70.
doctrine of ideas of, 72.
interests of, 70.
philosophy of, 67.

Xenophon, 72.

Zeno, mathematical puzzles of, 69. |
|---|---|

INDEX OF IMPORTANT CITATIONS

- | | |
|---|--|
| <p>Aeschylus, <i>Agam.</i> (750 sqq.), 126.
 <i>Choeph.</i> (935 sqq.), 161; (1025), 144, 159; (1044 sqq.), 118.
 <i>Eumen.</i> (490 sqq.), 162.
 <i>Pers.</i> (821 sqq.), 126.
 <i>Prom.</i> (686 sqq.), 162.
 <i>Sept.</i> (78 sqq.), 161.
 <i>Suppl.</i> (538–590), 98.</p> <p>Aristotle, <i>Metaphys.</i> (984 A 11), 70, n. 1.
 <i>Poetics</i> (1447 A), 55; (1456 A), 92.</p> <p>Athenaeus (4, 10, 181 B), 149; (14, 25, 628 D), 152; (14, 28, 630 C), 151; (14, 30, 631 C), 146, 149.</p> <p>Callimachus, <i>Hymns</i> (2, 11 sqq.), 156.</p> <p>Cicero, <i>Brutus</i> (185, 258), 38.
 <i>de Inv.</i> (1–3), 38.
 <i>de Or.</i> (1, 109), 38; (1, 223), 38; (2, 5), 38; (2, 187), 38.
 <i>Orator</i> (70–75), 38–42.</p> <p>Diogenes Laertius (2, 16–17), 67, n. 1; (10, 12), 67, n. 1.</p> <p>Euripides, <i>Androm.</i> (815 sqq.), 138.
 <i>Bacch.</i> (64 sqq.), 124; (263 sqq.), 125; (370 sqq.), 125; (395 sqq.), 126; (977), 167; (1153 sqq.), 168.
 <i>Cycl.</i> (41 sqq.), 167.
 <i>El.</i> (737 sqq.), 117; (859 sqq.), 166; (988 sqq.), 132.
 <i>Hec.</i> (444 sqq.), 133; (1042), 138.
 <i>Hel.</i> (179 sqq.), 121; (213 sqq.), 116; (1626 sqq.), 136.
 <i>Heraclid.</i> (658), 141; (961 sqq.), 138.</p> | <p><i>Herc.</i> (348–441), 95; (637 sqq.), 96; (655 sqq.), 115; (735–821), 166; (875–921), 166; (1016–1038), 166.</p> <p><i>Hipp.</i> (58 sqq.), 141; (121 sqq.), 120; (141 sqq.), 120; (732 sqq.), 102; (782), 138; (1104 sqq.), 114.</p> <p><i>Ion</i> (492 sqq.), 85.</p> <p><i>Iph. Aul.</i> (168–302; 543 sqq.), 100; (598 sqq.), 132; (794–800), 116.</p> <p><i>Iph. Taur.</i> (1089 sqq.), 102.</p> <p><i>Med.</i> (267), 131; (824 sqq.), 93; (1271 sqq.), 138.</p> <p><i>Orest.</i> (255 sqq.), 118.</p> <p><i>Phoen.</i> (202 sqq.), 87; (638–690), 98; (1018 sqq.), 99.</p> <p><i>Rhes.</i> (672–729), 168; (674 sqq.), 137.</p> <p><i>Suppl.</i> (98 sqq.), 141; (948), 142.</p> <p><i>Tro.</i> (799 sqq.), 103.</p> <p>Eustathius <i>ad. Hom. Il.</i> (18, 590), 150, 159.
 <i>ad Hom. Od.</i> (8, 264), 154, 159.</p> <p>Herodotus (1, 5; 3, 39–46), 126.</p> <p>Homer, <i>Il.</i> (18, 590 sqq.), 147.
 <i>Od.</i> (256–267), 145.</p> <p>Horace, <i>Ars Poetica</i>, 4–37.
 <i>Carmina</i>, 29–32.
 <i>Ep.</i> (1, 19, 21–33), 24–26.
 <i>Epode</i>, 28, 29.</p> <p>Lucian, <i>Saltat.</i> (16), 146, 156, 158; (22), 159; (30), 147.</p> <p>Lucretius (5, 806–817), 67, n. 1.</p> |
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| Pindar, <i>Pyth.</i> (2, 127), 148. | Simplicius, <i>Phys.</i> (25, 19), 70, n. 1. |
| Plato, <i>Ion</i> (534 B), 144. | Sophocles, <i>Aj.</i> (693 sqq.), 160, 163. |
| <i>Parmenides</i> (127 C), 73, n. 1. | <i>Antig.</i> (1115), 163. |
| <i>Phaedo</i> (74 A), 75; (96 B), 69, n. | <i>Oed. Col.</i> (668 sqq.), 94. |
| <i>Repub.</i> (bks. 5, 6, 7), 74; (596–607), | <i>Oed. Rex.</i> (863 sqq.), 122; (1086), |
| 47–50. | 163. |
| <i>Symp.</i> (210 D), 73. | <i>Philoct.</i> (507), 164–165. |
| Plutarch, <i>Moral.</i> (6, 495), 150. | <i>Trach.</i> (205, 633), 164. |
| Proclus, <i>Chrestom.</i> (<i>Phot. Biblioth.</i> 522), | |
| 145. | |

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